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ABSTRACT 
 
This research aims to identify the determinants of the ex-ante risk premium 
required by Italian private equity funds (PEFs) when valuing privately-held 
target companies. In theory, perceived risk is a key driver of expected returns 
and anticipated value, but: “Although PE (private equity) has experienced 
rapid growth, the risk and return profile of this asset class is not well 
understood.” (Jegadeesh et al., 2009).  
 
Some papers have attempted to assess the ex post returns pioneered by 
Lerner & Gompers (1997). Yet such studies reveal both contradictory 
conclusions and hitherto inexplicable phenomena: what some authors call 
the “private equity premium puzzle” (Moskowitz & Jorgensen, 2000). Such 
contradictory conclusions include a wide spread of abnormal realized returns 
ranging from -6% (Phalippou & Gottschalg, 2009) to +32% (Cochrane, 2005). 
 
In this research, the perceived risk and expected return drivers refer not to 
the ex-post realized return that PEF investors actually achieve, but to the 
required return the PEF hopes to gain from the target investment. At this 
stage, two important indicators adopted in PEF parlance have to be 
differentiated: (i) the Expected IRR (E.IRR) and (ii) the Threshold IRR 
(T.IRR). The first is the IRR as an output of a business plan, and the second 
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assesses the return expected by PEFs according to the risk perceived in the 
business plan. Put simply, these are respectively, the anticipated return and 
the (risk-adjusted) required return. 
 
The study of the T.IRR is one of the main contributions of this thesis since it 
has never been studied before by academia as an indicator of the ex-ante 
perceived risk of a PEF target company.  This is partly due to two important 
reasons. First, most previous papers examine ex-post performance, and only 
a few (e.g. Manigart et al., 2002), try to assess return expectations and risk 
perceptions using an ex-ante perspective. Second, most of the prior studies 
are quantitative and try to measure statistical effects captured by the ex-post 
IRR. 
 
By studying 26 deals (in 13 Italian PEFs) in detail (qualitatively and 
quantitatively), this research project has been able to observe how PEFs 
assess risk and estimate the T.IRR. The research project reveals that PEFs 
apply neither rational-based models nor explicit formulae to assess risk ex-
ante. By observing a set of phenomena unique to the PEF sector (fees effect, 
investment speed effect, persistence effect, money-chasing deal 
phenomenon, illiquidity effect, etc) whose existence has been suggested by 
many recent papers, this thesis has been able to propose an adjusted 
version of the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993, 1995) to assess 
risk.  
 
The application of a quasi-rational-based asset pricing model to guide PEFs 
assessments is also an important contribution of this thesis. In fact, Franzoni, 
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Nowak and Phalippou (2010), claim to be the first to calculate the PEFs’ cost 
of capital by applying asset pricing models.  
 
However, their approaches are not only based on the observations of 
realized returns, but also consider only one additional factor to the standard 
Fama & French three-factor model (1993), the liquidity factor. 
 
In contrast,  the results and the model proposed by this thesis are based on 
qualitative and quantitative ex-ante information and include not only the 
classical factors of that model, but also some other factors intended to 
explain some of the phenomena listed above which might also drive the risk 
premium in private equity funds. Based, therefore, on explaining the behavior 
of PEFs, the research develops a framework that can be applied by Italian 
PEFs and perhaps other PEFs in a more rational manner than their past 
behavior suggests. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
 
This chapter introduces the reader to the proposed subject and creates a 
background as to the main objective and the relevance of this research 
project. Section 1.2, gives a brief description of the scope and framework of 
this thesis, followed in section 1.3 by the description of the main 
characteristics of private equity funds, (PEFs). Section 1.4 will introduce the 
scenario of the PEFs by presenting the main procedures and variables 
involved in their deals. Section 1.5 will briefly describe both the 
epistemological approach and the methodology used in this research project. 
Subsequently, section 1.6 will outline the main contributions for both practice 
and academia achieved by this work. Finally, section 1.7 will provide a 
general outline of the whole thesis. 
 
1.2 Scope and framework of the Thesis 
 
This inquiry aims to identify the drivers of the risk premium incorporated in 
the required return (RR) assessed by Italian private equity funds (PEFs) for 
valuing their privately-held target companies (PHCs). By studying both 
valuation models used to calculate the internal rate of return, (IRR) and also 
particular risk situations found in selected PEFs’ deals, this research study 
intends to reveal the ex-ante (Return expectations and risk perceptions in an 
ex-ante perspective) risk-return drivers which determine the RR for valuing 
privately-held companies (PHCs). 
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The phrase “ex-ante risk-return drivers” does not refer to the final realized 
return that the private equity investors will receive, but refers to the required 
return that a PEF expects to gain from its investments (in an ex-ante 
perspective). Therefore, the main questions to be explored are:  
- What is the nature of the factors incorporated in the RR? Are they 
rational? Do they respond to the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) as 
developed for organized markets? Do they have some relationship 
with the factors included in the capital asset pricing models (CAPMs)? 
Do all of them have a risk dimension? Do they respond to some other 
theory outside the realm of traditional finance? 
- How can the risk drivers for a PEF portfolio and for each single deal, 
be measured (in an ex-ante perspective)?  
- What is the value of the RR and, therefore, the adequate premium to 
offset all the risks and costs involved in the target deal? In this sense, 
this work will propose a model which, although perhaps far from 
perfect, will set the basis for a new and more complete criterion to 
approach and assess PEFs’ deals. 
  
These are the questions that this study will try to answer and make a 
contribution for both academia and practitioners thus offering more effective 
and suitable solutions than those employed nowadays which are highly 
subjective and arbitrary in nature.  
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1.3  Private Equity: Definition and a Brief introduction 
 
According to the European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association 
(EVCA) definition:  
 
“Private Equity is a provision of equity capital by financial investors – over the 
medium- or long-term – to non-quoted companies with high growth potential.” 
(EVCA, 2007:6). 
 
PEFs can be used to develop new products and technologies, to expand 
working capital, to make acquisitions. They can also resolve ownership and 
management issues – a succession in family-owned companies, or the buy-
out or buy-in of a business by experienced managers may be achieved using 
private equity funds. 
 
The main purpose of such investment vehicles is to increase the value of the 
PEF target companies in the medium-term (between 3 and 5 years) and to 
provide an adequate remuneration (A premium which compensates for the 
risk involved in the operation) for the PEFs at the end of the investment 
period.   
 
“Private equity (PE) refers to equity securities in private companies that are 
not publicly traded.” (Jegadeesh et al. 2009:2).  
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The praxis normally distinguishes between Venture Capital and Private 
Equity. The first focuses on the early start-up stages of a company life-cycle. 
The second is aimed at adding value at a more advanced phase of a 
company life-cycle. This thesis will be focused on the more mature stages of 
a company life-cycle and therefore will refer only to the term “private equity 
funds” (PEFs).  
 
The development of the PEF has helped to shape the modern world financial 
system, at least, until the onset of the financial crisis. To have an idea of this 
impact it is useful to look at the figures presented in one such worldwide 
research study conducted by Morgan Stanley (2007)1 in which the total 
amount invested by PEFs in 2006 exceeded US$1,300 billion2 with an 
average annual growth rate of 24% (from 1980 to 2007). Furthermore, the 
capital collected exhibited an overall growth of 260% between 2003 and 
20063 (Cornelius et al. 2007).  
 
In 2011, the total amount invested worldwide was US$ 2,400 billion 
(TheCityUK Private Equity 2011). In Europe, in 2010, there were 1,696 active 
PEFs managing € 523 billion (EVCA yearbook 2011). In Italy, in 2010, there 
were 272 active PEFs with a total amount invested of € 21,5 billion in 1,160 
companies (AIFI yearbook, 2011). 
 
                                                 
1Big is better: Growth and Market Structure in Global Buyouts, Cornelius, Langerlaar, Van 
Rossum (2007). 
2 Cumulated amount still invested in deals and valued at the acquisition value. 
3 Capital collected in 2006 divided by the capital collected in 2003. 
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Michael Jensen (1989) predicted the eclipse of public equity by private equity 
and, in fact, in 2004, The Economist dubbed private equity funds as 
“Capitalism’s new kings”4 which have become bigger than public equity 
markets (Moskowitz and Jorgensen, 2000). 
 
Despite the explosive growth of the importance of PEFs in the economy, 
there is still a limited understanding of the economic characteristics of this 
industry:  
 
“Little is actually known about what private equity funds do, and how they add 
value.” (Jenkinson, 2008:2).  
 
Nowadays, there are three major areas of debate:  
x First, the question whether private equity funds enhance macro-
economic growth5.  
x Second, the information advantages of allocating savings through the 
private equity channel.  
x Third, the rate of return determinants and characteristics of private 
equity funds’ (PEFs) investments.  
 
As described in section 1.2, this thesis will specifically focus on the third 
issue in the Italian private equity sector. However, most papers use the word 
“performance” implying an ex-post focus which this study does not intend to 
                                                 
4 27 November 2004, The Economist. 
5 See Gompers and Lerner (1999) and Caselli and Gatti (2004) for a Europe-focused 
analysis and discussion. 
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Figure 1.1 shows the following steps for a typical LBO example: 
- Firstly, the PEF creates a new company (NewCo) with equity and 
leverage. 
- The NewCo then buys out some or all of the shares held by the 
entrepreneur. 
- The NewCo is then merged with the target company. 
- Thereafter, the company creates value with the help of the PEF: By 
eliminating the operating inefficiencies and by optimizing the overall 
performance.  
- There are five ways in which PEFs can exit an investment: Trade sale, 
entrepreneur or management team repurchase, sale of the investment 
to another financial purchaser or secondary buy-out, initial public 
offering (IPO), and liquidation.  
- Finally, Figure 1.1 shows, on opposite sides, two eyes looking out on 
two different perspectives: The ex-ante perspective and the ex-post 
perspective. The first has to do with the initial valuation of the target 
company, risk perceptions and return expectations. The second 
instead, looks at past performance, realized return and realized 
premium. Most academic papers concentrate on this second 
perspective (as shown in chapter 3). By contrast, the challenge of this 
thesis is directed at studying the first perspective, where there is a 
distinct gap in academic knowledge. 
The most commonly-used measure of performance within the private equity 
sector is the internal rate of return or IRR which is the 
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“rate of discount which equates the present value of the cash outflows 
associated with an investment with the sum of the present value of the cash 
inflows accruing from it and the present value of the valuation of the 
unrealised portfolio.” (EVCA, 2006:25). 
 
For the purpose of this thesis, it is important to identify two groups of IRRs: 
The first looks at the return expectations and risk perception based on future 
business plans. The second explores realized returns: This IRR is measured 
only when all investments have been realized and the cash has been paid to 
the PEF. This pure IRR is also known as the net (‘cash-on-cash’) return on 
the wholly-realized investment portfolio and it is calculated by the cash 
multiple ratio: Cash Out / Cash In. 
 
1.5      Research Approach 
 
Past research in this field rests on inductive reasoning: Researchers in this 
field infer causations and build explanatory models (generalizations) by 
looking at past statistical information.  In addition, recent research6 has 
developed models for the PEFs’ premium using adjusted capital asset pricing 
models  (CAPMs) (For instance: Korteweg & Sorensen, 2009; Franzoni et. al, 
2010).  
 
                                                 
6 See chapter 3 for the literature review in this field. 
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This thesis will take a completely different approach in order to complement 
past research. First: Risk perceptions and return expectations cannot be 
inferred by looking only at past information: 
 
“We strongly suggest that the investment community draw a distinction 
between past excess returns (observed returns from the past) and expected 
risk premiums (expected return differences in the future) to avoid continued 
confusion and to reduce the dangerous temptation to merely extrapolate past 
excess returns in shaping expectations for the risk premium.” (Arnott & 
Bernstein, 2002:82).  
 
“Given the large standard errors of historical estimates, and the likelihood 
that risks and equity premiums are non-stationary, one cannot determine a 
precise, forward-looking expected premium.” (Dimson et al., 2008:467) 
 
“We cannot directly infer a causal effect from a statistical effect.” (Marsh, 
1988: 229). 
 
Second: In order to avoid both the danger of falling into weak induction and 
the temptation of relying only on theories and models developed for 
organized markets (like the EMH and the CAPM), it is desirable to adopt an 
approach that allows researchers to interview PEFs’ managers and discuss 
in depth how exactly they behave in the field: What are their risk perceptions 
and return expectations and how they really consider them in their valuations. 
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“Due to the specific characteristics of the private equity asset class, e.g. the 
illiquidity of the investment, the stickiness of fund flows, the restricted number 
of target companies and the segmentation from other asset classes, the 
market may be far away from being frictionless and perfectly competitive, at 
least in the short run.”(Diller and Kaserer, 2007:3). 
 
Therefore, in order to understand the nature of the risk-return relationships in 
this asset class, instead of analyzing only past statistical data or addressing 
questionnaires by telephone (as the majority of previous studies do), this 
research has conducted in-depth interviews with practitioners, analyzed 
several deals, qualitatively and quantitatively, thus revealing the determinants 
that are priced by PEFs in an ex-ante perspective.  
 
The key innovation of this research project (in terms of methodology) is that it 
looks at the ex-ante IRR (That is: return expectations and perceived risks) 
through a qualitative, case-based research methodology directed at revealing  
phenomena within the context and through an explanatory approach able to 
reach sufficiently far back along the causal chain.  
 
The case study method is an ideal strategy when “how” or “why” questions 
are being posed: 
 
“The distinctive need for case studies arises out of the desire to understand 
complex social phenomena.” (Yin, 2003:2).  
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In other words, this thesis intends to complement the recent quantitative 
studies with a more qualitative approach capable of finding causations and 
explanations (that is, the determinants of the RR) without inferring them from 
statistical patterns. In this sense, a qualitative approach through interviews 
was adopted to understand causations of patterns.  
 
To summarize, referring to the Burrell and Morgan spectrum (Burrell & 
Morgan, 1979), this research project will be positioned (like past research 
studies) in the objectivist approach, that is, adopting realism regarding the 
ontological question, and positivist regarding the epistemological question. 
 
However, contrary to past research studies in this area, this research 
approach will be completely different in terms of methodology. In fact, similar 
research methods can belong to either an objective or subjective 
philosophical approach having a dual utilization. For instance, case studies 
(the methodology chosen for this research project) which involve in-depth 
interviews, have frequently been regarded as a primarily qualitative method. 
However, increasingly, researchers relying on the case study method have 
quantified the answers in order to conduct statistical analysis of case-study 
results (in the accounting and finance sphere, some examples can be found 
in Kaplan & Norton, 1993 and Barkham et al., 1996). 
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1.6 Contribution  
 
There are no previous studies analyzing in detail the determinants of the ex-
ante IRR. Specifically, there are no theories nor models using tools or drivers 
outside traditional finance besides those of the CAPM and the EMH models.  
 
Therefore, this project aims to make a contribution to the following specific 
areas:  
1. Corporate finance and valuation: In particular, to the risk-return 
nature and drivers of both private equity funds and privately-held 
companies: By revealing the determinants of the RR (that is, 
causes behind the RR), this project will be shedding some light on 
the valuation issues and theory. 
2. Strategic finance and risk management: by revealing the risk 
premium drivers, this thesis aims to help GPs to assess a more 
value-oriented strategy in terms of investment decisions and 
portfolio management. In addition, although this work is not about 
hedging, it will contribute to GPs’ decision-making in terms of 
finding new ways to both manage and mitigate the risk of the PEF 
portfolio. 
3. This type of study is unique for Italy where there is no previous 
research experience in this area. In fact, being younger and less 
developed than in other EU countries like the UK or France, the 
Italian private equity sector still tends to be very reluctant to reveal 
information.  
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4. As mentioned in section 1.5, this project also makes a contribution 
in terms of methodology in relation to work in this area. This project 
adopts a different approach: The use of critical realism and 
positivism like previous research studies, but using an explanatory 
case study method based on in-depth interviews in the field.  
 
Overall, it will make a distinctive contribution to PEFs who will be able to 
better understand the nature of their value drivers in the inefficient privately-
held markets. After the completion of this study, they will be able to better 
assess their valuations by classifying the determinants of the RR (value 
drivers) and by calculating its final value, according to a new model which will 
consider both rational and irrational factors. In other words, these 
contributions are positive and normative respectively, since they aim to 
explain how the drivers work as well as to recommend how to assess them. 
 
This research project is more appropriate for a DBA thesis than an orthodox 
PhD, since it mainly deals with a significant business problem and needs to 
explore deeply the practitioners’ arena thus being capable of offering 
practical advice within the context of a theoretical framework. However, there 
is also a contribution to academic knowledge. After the completion of this 
study, academia will benefit from a new, semi-rational valuation model 
applicable to contrast with the more overtly rational ones proposed by 
orthodox valuation theory.  Figure 1.2 shows a spectrum in which this project 
can be located. 
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        Figure 1.2 Research Spectrum        
 
       Source: Author’s own work 
 
1.7 General Outline of the Thesis 
 
This thesis consists of nine chapters. Chapter 2 will review and discuss the 
literature regarding the market equity premium, the EMH, the CAPM, and the 
relatively new behavioural theory. In addition, chapter 3 will deal with the 
literature review studying the risk premium in private equity funds. Chapter 4 
will explain the epistemological and methodological approach adopted in this 
research. Subsequently, Chapter 5 will exhibit the data collected during the 
interviews. Chapter 6 will analyze the data quantitatively. Thereafter, chapter 
7 will propose an explanatory model directed at both revealing all the risk 
premium determinants and improving GPs’ strategic decisions. Chapter 8 will 
propose a quantitative model based on the explanation and analysis of 
chapter 7. Finally, chapter 9 will conclude by outlining the main contribution 
of this thesis as well as its weaknesses, leaving the door open for future 
research. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW PART I – THE MARKET RISK PREMIUM 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
As stated in the previous chapter, in comparison with other areas in finance, 
knowledge in the arena of the firm risk-premium and risk–return drivers of the 
private equity sector is very limited. For the listed firms, the risk premium 
derives from the market risk premium, which itself is a subject of controversy. 
This presents two issues: First, what the value of the market risk premium 
(one of the most important contemporary issues in financial economics 
Dimson et al., 2003, 2008): Second, is it acceptable to adopt the organised 
market premium for use by PEFs firms? 
  
As the scope of this thesis is to investigate the ex-ante risk-return 
characteristics of PEFs aiming to propose a model directed at estimating the 
required premium for their privately-held company (PHC) targets, it is 
necessary to examine this essential concept in finance in order to assist the 
positioning of the present study.  
 
For decades, researchers have been trying to answer this question and there 
are still conflicting theories and a diversity of opinions which have yet to be 
reconciled. Most of the difficulties found in coming to a consensus regarding 
the equity premium are rooted in the anomalies found in theories developed 
by traditional finance. Such anomalies might reveal investors’ irrational 
behavior and seem to contradict the EMH (at least in its strong form).  
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Since PEFs have to deal with privately-held company markets (PHCMs), it is 
important to approach the concept of the market premium in situations where 
lack of information and irrational behavior are more pronounced than in 
organized markets.  
 
However, since valuation models applied to PHCMs are inherited from 
assumptions developed to assess risk and returns in organized markets, it is 
first necessary to explore theories proposed for such markets. 
 
Therefore, the first part of the chapter discusses the market risk premium: 
section two of this chapter will start by exploring the main assumptions of the 
traditional finance theory and its implications. Section three will analyze 
current discussions regarding the value of the market premium for organized 
markets. Section four will briefly examine anomalies found in these markets, 
that is; the price deviation from the fundamental values established by 
traditional and rational models upon which the EMH relies. Section five will 
briefly outline some concepts of the behavioural finance theory (BFT). 
 
A later part of the chapter discusses the single stock premium (cross 
sectional studies): Section 2.6 starts studying single stocks risk premium by 
introducing the Fama and French three-factor model (1993). In fact, this 
model partially captured the cross-sectional variation in past average returns 
(single type of firms’ anomalies - backward-looking). However, this model is 
also useful to predict future returns (forward-looking). Actually, the title of the 
Fama and French paper (1993) is “The Cross-section of Expected Returns. 
Finally, section 2.7 analyse the risk premium in privately held companies 
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(which are the targets of the PEFs). This last section is about single firms in 
PHCs where anomalies and the concept of Jensen’s alpha introduced in 
section 2.6 are particularly important.  
 
2.2 Introduction to the Traditional Finance Theory – The EMH. 
 
The EMH has been the central pillar of finance theory over the last 40 years. 
According to traditional theory, stock prices must equal fundamental values 
due to the facts that all investors are rational and that arbitrage7 eliminates 
any price anomaly. Fama has defined:  
 
“an efficient financial market as one in which security prices always fully 
reflect the available information.” Fama (1970: 383). 
 
Jensen stated:  
 
“There is no other proposition in economics which has more solid empirical 
evidence supporting it than the EMH.” Jensen (1978: 95). 
 
The EMH explicitly assumes rationality. Rationality implies: Firstly, that 
investors are risk-averse; Secondly, that they are unbiased in their forecasts; 
Thirdly, that they respond instantaneously to new information. Moreover, the 
                                                 
7 Arbitrage Definition: Attempting to profit by exploiting price differences between 
identical or similar financial instruments, on different markets. The arbitrage pricing theory 
(APT) was developed by Stephen Ross (1976:346). 
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acceptance of the EMH allowed researchers like William Sharpe (1964), to 
introduce the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM); a construct which can be 
empirically tested by its capability to predict past returns8. The CAPM, which 
is interdependent with the EMH (they are called joint hypotheses), extended 
Harry Markowitz's portfolio theory to introduce the notions of systematic and 
specific risk9.  
 
2.2.1 Theoretical foundations for the EMH 
 
The EMH is based on three interrelated concepts. First, the investors are 
rational. Second, if some of them are not, their interactions are random and 
non-correlated thus eliminating any irrational impact on pricing. Third, if some 
of them are not correlated, the rational arbitrageurs present in the market 
offset the non-correlated irrationality of the markets.   
 
The first assumption implies that all investors should value each stock 
according to its fundamental value: 
 
“A rational investor assesses a stock by its fundamental value.” (Blanchard 
2000:257) 
 
                                                 
8 One of the first empirical studies that found evidence for the CAPM was that of Black, 
Jensen and Scholes (1972). These authors found that the relationship between the average 
return and beta is almost linear and the portfolios with high (low) betas have high (low) 
average returns. 
9 See Modiglioni and Miller (1958). 
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That is: Valuation is the mechanism by which investors trade cash today for 
future claims on cash flows and the value refers to those future cash flows 
discounted at a rate which incorporates their levels of systematic risk.  
 
Additionally, research by Samuelson (1965) and Mandelbrot (1966) 
supported the first assumption by showing how in competitive markets, with 
risk-neutral rational investors, returns are unpredictable and stock prices 
follow a “random walk”. According to Fama (1970), rationality implied the 
impossibility of earning superior risk-adjusted returns. Under this perspective, 
investors cannot beat the market. 
 
The third assumption has been studied in detail by Friedman (1953) and 
Fama (1965). Friedman (1953) observed that competition amongst 
arbitrageurs will ensure that irrational traders will tend to accumulate losses 
and to reduce their wealth, leaving the arena open to rational investors. If 
either response is correct, prices will return to equilibrium and market 
efficiency will hold. 
 
2.2.2 Empirical foundations for the EMH 
 
The empirical evidence found in the 1960s and 1970s seemed to support the 
EMH. In general, the empirical implications of the EMH can be divided into 
two important categories. Firstly, the rapid and exact price response to 
relevant information. Secondly, the non-reaction to irrelevant information. 
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Fama (1970) revealed three types of information by which three levels of the 
EMH can be defined. First: The weak-form by which prices are based on past 
information. In this case, it is impossible to earn risk-adjusted excess profits 
or to make accurate predictions by looking at past stock price movements 
(Fama 1965). Second: The semi-strong form (pioneered by Fama et al., 
1969) in which prices are based on all available public information. This is the 
case where it is only possible to earn risk-adjusted excess profits by getting 
“inside information”. Third: the strong-form by which even inside information 
is incorporated into pricing. Fama (1965) demonstrated the weak-form and 
showed evidence regarding the semi-strong form.  
 
The non-reaction to irrelevant information was particularly studied by Scholes 
(1972:179) through his “substitution hypothesis”, in which he showed that the 
accessibility of close substitutes for a security, leads to extremely low impact 
on the stock price, as this is determined not by share supply but by the 
relative price of the alternative asset.  
 
No market is believed to be strong-form efficient. However, various studies 
tried to challenge this statement by confirming the existence of inside 
information. Neiderhoffer and Osborne (1966:897) showed that specialists 
from the NYSE obtained superior returns using their monopolistic access to 
the book of limit order10.  
 
                                                 
10 A limit order is an order to buy a security at no more (or sell at no less) than a specific 
price. This gives the customer some control over the price at which the trade is executed, but 
may prevent the order from being executed. 
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The next section will deal with deal with the value of the market risk premium. 
The value of the market risk premium is a key issue in financial economics 
since it is critical for asset allocation and wealth projections for individual 
investors. It is also used in calculating a company’s cost of capital.  
 
2.3 The Value of the Market Risk Premium. 
 
In finance, the risk premium percentage can be defined as the expected rate 
of return above the risk-free interest rate.  As a consequence, the risk 
premium helps to drive the allocation of resources, at a micro- and a macro-
economic level.  
 
“One of the most important contemporary issues in finance is the magnitude 
of the equity risk premium.” (Dimson et al., 2003:1).   
 
2.3.1 Current Academic Discussion and Different Approaches 
 
Nowadays, the discussion (both in academia and practice) about what is the 
value of the risk market premium is a central issue in financial economics. 
 
The most commonly-used method to estimate the equity premium is an 
extrapolation of the historical realized equity premium into the future. Brealey 
and Myers (1996:180) advised this method and suggested a premium 
between 8% and 8.5% as sourced from the Ibbotson 1995 yearbook. 
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However, historical averages are widely criticized and present many 
limitations. From an epistemological point of view, by using the past 
premium, it is assumed that investor expectations and their risk perceptions 
are only based on past realized returns. In fact, the equity premium could be 
based on other drivers like: changes in the level of investors’ risk aversion 
(the higher the risk aversion, the higher the required rates of return), 
variations in stock volatility (the higher the volatility, the higher the required 
stock returns), future macroeconomic expectations11, etc. 
 
Many researchers (e.g. Fama and French 2002, Campbell and Shiller 1988, 
and Blanchard 1993) instead of using the CAPM, have used predictive 
regressions of fundamentals12. For instance: Fama and French (2002) aimed 
at estimating the equity premium in the US markets using realized dividend 
and earnings growth rates to measure the expected rate of capital gain over 
two periods: 1872-1950 and 1951-2000. These estimates for the period 
1951-2000, 2.55 percent (dividend growth model) and 4.32 percent (earnings 
growth model), are much lower than the equity premium produced by the 
average stock return, 7.43 percent. Hence, discussions about the puzzle 
intensified. 
  
                                                 
11 This could be the case of removal of trade barriers which might be non-repeatable and 
imply projections for the premium that deviate from the past. 
12Future expected returns relies on the observation that, in the very long run, expected 
corporate payouts and expected investments returns must be equal. The stock price today 
must be the present value of all future dividend payouts (dividend method) or earnings 
(earnings method). 
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Since fundamentals are more precise (given the lower standard errors), 
Fama and French (2002) suggested that the output given by fundamentals is 
closer to real past expectations. These authors concluded that “the expected 
equity premium of the last 50 years is probably far below the realized 
premium.” (p.658). The main conclusion was that the average stock return of 
the last half-century was a lot higher than expectations, suggesting that 
fundamentals are better estimators of past expectations. 
  
Furthermore, although there are three ways according to financial theory by 
which capital gains could be upwardly biased (realistic cash flows with low 
discount rates; optimistic cash flows with normal discount rates or high 
growth expectations in 1950; both effects acting together), the authors took a 
courageous step by suggesting that the high value for the second period is 
due only to a decline in discount rates.  
 
Blanchard (1993) also observed a decrease in the equity premium after 
1950. He concluded that decreases in the equity premium are likely to 
translate to both an increase in expected bond rates and a decrease in 
expected rates of return on stocks (discount rates). From a different path, he 
arrived at a similar conclusion to Fama and French (2002). 
 
Claus and Thomas (2001) arrived at similar conclusions regarding the high 
value of the equity premium. However, they addressed the problem from the 
evidence of survivor-bias and suggested that the equity premium estimates 
were biased upward because a great deal of optimism can be found in 
earnings forecasts (problems in cash flows instead of discount rates). 
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However, few researchers have agreed on the equity premium being over-
estimated (as Fama and French (2002), Blanchard (1993), and Claus and 
Thomas (2001) have suggested) and one would expect most analysts to 
continue advising investors about future expectations based on the 
commonly recognized average equity premium (between 5 and 6 percent, 
according to most authors).  
 
Another method used to estimate the expected equity premium is based on 
calculations of what reasonable expected rates of return are necessary to 
entice investor to be indifferent between investing in stocks and bonds, given 
historical aggregate volatility and covariances. Mehra and Prescott (1985), 
using that approach estimate a value between 1% and 3%. This method 
might be more consistent with how PEFs might assess the premium in an ex-
ante perspective and will be addressed in coming chapters.  
 
In summary, there are wide discrepancies in estimating the equity premium: 
both the ex-ante equity premium (past expectations) and the ex-post equity 
premium (realized returns). Therefore, there are even more divergences in 
assessing the current expected (ex-ante) equity premium. The range is 
between -10% and +20%, depending on the source of the forecast and the 
method used to calculate it. However, since this thesis is concerned with an 
ex-ante perspective, it is important to underline that a negative market 
required risk premium makes no economic sense since no individual would 
be willing to invest. 
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2.3.2 The Value of the Market Risk Premium in Practice. 
 
Nowadays, investors have more cause than ever to ask what returns they 
can expect from equities, and what the future risk-reward tradeoff is likely to 
be (Dimson et al., 2008). This is also true for private equity funds whose risk 
premium will be the target of this thesis. 
 
In 1998, Ivo Welch started to study the opinions of 226 financial economists 
who were asked to forecast the average annual market risk premium over the 
next 30 years. Their mean forecast was 7.1%; the median was 7.0%; and the 
range ran from 1% to 15%. (Welch, 2000). On the other hand, macro-
economists argued at the time that even the 7% seemed too high and stated 
that stock prices had risen in the 1990s because rational and informed 
investors required and expected lower future equity rates of return (between 
1% and 3% over a 30-year horizon) (Welch, 2000).  
 
In August 2001, Welch updated his earlier survey and found that the 
respondents to the follow-up questionnaire had revised their estimates 
downward by an average of 1.6%. They now estimated an equity premium 
averaging 5.5% over a 30-year horizon, and 3.4% over a one-year horizon.  
 
Figure 2.1 shows in the first bar that the arithmetic mean premium based on 
the Ibbotson Yearbook data was 8.9% per year. The second bar shows that 
the key finance textbooks were on average suggesting a premium of 8.5%, a 
little below the Ibbotson mean (authors were shading the Ibbotson estimates 
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downward). The Welch survey mean is in turn lower than the textbook 
figures, but according to Dimson et al. (2008), since the respondents claimed 
to lower their forecasts when the equity market rises, this may be attributable 
to the market’s strong performance in the 1990s. 
 
Figure 2.1 Estimated Risk Premiums. 
                                           
                       Source: Dimson et al. (2008) 
 
However, according to Dimson et al. (2008), predictions of the long-term 
equity premium should not be so sensitive to short-term stock market 
fluctuations. The changing consensus might reflect new approaches to 
estimating the premium or new facts such as evidence from other countries.  
 
Dimson et al., (2003) shed light on the matter of the future expected premium 
by extending the analysis of long periods of capital market history beyond the 
US markets. Table 2.1 shows the historical equity risk premium for 16 
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countries over 103-years (1900-2005)13. It also exhibits equity premiums for 
the world equity index, which is a 16-country, common-currency (here taken 
as U.S. dollars) index with each country weighted by its beginning-of-period 
market capitalization or (in earlier years) its GDP14. 
 
Table 2.1 Annualized Equity Premium for 17 Countries, 1900 - 2005                  
 
Source: Dimson et al. (2008) 
 
The left half of Table 2.1 shows premiums relative to bills, and the right half 
shows premiums relative to government bonds. Each half of Table 2.1 shows 
the annualized, or geometric mean, equity premium over 106 years, the 
arithmetic mean of the 106 one-year premiums, the standard error of the 
                                                 
13 “Over the entire period, the annualized world equity risk premium relative to bills was 
4.74 percent, compared with 5.51 percent for the U.S. Part of this difference, however, 
reflects the strength of the dollar.” (Dimson et al. 2008). 
14 Authors use market capitalization weights from 1968 onward and GDP (gross domestic 
product) weights before then due to the lack of reliable comprehensive data on country 
capitalizations prior to that date. 
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arithmetic mean, and the standard deviation of the 106 one-year premiums. 
Table 2.1 shows that the arithmetic mean annual premium relative to bills for 
the U.S. was 7.4% compared with 5.9% for the world excluding the U.S. 
market. According to the authors, this difference of 1.5% supports the notion 
that it is dangerous to extrapolate from the U.S. experience because of ex 
post-success bias.  
 
Italy had the highest arithmetic equity premium at 10.5%, followed by Japan 
at 9.8%, France at 9.3%, and Germany at 9.1%. Part of the explanation for 
these rich premiums lies in the high historical volatilities (standard deviations) 
in these four markets, and part of this volatility is rooted in the first half of the 
20th century when these countries were affected by the world wars. 
However, it is possible to observe that these countries still had above-
average geometric equity premiums, despite their below-average equity 
market returns. This is due to the very poor historical bill and/or bond returns 
in these four countries. 
  
Dimson et al. (2008), underlined the difference in two concepts which are 
sometimes confused: The historical risk premium and the expected risk 
premium15. The first is the only one that can be measured and is called by 
some authors excess return16. In contrast, the risk premium should denote 
the expected reward from equity investment. 
                                                 
15 Something similar occurs in PEFs with the ex-post IRR and the ex-ante IRR, but this issue 
will be addressed in chapter 3. 
16 Even over a 10-year period, the historical market risk premium was sometimes negative 
(between 1970s and 1980 for instance). It is obvious that Investors could not expect negative 
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Arnott and Bernstein emphasized the importance of differentiating between 
the observed excess returns and the prospective risk premium:  
 
“These are two fundamental different concepts that unfortunately carry the 
same label – risk premium. If we distinguish between past excess returns 
and future expected risk premiums, the idea that future risk premiums should 
be different from past excess returns is not at all unreasonable.” Arnott and 
Bernstein (2002:64). 
 
This difference is very important for the purpose of this thesis which is aimed 
at understanding the required risk premium and future expectations of PEFs. 
Arnott and Bernstein continued, stating:  
 
“We strongly suggest that the investment community draw a distinction 
between past excess returns (observed returns from the past) and expected 
risk premiums (expected return differences in the future) to avoid continued 
confusion and to reduce the dangerous temptation to merely extrapolate past 
excess returns in shaping expectations for the risk premium. This habit is an 
important source of confusion that, quite literally, (mis)shapes decisions 
about the management of trillions in assets worldwide. We propose that the 
investment community begin applying the label “risk premium” only to 
expected future return differences and apply the label “excess returns” to 
observed historical return differences.” Arnott and Bernstein (2002:82). 
                                                                                                                                          
returns or otherwise they should not have invested. Therefore, history (according to Dimson 
et al. 2003, even with a full century of data, market fluctuations can have an impact) can 
distort investors’ expectations.   
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In addition, Arnott and Bernstein (2002) made another important distinction: 
Expected returns and expected risk premiums are rooted in objective data 
and defensible expectations for portfolio returns, rather than in the returns 
that an investor might hope to earn.  
 
“The distinction is subtle; both represent expectations, but one is objective 
and the other subjective.” Arnott and Bernstein (2002:65) 
 
With these concepts in mind, Arnott and Bernstein (2002) tried to assess 
what investors might have objectively expected in 1926 when the Ibbotson 
series started.  To achieve the target, they applied the following concepts: 
When referring to expected returns or expected risk premiums, they were 
referring to the estimated future returns and risk premiums that an objective 
evaluation-based on past rates of growth of the economy, past and 
prospective rates of inflation, current stock and bond yields, and so forth-
might have supported at the time. They arrived at the conclusion that the risk 
premium that investors might objectively have expected was about 2.4 
percent, half of what most investors expect.  
 
In addition, Dimson et al., (2008) argued that since all the series shown in 
Table 2.1 refer to the past, and in order to use an estimate for the equity risk 
premium in discounting future cash flows, it is necessary to look at the 
expected future risk premium using current levels of volatilities17. Therefore, 
                                                 
17 Volatility can be measured by the standard deviation and this is shown in Table 2.1. 
However, past standard deviation is a poor predictor of future volatility, especially since 
44 
 
Dimson et al., (2008) estimate the expected future arithmetic mean premium 
for each country, replacing the historical difference between the arithmetic 
and geometric means with a difference based on current risk estimates. With 
such adjustments, the authors propose a premium of 6.8% for the US and 
5.6 % for the world index. 
 
But the adjustments do not stop here. Dimson et al. (2008) also observed 
that a comparison between the first and the second halves of the 102-year 
period make another important point to be considered. In fact, over the first 
half of the twentieth century, the arithmetic average world equity risk 
premium relative to bills was 4.1%, whereas over the period 1950-2005, it 
was 7.7%. 
 
Dimson et al. (2008), and many other authors, suggested that the large risk 
premium achieved during the second half of the century is attributable to 
three main factors: 
- First: Unexpected growth in productivity and efficiency, accelerating 
technological change, and enhancements to the quality of 
management and corporate governance. After the second world war, 
expectations for improvement were limited to what could be imagined 
at that time, and reality could easily have exceeded investors’ 
expectations (cash flows grew faster than investors anticipated) 
                                                                                                                                          
some sources of extreme volatility (such as hyperinflation) are unlikely to recur (Dimson et 
al., 2003).  
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- Second: A fall in the required return due to diminished both business 
and investment risk. This was due to the following factors: increase in 
international trade flows, the end of the cold war, and increasing 
benefits because of diversification which allows investors to lower their 
risk exposure without detriment to expected returns. 
- Third: transactions and monitoring costs are also lower now than a 
century ago. 
 
Having these mentioned factors in mind, Dimson et al. (2008) tried to 
estimate them in order to convert the pure historical estimate of the risk 
premium into a forward-looking projection. Their estimations are shown in 
Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2 Inferring Expectations from the Historical Premium 
            
The first bar of the figure shows the historical risk premium. This includes the 
contribution from unanticipated growth in the cash flows and the gain from 
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falls in the required risk premium. The authors therefore explained the impact 
of these two factors as follows18: 
- The impact of unanticipated cash flows: This can be estimated by 
using fundamentals, as Fama and French (2002) did, that is, by 
calculating the past real dividend growth. In other words, the long-term 
real dividend growth rate is used to make projections of future growth. 
- The impact of a fall in the required return: This can be assessed by 
using the price / dividend ratio (the reciprocal of the dividend yield). 
The authors assumed that the increase in the price/dividend ratio is 
attributable solely to a long-term fall in the required risk premium19. 
 
Finally, these last adjustments (made by looking at past dividend growth and 
dividend yield) need to be converted by assessing them using current 
volatility. Using projected standard deviations Dimson et al. (2008) arrive at 
the following conclusion: 
The prospective arithmetic risk premium for the US markets will be 5.3% and 
3.9% for the world index.  
Table 2.2 summarizes all the values for the equity premium seen in this 
section:  
 
                                                 
18 They used the same method proposed by Fama and French (2002) who achieved similar 
results. 
19 The change is in part a reflection of expected future growth in real dividends. However, to 
keep things simpler, Dimson et al. (2008) assumed that such changes reflect only the fall in 
required return.  
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          Table 2.2 Values for the Equity Premium - Summary 
Author Future EPV 
Ibbotson Series 8.9% 
Most Finance Textbooks 8.5% 
Welch (2000)  (survey 1998) 7.1% 
Welch (2000)  (survey 2001) 5.5% 
Dimson et al., (2008) US premium 5.3% 
Dimson et al., (2008) World index premium 3.9% 
Mehra and Prescott (1985) 1% - 3% 
Arnott and Bernstein (2002) 0% - 2% 
 
These discrepancies in both the value of the premium and the methodologies 
to estimate it, lead one to question the main assumptions of the financial 
theory and as a consequence has led to a lengthening debate in academic 
finance about the major basic concepts which stand behind the assessment 
of the equity premium. 
 
2.4 Criticism of the EMH and the Birth of the BFT 
 
Although the studies of the 1960s and 1970s presented in section 2.2 might 
support the EMH, the numerous anomalies found in the last three decades 
have raised many issues that call into question the foundations of the 
financial theory, as to whether markets are efficient and arbitrage-free.  This 
section will review the literature addressing this long-standing debate. 
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2.4.1 Theoretical Attacks on the EMH. 
 
The argument against rationality started with a series of papers from 
Kahneman and Tversky (1972, 1973 and 1974). These authors stated that 
individuals, in making predictions under uncertainty, ignore prior information 
and use certain heuristics in making decisions. According to these authors, 
distortions should not be regarded as an exception or an expression of 
human stupidity, but rather the normality "generated" by the same cognitive 
constraints that Simon (1979) argued underlie the bounded rationality of 
human behaviour.  
 
Kahneman and Riepe (1998) stated that investors do not look at the final 
level of wealth that can be achieved, instead they look at losses and profits in 
relation to some particular conditions which could vary from individual to 
individual. For instance: loss-aversion.  Shiller argued that:  
 
“investor sentiment behaves like epidemics and noise traders may behave 
socially and follow each other’s mistakes by listening to rumours or imitating 
their neighbours.” Shiller (1984:457). 
 
The EMH, therefore, should depend on the activities of arbitrageurs who 
should redirect the prices to their fundamental values. However, the central 
claim of the BFT, in contrast with that of traditional theory, is the assumption 
that the efficacy of arbitrage in the real world is limited because it depends on 
the presence of close substitutes for those securities which are under the 
influence of noise trading. 
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2.4.2 Empirical Attacks on the EMH 
 
Here, it is important to identify two types of risk premium: The market risk 
premium intended as the premium of the whole market and an individual 
stock or portfolio risk premium. Attacks on the EMH have been mounted in 
both areas. 
 
In the first case, empirical criticisms can be divided into the following main 
groups: 
- The Risk Market Premium Puzzle: The fact that the apparent extreme 
high premiums in the late 20th century cannot be adequately 
explained is called by most authors “the premium puzzle”20. The stock 
market has historically earned a high excess rate of return: “our main 
message is that the unconditional expected equity premium of the last 
50 years is probably far below the realized premium.” (Fama and 
French, 2002:658).  
- Volatility Puzzle: Stock returns and price–dividend ratios are both 
highly variable and much higher than expected (Campbell 1999:1244). 
 
In the second case, some anomalies associated to a specific type of firms 
were found. This concerns not the market premium as a whole but the 
                                                 
20 However, as the premium is inevitable an ever-changing magnitude, is this actually a 
puzzle? The answer should be “yes” when authors refer to the value of the past premium. In 
fact, no financial economists agree on the value of the past equity premium because there is 
no consensus on how it should be calculated (Welch, 2000:505). 
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premium on single stocks (for instance: small capital companies). In other 
words, the theoretical return is predicted by a market model, most commonly 
the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) model. The CAPM predicts the risk-
adjusted return of single stocks.  
  
However, if single stock returns are even higher than the risk-adjusted return, 
and persistently so, this is considered anomalous. This kind of excess of 
return is also called "positive alpha" or "abnormal returns". Investors are 
constantly seeking investments that have positive alpha. This concept will be 
more fully covered in section 2.6 which address the problems of the capital 
asset pricing models (CAPMs) when assessing single firms. 
 
Many anomalies were found in the last three decades. One of the first 
important was found by Basu (1977) who showed that stocks with low P/E 
ratios earned a premium for investors during the period 1957-1971.  
Additionally, Banz (1981) observed a strong relation between company size 
and stock returns.  Over long periods of time, small companies seem to 
provide a greater return than the market average returns without a 
corresponding increase in risk. This so called “size-effect” is shown in figure 
2.3 
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Figure 2.3 Small Companies Stocks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Ibbotson Associates 
 
Unless firm size is somehow related to measurement errors in beta, so that 
small firms actually have higher betas than those estimated using 
conventional procedures, there is no CAPM-consistent explanation for the 
firm size effect. 
 
De Bondt and Thaler (1985,1987) showed that stocks that have registered 
the lowest returns (the “losers”) over the previous three-five years 
(observation period) did better during the following three-five years (test 
period) than those that previously had the highest positive return (the 
“winners”). This so-called losers-and-winners effect yielded an abnormal 
market adjusted return of 24.6% for the arbitrage portfolio (losers minus 
winners).  
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These observations are consistent with the overreaction hypothesis, that is: 
the excessive investors’ reaction to current information which seems to 
characterize all the securities. To test such a hypothesis, De Bond and 
Thaler (1985) expected to observe the mean-reverting movements in stock 
returns. Furthermore, the most important part of the losers’ excess happened 
in January (January effect) which can be clearly seen in the figure in the five 
return jumps. 
 
According to De Bondt and Thaler, the only alternative explanation for these 
observations is the presence of irrational behaviour in investors’ decisions by 
which returns on loser securities are under-estimated and returns on winner 
securities are over-estimated, producing an excessive reaction to stock 
prices “over-reaction”.  
 
In the same way, evidence of an under-reaction came from Jagadeesh and 
Titman (1993) who showed that stocks with high short-term past returns 
(based on the previous 3 to 12 months portfolio formation periods) continue 
to perform better in the future than the stocks with low short-term past 
returns. Contrary to the over-reaction hypothesis where the long-term 
tendencies reverse (De Bondt and Thaler), in the under-reaction hypothesis, 
also called the momentum-effect, these short-term tendencies continue. 
  
Among the more striking of the long-term anomalies is the study of IPOs 
(initial public offerings) and seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) (Loughran and 
Ritter 1995; Dechow, Hutton and Sloan, 2000; Chahine, 2001). In these 
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cases, analysts displayed over-optimistic forecasts concerning the potential 
growth of the offering firms. 
 
Freeman (2004) argued that the equity premium puzzle arises due to entry 
barriers (both practical and psychological) which have traditionally impeded 
entry by individuals into the stock market, and that returns between stocks 
and bonds should stabilize as electronic resources open up to a greater 
number of traders.  
 
Other researchers have concentrated on the study of the traditional 
proposition that stock prices do not react to “non-information”. In this arena, 
the most important finding is represented by the “crash of 1987”. On October 
19th 1987, the Dow Jones industrial Average fell 22.6%, the biggest daily fall 
ever, without having had any apparent new information.  Cutler et al. (1991) 
studied several movements like this and found that they did not derive from 
any relevant news. 
 
The anomalies outlined can be summarized as follows: The January effect, 
the size-effect, the P/E ratio effect, the losers-winners effect or the over- and 
under-reaction to earnings announcements anomaly, the IPOs and SEOs 
anomaly, and the crash of 1987 anomaly. All of them attack the semi-strong 
form of EMH since they involve public information: The excess returns based 
on “stale information” is clearly in contrast with the semi-strong form. 
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In order to provide evidence against the weak form of the EMH, it should be 
demonstrated that stock prices do not reflect past returns. The EMH is based 
on the idea that prices are unpredictable or as stated by Brealey and Myers 
(1988:289) capital markets “have no memory”. The logic of this statement is 
the following: If prices were predictable, competition and arbitrage would 
assure the adjustment of prices to fundamentals, thus leaving random 
movements to non-anticipated events. 
 
However, some earlier economists revealed that stock prices could differ 
from their fundamental values. Keynes (1936:153-154), in his “General 
Theory”, argued that “day-to-day fluctuations in the profits of existing 
investments tend to have an altogether excessive, and even absurd, 
influence on the market.” Graham (1949) recommended buying stocks whose 
prices seemed to be low in relation to their fundamental values. This 
“contrarian strategy” was based on the fact that prices stayed low only 
temporarily.  
 
More recently, Poterba and Summers (1988) conducted an international 
study that concluded that the mean-reversion is more evident in less efficient 
equity markets. Additionally, Lakonishok, Shliefer, and Vishny (1994) and La 
Porta (1996) provided evidence that suggested that if investors generally do 
not understand regression to the mean, they are likely to overestimate a 
company’s “true greatness” and pay too much for the company’s stock, a 
decision they will regret when measures of the company’s greatness regress 
to the mean.  
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Those arguments are in line with the losers-and-winners effect of De Bondt 
and Thaler (1985 and 1987) in which the high book-to-market ratios could 
reflect the excessive market optimism regarding future returns. In fact, their 
results of negative serial correlation for 36 months might be inconsistent with 
the weak-form. 
 
In addition, although Fama (1965) presented important evidence in favour of 
the random walk hypothesis, Fama and French (1988) showed that the 
dividend–price ratio is able to explain only 27% of the variation of cumulative 
stock returns over the subsequent four years. Therefore, Fama and French 
(1991) extended the concept of the weak-form to include predicting future 
returns with the use of accounting or macro-economic variables. 
 
To reinforce the weak-form, many other studies conclude that stock returns 
can be predicted by means of publicly-available information, such as time 
series data on financial and macroeconomic variables21. In contrast, other 
studies have argued that the equity premium is overstated and fundamentals 
alone cannot explain its value22.  
 
This on-going discussion implies that there is no clear evidence to reject the 
weak-form hypothesis. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence suggests that 
                                                 
21 For example, see the following papers: Balvers, Cosimano, and McDonald (1990), Breen, 
Glosten, and Jagannathan (1990), Campbell (1987), Cochrane (1991), Fama and French 
(1986, 1989), Ferson and Harvey (1993), French, Schwert, and Stambaugh (1987), Glosten, 
Jagannathan, and Runkle (1993), and Pesaran and Timmermann (1995). 
22 See also Blanchard (1993), Claus and Thomas (2001), Fama and French (2002), and 
Brown et al. (1995). 
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capital markets are not efficient, at least in the fully-strong-form. Through 
their trading behaviour, biased investors can cause prices to deviate 
significantly from fundamental value. These deviations create opportunities, 
and risks for sophisticated investors and therefore the so-called limits-to-
arbitrage, as explained in the next section. 
 
2.5 Introduction to Behavioural Finance Theory (BFT) 
BFT helps traditional finance to explain some of the anomalies observed in 
the last section by incorporating some psychological concepts. “The limits of 
arbitrage create anomalies that the psychology of decision-making helps 
explain.” (Mullainathan and Thaler 2000:1).  
 
The key concepts addressed by the theory include: Loss aversion; Regret 
aversion; Mental accounting; Self-control; Over-confidence; Herding 
behaviour; Representativeness; Anchoring, Adjustment and Conservatism:  
- Loss aversion is based on the idea that the mental penalty 
associated with a given loss is greater than the mental reward from a 
gain of the same size (Tversky and Kahneman, 1986, 1992). 
- Regret aversion arises because of a person’s desire to avoid feeling 
the pain of regret resulting from a poor investment decision. This 
explains the investor’s tendency to hold on to losing stocks for too long 
and sell winning stocks too soon.  
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- Mental accounting refers to the implicit methods (aggregation rules) 
that individuals use to code and evaluate financial outcomes: 
transactions, investments, gambles, etc. Investors tend to treat each 
element of their investment portfolios separately. This can lead to 
inefficient decision-making.  
- Self-control, as noted by Thaler and Shefrin (1981), investors are 
subject to temptation and they look for tools to improve self-control. By 
mentally separating their financial resources into capital and ‘available 
for expenditure’ pools, investors can control their urge to over-
consume. 
- Over-confidence (Hubris): For instance, entrepreneurs and investors 
in general may be over-optimistic about their firm’s prospects 
(Moskowitz and Jorgensen, 2000). 
- Herding behavior: Investors tend to invest in ‘respected companies’ 
as these investments carry implicit insurance against regret (Koening 
1999).  
- Representativeness: This principle was introduced by Kahneman 
and Tversky (1972) and states that people can make judgments based 
on stereotypes. Under representativeness, investors will consider a 
series of positive company performances as representative of a 
continuous growth potential, and ignore the investors’ random 
behavior (see first paragraph of section 2.2.1). An important example 
of representativeness taken from the empirical evidence is the “losers-
and-winner effect” or “over- and under-reaction effect”   
- Anchoring, Adjustment and Conservatism: Investors tend to 
remain anchored to their original judgments regarding the company's 
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performance and will only slowly adjust to the new, positive 
information. The state of conservatism refers to the condition where 
investors subconsciously are reluctant to alter their beliefs in the face 
of new evidence (Edwards, 1968). This phenomenon might explain the 
“over- and under-reaction effect”. As representativeness explains the 
long-term over-reaction, conservatism explains the short-term under-
reaction. After a series of good earnings announcements, though, 
representativeness causes people to overreact and push the price up 
too high. 
 
Therefore, some behavioralists, in order to account for the under-reaction 
effect have recently developed the first behavioralist models. For instance: 
Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (BSV (1998)), Daniel, Hirshleifer and 
Subrahmanyam (DHS (1998)) and Hong and Stein (HS (1998)). These 
models tried to integrate both over- and under-reaction. 
 
Other behavioralists have as a main target to build a behavioural and 
predictive asset pricing model (BAPM) empirically testable. Many authors 
have tried to build such a model: Merton (1987), Blume and Easly (1992), 
Shrefrin and Statman (1994), Odean (1998), Daniel et al. (1998), Daniel et al. 
(2001)).  
 
The anomalies found in the last decades and the new concepts developed by 
the behaviouralists seem to contradict the most basic hypothesis of financial 
economics like the EMH itself as well as the estimations for the value of the 
risk-premium. Is it possible to trust the Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965a, 1965b) 
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Mossin (1966) CAPM (SLM-CAPM) to predict risk-adjusted return 
expectations? How can investors and in particular, for this thesis, private 
equity funds assess risk and return premium ex-ante? Is the SLM-CAPM a 
valid tool to estimate the premium for PEFs’ investments? It is not easy to 
answer these questions but they have to do with the objective of this thesis. 
The next sections will try to deal with some of them. 
 
2.6 The SLM-CAPM and the Three-Factor CAPM. 
 
The problem with behavioural finance is the fact that its models (predictive 
behavioural models that tried to replace the SLM-CAPM) are far from having 
been successfully tested and being widely recognized. In fact, Fama (1997) 
asserted that behavioural finance is more a collection of anomalies and 
concepts than a true theory of finance, and that these anomalies will 
eventually be priced out of the market or explained by appealing to minor 
adjustments in methodologies like the three-factor model.  
 
Fama (1997) argued that long-term anomalies (like over- and under-reaction) 
are chance results. Additionally, EMH supporters argued that after the 
publication of the anomalies, investors should understand that their decisions 
were bad ones or irrational and they should make much better decisions for 
the future thus eliminating any non-random anomalies. In favour of these 
ideas, there is the fact that there is no clear evidence against the weak-form 
EMH. 
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Yet the discussion regarding the weak-form hypothesis is exacerbated by the 
joint hypothesis23 problem (methodology problem for testing)24: In other 
words, is this a problem of biased cash flows or wrong discount rates 
calculated with SLM-CAPM? In this direction, Fama and French (2002) 
suggested that discount rates are under-estimated, thus causing the equity 
premium to be overestimated, suggesting that the problem is the SLM-CAPM 
not the EMH25 (at least in its weak form).  
 
In fact, although Black, Jensen, and Scholes (1972) as well as Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) found that, as predicted by the SLM-CAPM, there is a 
positive simple relation between average stock returns and β during the pre-
1969 period, this is not true for the period 1963-1990. The relationship 
between β and average return disappears during the most recent period 
(Fama and French, 1992).   
 
Therefore, Fama and French (1993), proposed the three-factor CAPM to 
capture two of the most important anomalies: Size effect (Banz, 1981) and 
book-to-market value (Basu, 1983). They tried to capture the cross-sectional 
variation in past average returns associated with the market β, size, 
leverage, book-to-market equity, and earnings price ratios.   
 
                                                 
23 Tests of market efficiency must be based on CAPM and since much evidence contradicts 
the EMH, it may be because the market is inefficient, or it may be that the model is incorrect. 
24 “Market efficiency per se is not testable” Fama (1991). Hawawini and Keim (1998) 
concluded that finance has no tests strong enough to distinguish market inefficiency from 
bad asset-pricing models. 
25 See also Fama and French (1992) and the failure of beta to reflect risk. 
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Fama and French (1993) found factors describing “value” and “size” to be the 
most significant factors, outside of market risk, for explaining the realized 
returns. They constructed two factors: SMB to address size risk and HML to 
address value risk.  The formula known as the three-factor model of Fama 
and French is shown as follows: 
 
    E(R) = Rf + β * Rm + bs * SMB + bv * HML + α 
 
Where: 
E(R):  is the expected rate of return of a specific asset, 
Rf: is the risk-free return rate, 
Rm: is the return of the whole stock market, 
The SMB Factor: which stands for Small minus Big, is designed to estimate 
the additional return investors have historically received by investing in 
companies with small market capitalizations (referred t the size premium). In 
practice, the SMB monthly factor is computed as the average return for the 
smallest 30% of stocks minus the average return of the largest 30% of stocks 
in that month. As a reference point, the historical average from July 1926 to 
July 2002 of the annual SMB factor has been approximately 3.3% (Womack 
and Zhang, 2003), 
The HML Factor, which is short for High minus Low, has been constructed to 
estimate the so-called “value premium” provided to investors for investing in 
companies with high book-to-market (B/M) values.  Similarly to the SMB, 
HML is computed as the average return for the 50% of stocks with the 
highest B/M ratio minus the average return of the 50% of stocks with the 
lowest B/M ratio each month. Over the time period from 1926 to 2003, this 
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premium for value stocks has averaged approximately 5.1% annually 
(Womack and Zhang, 2003),  
The β: intends to measure the exposure that an asset has to market risk 
(although this beta will have a different value from the beta in a SLM-CAPM 
as a result of the added factors),  
The bs: measures the level of exposure of the specific asset to size risk, 
the bv: intends to measure the level of exposure of the specific asset to 
value risk.  
 
These coefficients (β, bs and bv) in this model have similar interpretations to 
beta in the SLM-CAPM. The bs and bv factors, like the market beta, are 
regression coefficients: the higher the value of bs, the smaller the 
capitalization. Similarly, the higher the value of bv, the larger the book/price 
ratio. 
 
In addition, all these factors combined have the greatest predictive power 
that researchers have tested – often yielding an R-Squared26 value of 
approximately 0.95 (Bahl, 2006). However, the HML as a “risk factor” has 
spurred much discussion. In the case of SMB, which calculates “size risk”, 
small CAPS logically might be expected to be more susceptible to many risk 
factors due to their undiversified nature and their reduced capability to absorb 
negative financial events. 
 
                                                 
26 Statistical measure of how well a regression line approximates real data points; an r-
squared of 1.0 (100%) indicates a perfect fit. In finance, r-squared measures how well the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model predicts the actual performance of an investment or portfolio.  
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Conversely, the HML factor intuitively might suggest higher risk exposure for 
typical “value” stocks (high B/M) versus “growth” stocks (low B/M). This 
makes sense intuitively because companies need to reach a minimum size in 
order to execute an Initial Public Offering (IPO).  
 
One of the central aspects about the three-factor CAPM devised by Fama 
and French (1992) is the fact that this model is based on rational behaviour. 
If assets are priced rationally, variables that are related to average returns, 
such as size and book-to-market equity, must proxy for sensitivity to common 
(shared and thus undiversifiable) risk factors in returns (Fama and French 
1992). 
 
The Fama and French three factor model (1993) partially captured the cross-
sectional variation in past average returns (single type of firms’ anomalies). 
However, the scope of this thesis is to have a forward-looking perspective. In 
fact, the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model was not only developed 
to explain past anomalies and past performance (backward-looking) but also 
to predict future returns (forward-looking). Actually, the title of the Fama and 
French paper (1993) is “The Cross-section of Expected Returns.” 
 
This issue of abnormal returns found in the cross-sectional studies was also 
studied by Jensen (1968) who developed a model, a pillar for this research 
project that will have to deal with single firms and small portfolios held by 
PEFs. Therefore, it is important to introduce an important concept known as 
the Jensen's alpha or Jensen's Performance Index, ex-post alpha and also 
known as abnormal returns. This is used to assess the performance of 
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individual stocks or portfolios. If such an asset's return is even higher than 
the risk-adjusted return, that asset is said to have "positive alpha" or 
"abnormal returns", which according to the EMH, should be eliminated quite 
rapidly as the market moves to equilibrium. 
 
Jensen's alpha = Portfolio Return − [Risk Free Rate + Portfolio Beta * 
(Market Premium)] 
     
 
This concept is particularly relevant for this thesis27. In fact, PEFs need to 
know what is the future risk-reward trade-off for both their portfolios and their 
single deals. 
 
Beyond the F&F three-factor CAPM other authors have recently proposed 
alternative rational-based asset pricing models. For instance: Ang et al. 
(2006), Adrian and Rosenberg (2008), Chen et al. (2010).  
 
Chen et al. (2010) claimed that the Fama and French three-factor model 
cannot explain many anomalies, one of them being (the most important) the 
momentum or under-reaction to earnings surprises. They proposed a new 
three-factor model including: the market excess return (R mkt), the difference 
between the return of a portfolio of low-capital investment stocks and the 
return of a portfolio of high-capital investment stocks (R inv), and the 
                                                 
27 Recent academic papers in the PEFs arena (see chapter 3) found high levels of abnormal 
returns. Since the target of this thesis is to explain the determinants of the risk-premium, it 
will have to deal with these unexplained alphas.  
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difference between the return of a portfolio of stocks with high returns on 
assets (ROA) and the return of a portfolio of stocks with low returns on 
assets (R roa) 
 
  E(R) = Rf + β (Rm) + (β inv * R inv) + (β roa * R roa) 
 
These authors stated that ROA predicts returns because high expected ROA 
relative to low investment means high discount rates. The high discount rates 
are necessary to offset the high expected ROA to induce low net present 
values (NPV) of new capital and thereby low investment. If, instead, the 
discount rates are not high enough to offset the high expected ROA, firms 
would obtain high net present values of new capital and invest more. In the 
same way, low expected ROA relative to high investment (such as small-
growth firms in the late 1990s) means low discount rates. If the discount rates 
are not low enough to offset the low expected ROA, these firms would obtain 
low NPV of new capital and invest less. 
 
Another important innovation of Chen et al. (2010) (differing from Fama and 
French (1993 and 1996), who interpreted their SMB and HML concepts as 
risk factors) is the fact that they did not interpret ROA as a risk factor.  
 
“Unlike size and book-to-market that directly involve market equity, which 
behavioralists often use as a proxy for mispricing (e.g. Daniel, Hirshleifer, 
and Subrahmanyam (2001)), the new factors are constructed on economic 
fundamentals that are less likely to be affected by mispricing, at least 
directly.” (Chen et al. 2010:26).  
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Moreover, these authors claimed that this theory is silent on investors’ 
behaviour, which can be rational or irrational. As such, they argued that their 
“tests do not aim to (and cannot) determine whether the anomalies are driven 
by rational or irrational forces.” (Chen et al. 2010:27). 
 
Future studies should deepen the understanding of these new proposals and 
might eventually corroborate them as better tools to predict future return 
expectations and risk perceptions. Instead, what academia seems to have 
revealed is that the SLM-CAPM’s true predictive power is questionable (in 
particular in the period 1963-1990). For instance, recent research conducted 
by Bahl (2006) found, on the basis of the adjusted R², that the three-factor 
model is better able to capture the variations in the stock returns than the 
SLM-CAPM, the average adjusted R² being 87% for the former model and 
76% for the latter model. 
 
Past empirical evidence strongly suggested that rational-model predictions, 
although far from being perfect, are still the best approximations that we have 
overall. On this basis, this section concludes that although the anomalies 
might invalidate the strong form of the EMH (even the semi-strong form), the 
rational models cannot be invalidated, at least not yet. In particular, the three-
factor CAPM of Fama and French seems to be the most widely tested and 
recognized predictive model. Therefore, this thesis will consider the concepts 
developed by the rational capital asset pricing models as important pillars to 
identify the determinants needed to assess risk perceptions and return 
expectations in the PEFs’ valuations. 
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2.7 The Value of Using a Market Premium in the Private-Market Sector 
 
This section is about single firms in PHCs where anomalies and the concept 
of Jensen’s alpha introduced in section 2.6 are particularly important. In 
addition, it is important to underline that the justification for this thesis not 
deviating from the CAPM framework was underlined in the conclusion of 
Section 2.6. However, since PEFs have to deal with PHCs, this section will 
review the particular characteristics that must be considered when using the 
CAPM in these particular markets. 
 
2.7.1 Characteristics of the Privately-Held Company Markets (PHCMs) 
 
Although very different to organized markets, PHCMs might be approached 
by PEFs with the same models used by traditional finance theory (TFT), as 
developed for organized markets. All these models are based on adjusted 
versions from the Modern Portfolio Theory/CAPM, the Efficient Markets 
Hypothesis (EMH), the Rational Decision Making Hypothesis (RDMH), and 
agency theory.  
 
Greater inefficiency in privately-held markets stems from the following issues:  
1. The presence of higher transaction costs,  
2. diseconomies of scale due to size limitations,  
3. illiquidity,  
4. information asymmetries,  
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5. family members being directly involved in the company management 
(decisions are influenced by a more sentimental approach due to the 
family attachment to the firm property),  
6. family succession issues 
7. higher exposure to the economic and political environment,  
8. large non-pecuniary benefits.  
Such conditions imply lack of information and bounded rationality28. In order 
to reveal the determinants of the PEFs’ risk premium, this research has to 
consider the anomalies and the issues revealed in the previous sections. It is 
also necessary to analyse the adjusted models. In addition, the nature of 
PHCMs and PEFs might reveal new anomalies and non-rational behavior 
that needs to be considered.  
 
Figure 2.4 illustrates both markets: Organized markets and privately-held 
markets. Assumptions and models of the first might influence the second. 
However, this second market arena might have its own phenomena and 
patterns. 
  
                                                 
28 That is: decisions are inconsistent with stated rational objectives. For instance: Cultural 
PHCMs factors, fashion and modes could be forcing PEFs to assess risk and value according 
to false risk drivers. 
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Figure 2.4 Is the PHCM Premium Driven only by Factors of the 
Organized Markets? 
 
 
Source: Author's own work 
 
Figure 2.4 shows that organized markets (the right quadrant of the figure) 
present anomalies and new theories like BFT and the thee-factor model were 
developed to understand those anomalies. On the left side, PHCMs are 
influenced by those approaches developed in organized markets. But are 
these factors enough to explain the PEFs’ premium? This is one of the main 
questions this thesis intends to answer. 
 
In fact, most authors29 have stated that the difference between valuations in 
organized and in PHCMs lies only in some specific risks and asymmetries 
                                                 
29 Bajaj et al (2001) argue in favor of IRS approach (Issues of Restricted Stock); Mercer 
(2003) introduces the DLOM (Discount for Lack of Marketability); Margulis et al. (2005) 
support the BSAF (Beta Size Adjusting Factor).  
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often bundled together under the phrase “liquidity risk” Other authors30 prefer 
to use multiples by observing other PHCMs’ transactions.   
 
2.7.2 Adjusted Models to Assess PHCs’ Cost of Capital 
 
There are currently several models for estimating a PHC’s cost of capital, all 
of which are adjusted versions of the classical CAPM. Recently, some 
authors have tried to apply the Fama and French three-factor model to PHCs 
to estimate the risk premium. For instance: Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), 
Feldman (2005), Liu (2006), Korteweg and Sorensen (2009), Franzoni et al. 
(2010).  
 
In general, these models add a new factor to the three-factor model: the 
liquidity risk factor.  
 
    The four-factor formula 
E(R) = Rf + β * Rm + (βs * Rs) + (βv * Rv) + (β liq * R liq) 
Where the new factor added is the liquidity:  
(β liq * R liq) 
 
Some authors like Feldman (2005), added an additional factor called the 
FSRP factor: The additional return an investor requires for the non-
systematic risk or specific risk like: business stability, business transparency, 
customer concentration, supplier reliance, reliance on key people, and 
intensity of competition (Feldman, 2005:81). In addition, according to Pintado 
                                                 
30 Pratt (2002) and Tatum (2000) support private databases. 
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et al. (2007), the stage of development of PHCs should be considered as a 
risk factor.  
 
Fama and French (1995) found (for very small publicly-traded companies) 
the following estimations for the factor loadings (the betas) of their three-
factor model: the market beta around 1.06, the size beta around 1.04, and 
the value beta around -0.31. Davis, Fama and French (2000) estimated the 
factor loadings (the betas) for publicly-traded companies. According to these 
authors, the size beta is between 1.22 and 1.39 (for very small companies) 
and the value beta between -0.14 and 0.23. Cochrane (2005) found a market 
beta between 0.7 and 0.9, a size beta between 1.3 and 1.8 and a value beta 
between 0.1 and 0.4. 
 
Korteweg and Sorensen (2009), by observing individual PHCs and PEFs, 
estimated the market beta for PHCs ranging from 2.2 to 2.5, the size beta 
between 0.9 and 1.1 and the value beta between -2.0 and -1.7. They also 
calculated these factors over each stage of development (see Table 2.3). 
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Table 2.3 The premium for PHCs (Korteweg and Sorensen, 2009). 
 
                             
                                  
Source: Korteweg and Sorensen (2009) and the K. French Website 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/) 
 
 
In Table 2.3, the first column calculates the premium using the simple SLM-
CAPM, and the second column uses the three-factor model. Table 2.3 shows 
that the seed premium is negative because (as Berk, Green and Naik, 2004 
stated) entrepreneurial risks are idiosyncratic and technological risks 
(unsystematic risks). In addition, since these results are based on 
CAPM 3F CAPM
Rm (market premium) 5,0% 5,0%
Rs (size premium) 1,5%
R (value premium 3,5%
βm seed 0,0011-    0,2990    
βm early 2,8120    2,1549    
βm late 3,1700    2,0133    
βs seed 0,3445-    
βs early 1,2705    
βs late 0,7819    
βv seed 0,4564    
βv early 1,2211-    
βv late 2,1263-    
Seed Premium -0,01% -0,6%
Early Premium 14,06% 8,4%
Late Premium 15,85% 3,8%
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observations made in unquoted companies, the illiquidity risk might be 
included31. 
 
Korteweg and Sorensen (2009) also found that the values of beta are very 
different for each industry, suggesting that estimates of risk and return to 
private equity investments performed using fund level returns may be 
sensitive to the industry composition of these funds. 
 
Metrick (2007) estimated the liquidity risk (for private equity investments) at 
only 1%. However, Franzoni et al., (2010) stated that the liquidity risk in PEFs 
may be very significant.  These authors found that that the liquidity risk 
premium ranges between 5% and 15%. Cumming et al. (2005) stated that 
liquidity risk is one reason why PEFs require higher returns on investments. 
 
The target of this last section was to introduce the current methodology 
proposed by academia to calculate the premium for PHCMs (in particular 
from a PEF perspective). One of the features of these markets is the 
illiquidity risk. The particular phenomena behind this factor as well as any 
                                                 
31 Other articles include: Cumming et al. (2005), Chordia, Subrahmanyam, and Anshuman 
(2001), Baekert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005), Watanabe and Watanabe (2008), Martinez, 
Nieto, Rubio, and Tapia (2005), Bandi, Moise, and Russel (2008), Fontaine and Garcia 
(2008), and Hasbrouck (2009). A number of papers provide theoretical arguments as to why 
investors want to be compensated for liquidity risk (e.g. Holmstrom and Tirole, 2001, 
Acharya and Pedersen, 2005, Lustig, 2009). The empirical literature was pioneered by 
Amihud and Mendelson (1986), and more recent work emphasizes the importance of 
systematic liquidity risk in public equity returns (e.g. Amihud, 2002, Pastor and Stambaugh, 
2003, Acharya and Pedersen, 2005, Sadka, 2006). In particular, the determinants of the 
liquidity risk in PEFs will be further studied in the next chapter. 
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phenomena driving the PEFs’ premium are the central issues of this thesis 
and will be studied in the coming chapters. The next chapter will deepen its 
focus on the models seen in this section to assess the risk premium but with 
another perspective, and in the light of the distinctive phenomena driving the 
PEF risk-premium (the true determinants of the PEF premium). 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
 
As stated in the introduction of this chapter, the scope of this thesis is to 
investigate the ex-ante risk-return characteristics of PEFs aiming to propose 
a model directed at estimating the required premium for their privately-held 
company (PHC) targets. Therefore, the main objective of this chapter was to 
review the academic knowledge directed at estimating the risk premium for 
PHCs.  
 
However, in order to achieve this goal, it was necessary to discuss the 
traditional rational-based financial theory and the EMH, to review the current 
discussion regarding the value of the market premium for public companies, 
to outline some of the anomalies found and attacks made against the EMH 
and the TFT, and to make a brief introduction to the BFT.  
 
It has also explained the difference the issues of the risk market premium 
(specially analyzed in section 2.2 and 2.3) and the anomalies revealed by 
cross-sectional studies (especially seen in section 2.4 and 2.6). Therefore 
section 2.6 has introduced the Fama and French three-factor model (1993) 
as an explanation for past sectional returns and as a predictive model for 
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single firms. Finally, section 2.7 was concentrated on single firms and 
undiversified portfolios held by PEFs in the PHCMs which are the subject of 
this thesis. 
 
The large discrepancies found in both the value of the risk-premium, and the 
methodologies to assess it, might be forcing investors, firms, and PEFs to 
use approximations. Therefore, irrationality in organized markets might arise 
from the lack of consensus and this clearly might influence other markets like 
that of PEFs. 
 
The conceptual differences between an ex-post perspective and ex-ante 
perspective underlined by Arnott and Bernstein (2002) are extremely 
important for the methodology to be chosen (see chapter 4) by this thesis 
which intends to take the latter perspective. In fact, Fama and French (2002), 
who opposed the use of past data on betas, used methodologies looking at 
past returns when using fundamentals. Similarly, Dimson et al., (2008) trust 
the ex-post premium to assess future expectations.  
 
New theories like the BFT have not been able to prove the failure of the EMH 
(at least in its weak and semi-strong-forms) nor to develop recognized and 
tested models. Consequently, this thesis will rely on the factors contained in 
the CAPM as important determinants that might be driving the PEFs’ 
premium. That is the reason why, based on rational-based models, section 
2.7 reviewed recent papers directed at assessing the risk premium in PHCs 
from a PEF perspective. These approaches showed that the illiquidity risk 
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might be an important new driver which has to be considered in these 
particular markets.  
 
However, Section 2.7 also suggested that there might be new phenomena 
present in the nature of PHCMs and PEFs driving the illiquidity risk and other 
potential factors not yet understood and explained by traditional finance. In 
fact, the causes behind the illiquidity factor as well as the new phenomena 
which might drive the PEFs’ premium (its determinants), are the very core of 
this thesis and the literature studying such potential determinants will be 
reviewed in the next chapter.  
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3 LITERATURE REVIEW PART II – THE REQUIRED RETURN IN THE 
PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 2, by reviewing models based on theories developed by traditional 
finance for organized markets, has shown that the illiquidity risk appears to 
be one important factor to consider for PEFs when assessing investment in 
privately-held companies (PHCs). Since the target of this thesis is to reveal 
the whole range of determinants of the risk premium, the purpose of this 
chapter will be to show, according to the research of the last couple of 
decades, what kind of phenomena might be driving this premium. The 
illiquidity factor shown in chapter 2 might be only a blanket variable that hides 
other factors.  
 
Therefore, the scope of this chapter will be to review current literature, 
pioneered by Lerner and Gompers (1997), regarding the study of the PEFs’ 
required return in order to understand its nature and drivers. The internal rate 
of return (IRR) is the most popular and widely-used tool to measure the 
performance of a private equity deal. It might have different meanings 
according to the time perspective. For instance, an ex-post IRR measures 
the PEF deal performance, and the ex-ante IRR measures the expected 
return.  
 
Section 3.2 will review the most important papers that have studied the 
nature of the PEF required return revealing the new phenomena and drivers 
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present in private equity deals.  After classifying the research papers (section 
3.2.1) into four different groups or “perspectives”, sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 will 
respectively review the private equity premium puzzle and the PEF required 
returns in an ex-post perspective.  
 
Although section 3.2.3 will look at studies with an ex-post perspective (past 
performance), the phenomena they found might be also present in an ex-
ante perspective. In other words, the factors driving past performance might 
be considered and priced by GPs’ assessments. 
 
Thereafter, section 3.2.4 will deal with literature focused on an ex-ante 
perspective as well as with studies proposing models (ex-ante perspective) 
as this thesis intends to do. Section 3.2.5 will outline and discuss important 
gaps still uncovered by recent papers. 
 
Section 3.3 will briefly examine the particular nature of PHCs which are the 
target of the PEFs. This section will show the special drivers that arise due to 
the unique type of interaction between both PHCs and PEFs. Finally, section 
3.4 will summarize all the phenomena introduced in this chapter.  
 
3.2 The Rate of Return in the Private Equity Funds (PEFs) 
 
 
In comparison with other areas in finance, knowledge about the performance 
and risk–return drivers of the private equity sector is very limited. There are a 
few papers directed at assessing the risk-return nature of PEFs. Such studies 
reveal both contradictory conclusions and as yet unexplained phenomena: 
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what some authors call the “private equity premium puzzle” (e.g. Moskowitz 
and Jorgensen 2000).  
 
3.2.1 Literature Review Classification  
 
The literature can be divided into two sets of studies (see Table 3.1), both 
directed at studying risk and return. The first looks at the return expectations 
and risk perceptions of the PEFs (ex-ante). The second explores realized 
returns and risks (ex-post). Additionally, these sets of studies can be sub-
divided according to two different perspectives:  
 
- The first documents the (gross-of-fees) performance of individual 
venture capital investments of General Partners (GPs)  
 
- The second set focuses on the cash-flow stream from (to) the private 
equity funds to (from) limited partners (LPs). It includes fee payments 
and measures the net performance obtained by LPs that invest in 
private equity funds (Jenkinson, 2008).   
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Table 3.1 Literature Classification 
     
Source: Author’s own work 
 
As shown in Table 3.1, most of these studies look at ex-post realized returns 
and they are more concerned with past performance than with understanding 
return expectations and risk perception. In this framework of studies32, this 
thesis will make a contribution regarding the ex-ante analysis (in the south-
west cell of Table 3.1) 
 
3.2.2 The Private Equity Premium Puzzle 
 
Solving the private equity premium puzzle might help to explain the public 
equity premium puzzle seen in chapter 2. In fact, Moskowitz and Jorgensen 
(2000) find that returns to private equity are surprisingly low given their risk 
                                                 
32 See also Mehra and Prescott (1985); Austin and Nickels (1995); Villalonga (2004); Lerner 
and Schoar (2004); Cumming and Dai (2008); Cumming (2006); Gompers et al. (2005, 2006 
and 2008); Gottschalg et al. (2004); Graham et al. (2002); Kaserer and Diller (2004a, 2004b, 
2005 and  2009).  
LPs TargetGP - PEFs
Group1
Net 
Group2
Gross
EX-ANTE 
Return Expectations / Risk 
Perceptions
EX-POST
Realized Returns and Risks
NET Woodward (2004)
Jegadeesh et al. (2009) (*)
Peng (2001), Quigley & Woodward 
(2003), Woodward and Hall (2003), 
Getmansky et al. (2003), Emery
(2003).
GROSS Manigart et al. (2002)
Korteweg & Sorensen (2009) (*)
Franzoni et al. (2010) (*)
Gompers & Lerner (1997), Jones & 
Rhodes-Kropf (2003), Ljungqvist & 
Richardson (2003), and Kaplan & 
Schoar (2005)
(*) these papers try to estimate the risk premium and to develop predicting models in an ex-ante 
perspective, but they are based on ex-post information. 
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and have named this phenomenon the “private equity premium puzzle”33. 
The corresponding phenomenon was presented in chapter two and it is 
known as the equity premium puzzle34 (or the “public equity premium 
puzzle”) in which, given the returns and volatility of publicly-traded equity, 
investors seem to allocate too little wealth to it (see Mehra and Prescott 
1985, Campbell and Cochrane, 1999 and Fama and French, 2002).  
 
These authors suggest that the explanation for the “public puzzle” could be 
attributable to particular factors present in private equity markets: Investors 
both overestimated expectations and misperceived risk regarding private 
equity markets35; and large additional pecuniary benefits like: stock options, 
bonuses, fees, incentive plans; large-non pecuniary benefits. Therefore, the 
question and the puzzle is: why are investors willing to allocate substantial 
amounts of wealth into a single private company with a much worse risk-
return trade-off? 
 
Moskowitz and Jorgensen (2000) suggest three main possible answers to 
that question: First, they consider the possibility that entrepreneurs cannot 
diversify their holdings because it is costly to sell private equity or because 
they are contractually forbidden to do so. However, this would not be 
completely true for PEFs which might hold diversified portfolios. Second, they 
                                                 
33 They refer to the whole universe of privately-held companies and not only the ones 
managed by private equity firms. 
34 It questions why the equity premium has been so high in recent decades. 
35 Since investors overestimate expected returns from private equity markets, financial 
resources fly irrationally from quoted companies to non-quoted companies. Such behavior 
may explain why the equity premium for public markets has been that low. 
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argued that entrepreneurs (who normally manage their own firms) have more 
risk tolerance than managers (who normally manage quoted firms)36. 
However, this issue again might not be the right answer for PEFs which are 
normally managed by GPs37.  
 
Third, they tell us about the non-pecuniary benefits like the flexibility and 
autonomy that self-employment gives to entrepreneurs. Four, they propose 
an alternative theory in which entrepreneurs and insiders may behave in a 
manner that is not perfectly rational and therefore not explicable by using 
traditional finance theory. For instance, entrepreneurs may be over-optimistic 
(hubris / overconfidence) about their own firm’s prospects or they irrationally 
believe it is safer to invest in a family company. 
 
Thus, misperception of both success and risk could explain why people start 
their own businesses and hold so much of their wealth in their firms. Heaton 
and Lucas (2000a) suggested that the additional risk of private investment 
and its low correlation with public equity market returns may explain why the 
public equity premium is so high. One should also add the fact that necessity 
is also the mother of invention. In fact, it has long been true that 
entrepreneurship rises when unemployment rises. Displaced employees 
often see self-employment as the only chance to replace lost income. 
 
 
                                                 
36 This addresses the problem of having different groups of people with different risk 
behavior. 
37 They are not entrepreneurs in a strict sense - their risk aversion might be different from 
that of LPs or entrepreneurs outside the PEF arena. 
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3.2.3 Current Academic Debate – Past Performance and its Drivers. 
 
The National Venture Capital Association announced that Thomson Reuters 
US Private Equity Performance (PEPI)38: “across all horizons outperformed 
public market indices, NASDAQ and the S&P500” (the measure was taken 
for 20-year period ending in September 2008)39 (Jegadeesh et al., 2009). 
However, most papers contradict such reported results and find a wide range 
of abnormal returns (risk-adjusted returns) from -6% (Phalippou and 
Gottschalg 2009) to +32% (Cochrane 2005)40.  
 
Why is there such a wide range of recorded abnormal returns? First: all these 
papers use different sources of data. Second: all these fonts of data suffer 
from diverse types of selection bias. Third: the papers themselves have their 
own selection bias according to the criteria applied by each author. Fourth: 
they use different methods and factors to assess risk and beta.  
 
For example, Kaplan and Shoar (2005) use Venture Economics (VE) data. 
These data are collected based on self-reported data provided only by large 
private equity funds, and excludes data from investors who choose not to 
report their investments to Venture Economics (VE). Additionally, most 
                                                 
38 See http://www.nvca.org/pdf/Q3_08_VC_Performance_Release.pdf. PEPI is computed 
based on quarterly statistics from Thomson Reuters Private Equity Database which analyses 
cash flows and returns for more than 1,900 US PEFs with a capitalization of US$ 828 
billion. 
39 For instance: for the 20-year period ending in September 2008, PEPI earned an annualized 
return of 15.4 percent after fees, which is more than twice the return of 7.5 percent earned by 
the S&P500 (Jegadeesh et al. 2009). 
40 The estimates of beta range from about 0.5 in Quigley et al. (2005) to 4.66 in Peng (2001). 
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databases estimate performance depending on the valuation of non-exited 
investments at the end of the sample period (this is the case of the studies 
conducted by Kaplan and Schoar, (2005).  
 
Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009) argued that it is more reasonable to write-
off non-exited investments after a certain period of time and, in doing so, they 
find that PEFs underperform the market by three to six percent per year. 
Therefore, the diverse spectrum of databases, selection criteria and 
methodologies used might explain such a wide range of abnormal returns. 
These issues will be better explained in the next sections. 
 
3.2.3.1 Studies with Positive alphas 
 
Ex-post studies were pioneered by Gompers and Lerner (1997), who argued 
that private equity returns may not accurately reflect the true creation of value 
because they are based on subjective valuations rather than on objective 
market prices, and overestimate their value creation in order to keep and 
attract investors.  
 
By proposing a “mark-to-market” revaluation methodology for each firm in the 
portfolio of a single PEF41, Gompers and Lerner (1997) find that this single 
PEF earns positive-adjusted returns of 8% per year considering this 
performance to be enough to pay any additional premium for lack of 
marketability. Unfortunately, the usefulness of this approach depends on how 
                                                 
41  According to market comparables acquired for every reporting period. 
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well the NASDAQ sub-index matches the companies in the portfolio 
(Woodward, 2004)42. 
 
However, due to accounting criteria disagreements in the valuation of 
residual investments, more recent papers have focussed on studying funds 
which were largely liquidated. Although most of those researchers confirm 
the perplexing low risk-adjusted returns for PEFs, they differ significantly in 
methodologies and results.  
 
For instance, authors located in the south-east cell like Ljungqvist and 
Richardson (2003), Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2003) and Kaplan and Schoar 
(2005), reported that PEF returns, gross of fees, out-performed the S&P 500 
(measured from 1995 to ensure the funds were largely liquidated to avoid 
accounting issues such as subjective company valuations made by GPs). 
Additionally, by looking at each fund’s investments in detail, assigning 
industry betas to the portfolio companies, they are able to estimate fund risk. 
They found that fund returns are still abnormally large even on a risk-
adjusted basis, estimating betas of roughly 1.10. 
 
                                                 
42 Several approaches used data on comparable public companies obtaining a beta equal to 
one: Long and Nickles (1995); Chen, Baierle, and Kaplan (2002); Kerins, Kiholm Smith, and 
Smith (2003); Emery (2003); Lundqvist and Richardson (2003). These last studies depend on 
how well the comparable public companies match. Conversely, other authors used company-
level deal data (private rounds of funding, IPOs, acquisitions, and shut downs): Cochrane 
(2002); Peng (2001); Quigley and Woodward (2002). These last authors also depended on 
how well comparables match. However, these comparables might be more accurate since  
the betas are not measured on public companies whose volatilities are lower from that of 
PHCs .  
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Their results are consistent with funds generating positive alphas over the 
estimated period. However, this conclusion is not entirely reliable, as all three 
studies suffer from a positive selection bias and all three may under-state 
systematic risk (they assumed betas equal to 1). In fact, authors located in 
the south-east cell intuitively believed that systematic risk for both LBO funds 
and VC funds should exceed 1 because of the high leverage present in the 
first case, and high risk present in the second43. 
 
Among the authors occupying the north-east cell (according to the literature 
classification of Table 3.1), Woodward and Hall (2003) have built a private 
equity index that provides a measure of month-to-month market-wide 
movements in value and also allows traditional methods employed to analyse 
performance for traded securities to be applied to untraded venture-type 
investments44.   
 
Thereafter, they computed their VC index and derived the correlation 
between this index and a public stock market index. They estimated that the 
average overall return is 20% per year, abnormal performance is 8.5% per 
year (alpha), and beta is 0.86. Such results45, according to these authors, 
suggested (“there is mild evidence”) that venture-type investments have 
higher returns, risk-adjusted, than does the Nasdaq index. 
 
                                                 
43 Venture Capital investments resemble small, growth firms, which typically show high 
systematic risk. 
44 They did not include leveraged buyouts and  management buyouts. 
45 These results did not include fees and carried interest like the other papers reviewed. 
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However, the main challenge faced by studies in the north-east cell46 like that 
of Woodward and Hall (2003) is that, in the majority of cases, they observe 
performance only when the investment was successful: 
 
“Accounting for such selection bias is difficult as successful investments 
account for a mere quarter of the total number of observations.” Phalippou 
and Zollo (2005:5). 
 
Kaserer and Diller (2004), using a European dataset of 777 funds over a 
period between 1980 and 2003 (they use only liquidated PEFs) provided by 
Thomson Venture Economics (TVE), documented a cash flow-based IRR of 
12.7% and an average excess-IRR of 4.5% relative to the MSCI Europe 
equity index (this implies positive abnormal returns). 
 
3.2.3.2 Studies with Negative Alphas 
 
Phalippou and Zollo, 2005, 2006 (contrary to Ljungqvist and Richardson, 
2003, Jones and Rhodes-Kropf, 2003 and Kaplan and Schoar, 2005), using 
the same data47, found that the PEF gross-of-fees returns were lower than 
those of the S&P500 by as much as 3.3% per annum. Phalippou and Zollo 
(2005) also found that if young funds are removed from the sample, PEFs 
still under-perform. Therefore, they raised the question as whether the 
                                                 
46 Quigley and Woodward (2003) found gross real returns on VC investments of about 5% 
per quarter, which is less than the S&P 500 and the Nasdaq over the same period, but found 
a beta close to 0.  
47 Considering substantial adjustments for the sample selection. 
88 
 
performance reflects a learning cost in the first years48 implying that such 
observations might differ in the future.  
 
Phalippou and Gottschalg (2008) made an important correction to the dataset 
used by Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003), Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2003), 
and Kaplan and Schoar (2005)49 which concerns performance weights.  
 
“Standard practice is to weight each fund by the total capital committed by 
the investors at inception. However, the present value of money invested 
differs from capital pre-committed as funds vary in both the speed at which 
they call capital and the fraction they actually call. If poorly-performing funds 
invest more slowly, then capital-committed-weighted performance is 
downward-biased and (vice versa). We thus weight fund performance by the 
present value of investments and find that this choice reduces the average 
PI50 by 2% compared to a standard capital-committed weighting. Therefore, 
our second finding is that standard aggregation choices bias performance 
estimates upward.” Phalippou and Gottschalg (2008:1748). 
 
                                                 
48 Consider that all these “post-liquidation studies” account for the years 1980 to 1995 which 
means the very beginning of the life of private equity markets. 
49 One important difference in data selection is that Kaplan and Schoar (2005) considered 
some fund self-reported values of non-exited investments. On the contrary, Phalippou and 
Gottschalg (2009) argued that is more reasonable to write-off non-exited investments after a 
certain period of time. 
50 The profitability index (PI) is the present value of the cash flows received by investors 
divided by the present value of the capital paid by investors. The discount rate is the realized 
S&P500 rate of return; PI > 1 indicates outperformance. 
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In addition, by using a complementary dataset (from VentureXpert)51, they 
argued that the assumption made by previous authors regarding a beta equal 
to 1, is likely to overstate relative performance. Therefore, using industry-
size-matched costs of capital, they found a risk-adjusted PI of 0.75 for BO 
funds and 0.77 for VC funds. These corresponded to an alpha of about -6% 
per year in both cases. 
 
Finally, they found an average net-of-fees fund performance of more than 3% 
per year below the S&P50052 (gross-of-fees is above 3%) which implies a 6% 
underperformance when risk-adjusted53.  
 
3.2.3.3 Ex-Post Phenomena 
 
Kaplan and Schoar (2002, 2005) documented substantial persistence in the 
performance of funds. GPs whose funds outperform the industry, are likely to 
outperform the industry in the next fund they manage and vice versa. 
Phalippou and Gottschalg (2008) also observed that top quartile funds 
outperform the S&P500 and there is evidence of performance persistence. 
 
Fund size and flows are positively correlated to past performance. 
Conversely, funds raised in boom times are less likely to raise follow-on 
                                                 
51 A commercially available dataset which contains information on investment exits. For 
these additional funds, performance is not available, but the authors observed their fraction 
of successfully exited investments (IPO or sale next to bankruptcy), a widely-used proxy for 
performance. 
52 Which is in line with Phalippou and Zollo 2005 / 2006. 
53 However, like the others, this paper still does not account for illiquidity risk. This 
suggested that risk-adjusted performance may still be worse. 
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funds suggesting that such funds perform poorly. As a consequence, better 
GPs may be able to invest in better investments and get better deal terms 
(lower valuations). They also concluded that competitive forces do not drive 
away persistence in the sample period.  
 
Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2003) proposed that in private equities, as well as 
in public companies, higher idiosyncratic risk or unsystematic risk should be 
associated with higher returns which means that higher industry 
specialization implies higher performance54. 
 
Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) also relied on data as collected by VE. 
However, they focused on the determinants of the speed of the draw-downs 
and capital distribution and documented the following results: It takes six 
years for a private equity fund to invest 90% of its committed capital55, and 
this has an enormous effect on performance; the IRR does not turn positive 
until the eighth year of the fund’s life56; The IRR between 1981 and 1993 
averages 19.81% (net of all fees) which implies an excess return close to six 
percent per annum (S&P500 was 14.1%) 
 
                                                 
54 Being focused allows GPs to work with more specialized teams in a high number of 
similar deals. Additionally, close contacts within a specific industry can be built thus 
improving the overall performance. 
55 They identified to key factors: time variation in the availability of investment opportunities 
and competition for deal flow with other private equity funds. 
56 This underlines the opportunity cost of the capital not invested and therefore the illiquidity 
of PEF investments. It also implies that “interim” IRRs computed before a fund reaches 
maturity are not very informative. 
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Phalippou and Zollo (2005) were the first to focus on how macroeconomic 
conditions influence performance and whether there is evidence of non-linear 
risk factors. They found that PEF performance is significantly pro-cyclical and 
increases with GDP growth rate, and decreases with the average level of 
interest rates (in particular corporate bond yields)57. Performance significantly 
increases with both the average return on the stock-market (CRSP-VW  
index) and the average return on the call options written on the S&P 
composite index. This showed, according to Phalippou and Zollo (2005), that 
like hedge funds, PEFs reveal tail risk, i.e. non-linear systematic risk (see 
also Aggarwal and Naik, 2004). 
 
Phalippou and Gottschalg stated:  
 
“the performance of Private Equity Funds as reported by industry 
associations and previous research is overstated. A large part of 
performance is driven by inflated accounting valuation of ongoing 
investments.” Phalippou and Gottschalg (2008:1787). 
 
They found that: commonly-used datasets contain PEFs that perform better 
than average; poorly-performing funds invest more slowly and therefore 
capital-committed-weighted performance is downward biased and vice 
versa58 (opportunity cost). 
 
                                                 
57 When either credit spreads or corporate bond yields are low at the time investments are 
made, fund performance is higher. This is due in part to the fact that with low interest PEF 
target companies leverage more efficiently.  
58 See also Lerner, Schoar and Wong (2007). 
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In addition, authors who found negative alphas (like Phalippou and 
Gottschalg, 2008) stated that certain investors might have mis-valued this 
asset class. Some potential explanations regarding the low performance 
found in PEFs are proposed. For instance, investor objectives may not only 
be to maximize returns but to establish commercial relationships with GPs in 
order to increase the likelihood that the funds will purchase LP’s services like 
consulting (M&A services)59. Additionally, pension fund managers and 
government-related agencies, invest in PEFs to stimulate local economies 
(see Lerner, Schoar, and Wong 2007). In sum, these are all non-pecuniary 
drivers. Furthermore, all these externalities in investor behaviours might 
partially explain the so-called “private equity premium puzzle”. 
 
Lopez-de-Silanes and Phalippou (2008) focused the analysis on the 
economies of scale effects on performance. The study established a negative 
effect of scale on performance due to the following reasons:  
- Size may penalize purchase prices. Firms may have a limited number 
of good ideas;  
- Scale increases may imply diseconomies of scope60. Private equities 
investing in many different types of companies may lose specialization 
                                                 
59 This may be corroborated by a recent study conducted by Hellmann, Lindsey, and Puri 
(2005). 
60 They used two measures of “focus”: an industry Herfindhal index, and the number of 
different industries in which the firm invests. They found evidence of diseconomies of scope 
in addition to the scale effect. 
93 
 
as well as scope. These conclusions also conform to the Manigart et 
al. (2002) findings61; 
-  Communication costs and increasing workload. 
 
Overall, “PEF performance suffers when the value-added capacity of a 
management team needs to be shared across more investments. The 
negative effects are minimized by experience, more homogeneous teams 
and flatter hierarchies.” (Lopez-de-Silanes and Phalippou 2008:6)62.  
 
Gompers and Lerner (1999, 2000) argued that there is a limited number of 
favourable investments in the private equity industry that has to be matched 
with a fluctuation in capital supply. This issue gave birth to the so-called 
“money-chasing deals phenomenon” which states that there is a negative 
correlation between a fund’s performance and the amount of money directed 
toward the private equity industry63. 
 
Kaserer and Diller (2007) also confirmed the “money-chasing deals 
phenomenon” for the European markets64 by showing that, for a given 
                                                 
61 Other studies approaching the trade-off between larger/smaller portfolios and 
diversified/concentrated portfolios are: Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2003); Bernile et al. 
(2007); Cumming (2006); Fulghieri and Sevilir (2008); Jones and Rhodes-Kropf (2004); Dai 
and Cumming (2008); Gompers et al. (2008). 
62 Further studies for economies of scale / scope can be found in: Lang and Stulz (1994); 
Graham et al. (2002); Campa and Kedia (2002); Villalonga (2004); Gompers et al. (2006). 
63 See also Inderst and Muller (2003) who warned about the value-reducing effects of 
increasing the supply of funds to the private equity industry when competition for 
good projects is high. 
64See also Fiet (1995); Forlani and Mullins (2000); Wright et al. (2004); Kut et al. (2006). 
94 
 
absolute funds inflow, an increase in the allocation of money towards a 
particular fund type has a significant negative impact on the performance of 
that particular fund type. They showed that private equity fund returns are 
driven by market sentiment, GPs’ skills and stand-alone investment risk65. 
 
In addition, Gompers and Lerner (2000) argued that PEF markets are 
imperfect due to the fact that this asset class is segmented from other asset 
classes. Since PEFs are not permitted to invest in other asset classes, GPs 
are not able to redirect newly-committed funds outside the asset class even 
in the case of industry over-valuation. Therefore, if an increase in capital 
inflow is not accompanied by an increase in the number of investment 
projects, then both competition and valuations increase66. This effect might 
be amplified, if the asset class is illiquid as in the case of PEFs. 
 
As seen during this section, all these studies were primarily concerned in the 
calculation of past performance using a diverse spectrum of methodologies. 
However, when the authors come to interpret and understand the different 
results, they infer the existence of interesting new phenomena which might 
drive the ex-ante PEF risk premium. These phenomena are not included as 
explicit factors in the asset pricing models seen in chapter 2. All these 
phenomena will be summarized in section 3.5. 
                                                 
65 The investment policy as defined by the investment focus in terms of the stages of 
portfolio companies. 
66 However they admitted that there is not enough evidence to explain whether higher 
valuations due to better economic prospects cause higher inflows or whether higher inflows 
cause higher valuations. They suggested the second explanation, that is, the “money-chasing 
deals” phenomenon because of the performance of deals closed in “hot” periods, (periods 
with high inflows) is not better than the performance of deals closed during “cold” periods. 
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3.2.4 The PEF Risk Premium from an Ex-Ante Perspective 
 
This section will review the existing literature focusing on an ex-ante 
perspective by first looking at the phenomena found in these papers and 
second by looking at some very recent models. The literature in this arena 
(the west cells of Table 3.1) is limited and very young. 
 
3.2.4.1 Ex-Ante Phenomena 
 
Manigart et al. (2002) were among the first authors to study performance in 
an ex-ante perspective. They initially introduced some particular issues 
present in PEFs and PHCMs which question the traditional valuation theory, 
their assumptions and models: First, the lack of information; second, PEF 
managers are actively involved in companies; third, the lack of marketability; 
fourth, difficulty in diversifying; fifth, the higher idiosyncratic risk.   
 
Thereafter, PEFs were asked to give their required return (ex-ante) according 
to specific investment stages: early stage, expansion and acquisition/buy-out. 
In fact, Carter and Van Auken (1994) stated that stage of development is 
directly proportional to risk assessment and return potential.  Manigart et al. 
(2002) used two theoretical perspectives: The resource-based theory (RBT)67 
and the TFT.  
                                                 
67 TFT is based on the fact that investors can reduce risk and therefore add value by 
diversifying their portfolios. On the contrary, the RBT is based on the premise that economic 
value added (EVA) comes from the collection of distinctive internal resources and 
capabilities and therefore specialization (as opposed to diversification) reduces risk and adds 
value.  
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The RBT is an alternative theory outside TFT to describe PEFs’ behavior.  In 
general, Manigart et al. (2002) found that higher required returns are 
associated with PEFs providing more intensity of monitoring (fees-effect), 
diversified portfolios (specialization-effect) and having shorter expected 
holding periods of investment. 
 
They concluded their quantitative analysis by stating: First, diversification is 
not generally viewed by PEFs as a risk-reduction strategy as it should be 
according to traditional finance; Second, high levels of monitoring intensity 
are associated with high levels of IRR. This last finding implies that risk is not 
the only factor considered by PEFs to determine IRR as it should be for 
traditional finance. 
 
Another interesting observation suggested that the greater the percentage of 
small-sized investments held by a PEF, the lower its required return68. 
According to the authors, one possible explanation is that such PEFs use the 
number of investments as a hedge against performance variance. Perhaps 
PEFs without a good reputation are relegated to smaller deals, accepting 
less favourable returns.  
 
They also found that required returns for independent PEFs are significantly 
higher than for captive and publicly-supported firms for early-stage and 
expansion-stage investments. However, they are not able to separate risk 
                                                 
68 This observation seems to contradict the specialization effect. However, the specialization 
effect refers to industry sector diversification and not to the size and number of deals 
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factors from cost factors (TFT factors from RBT factors) which is a vital gap 
regarding their research objectives and conclusions.  
 
Manigart et al. (2002)’s paper also brought to light further research needs: 
first, the lack of information about industry or sectors which is essential to 
strengthen any assumption regarding specialization; second, any competition 
effect between PEFs which force them to adopt fashions when investing 
outside their arena distorting the obtained data regarding real perceived risk 
drivers; Third, a study regarding the difference between perceived and 
realized risk drivers (in this direction, this thesis intends to add a significant 
value). 
 
Concerning the first issue, Sapienza and Gupta (1994) found that low goal 
congruence, early stage-of-venture development, and high levels of 
innovation, may increase the frequency of PEF-CEO interaction. This 
confirms that the sole classification of PEFs into investment stages (as 
proposed by Manigart et al. 2002) would not be enough to understand these 
drivers. Furthermore, Sapienza and Gupta (1994) raised the issue as to 
whether these factors really increased the risk of the investment or just the 
perceived risk of PEFs, a problem also mentioned in the third issue.  
 
Regarding the second issue, market cultural factors like fashion could be 
forcing PEFs to assess risk and value according to false risk drivers. 
Therefore, there are further reasons to think that the study conducted by 
Manigart et al. (2002) could be distorted. Here again, these factors increase 
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the difference between risk perception and true risk drivers, leading us to put 
greater importance on the third issue. 
 
Finally, in the third issue, it is important to learn how PEFs really calculate the 
exact return required for each case starting from the understanding of the 
perceived risk drivers which compose those final values (this is the core of 
this thesis). Here again, instead of inferring causations from incomplete and 
biased information, it might be more fruitful to explore perceived causations 
in the first place. 
 
March and Shapira (1987) examined how perceived risk could differ from true 
risk. Specifically, they identified ways in which the conceptions of risk lead to 
orientations to risk that are far from what might be expected from the decision 
theory perspective.  
 
Sitkin and Pablo (1992) identified two different concepts as a cause for 
behaviour under risk: risk propensity and risk perception. Future studies 
aimed at determining the PEFs’ required return (the core of this research 
project), should first capture the PEFs’ process of interpretation in order to 
identify both risk perception drivers and risk propensity. All these studies and 
concepts underlined the importance of an ex-ante perspective.  
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3.2.4.2 Ex-post-based Models 
 
This section will deal with the literature which, like this thesis, is more 
concerned with calculating the risk premium and developing models in an ex-
ante perspective. In studying the models in existence, this section expands 
section 2.7 of chapter 2.  
  
Jegadeesh et al. (2009) were among the very few69 to study private equity 
investors’ expectations. These authors observed the market prices of the 
listed funds of funds (FoFs)70 and then compared these prices with the 
capital initially invested in the PEFs (any difference should show the 
expected return - E.IRR). In addition, like Korteweg and Sorensen (2009)71, 
Jegadeesh et al. (2009) tried to estimate the risk premium by using the four-
factor model developed by Cahart (1997)72. Table 3.2 shows their attempt to 
assess the risk premium: 
 
 
 
                                                 
69 Similar studies can only be found in: Martin and Petty (1983); Brophy and Guthner 
(1988); Bilo et al. (2005). 
70 The relationship between market prices of these FoFs with the amount they invest in 
unlisted PEFs provides a measure of the value added expected by the underlying PEFs. 
71 Refer to chapter 2. 
72 The four-factor formula of Cahart (1997) uses the model of Fama and French (1993) and 
adds the momentum factor not captured by the former: 
E(R) = Rf +  β * Rm + (βs * Rs) + (βv * Rv) + (β mom * R mom) 
Where:  
(β mom * R mom) refers to the momentum effect already seen in chapter 2. 
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Table 3.2  The Risk Premium in the FoFs 
                               
 
Source: Jegadeesh et al. (2009) 
 
As shown in Table 3.2, the risk premium73 is between 5.9% and 7%74. 
Through the difference between the E.IRR and the risk premium shown in the 
table, these authors suggested that investors in organized markets expect 
unlisted funds to earn abnormal returns of one to two percent, net of their 
fees, in the long run.  
 
The problems in the methodologies used by these authors to calculate the 
expected IRR as well as the risk premium are twofold: First, these being 
calculations based on FoFs holding many different PEFs, the outputs refer to 
                                                 
73 Since βs is much greater than zero, the authors conclude that PEFs behave more like small 
firms than large firms. This is logical since many PEFs invest in firms that are smaller than 
those firms quoted in the organized markets. In addition, since βv is near zero, PEFs might 
be more sensitive to value firms than to growth firms. One possible explanation is that PEFs 
have significant investments in buyouts which are more likely to be value firms than growth 
firms. 
74  Such results might contradict the common intuition of private equity investors having 
high expectations. For example: The Financial Times (September 26, 2005) reported that 
investors in the UK hoped to make an average annual net return of 12.8 percent from their 
private equity investments. 
Min Val Max Val
βm (beta market) 0,8 0,95 βs: Since this value is much greater than zero, the authors concluded that PEFs
βs (beta size) 0,44 0,55 behave  more like small firms than large firms. This is reasonable since most PEFs
βv (beta value) 0,34 0,4 invest  in firms that are smaller than quoted firms
βm (beta momentum) 0,06 0,06 βv: Since this value is near to zero, PEFs might be more sensitive to value firms
 than to growth firms. One possible explanations is that PEFs have significant
Rm (market premium) 5,0% 5,0% investments in Buyouts which are more likely to be value firms than growth firms.
Rs (size Premium) 1,5% 1,5% Risk Premium: The authors used the four factor model of Carhart 1997 
Rv (Value premium) 3,5% 3,5% and caculate regressions (betas) accordingly.
Rmom (momentum premium) 1% 1% Expected Value: The authors compared the market price of FoFs 
(holding unlited PEFs) with the amount of capital initially invested
Risk Premium (yearly) 5,9% 7,0%
Expected value 8,9% 10,0%
alpha 3,0% 3,0%
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a portfolio of PEFs and not to a single PEF (each of them having different 
portfolios of investments and very different risks). Each single PEF might 
show specific risk characteristics depending on the portfolio of investments 
they hold and therefore a diversified value given by the FoFs might make 
little sense, when being used to estimate the expected premium; Second, the 
database is based on listed FoFs where the illiquidity risk present in their 
portfolio might not be reflected (this is probably the reason why the risk 
premium estimated in the study of Jegadeesh et al. (2009) is intuitively very 
low). Furthermore, most of the risk drivers generated by the nature of the 
PEFs might not be reflected in quoted FoFs. 
 
Korteweg and Sorensen (2009) as well as Jegadeesh et al. (2009) were 
among the very first attempts to develop models for an ex-ante perspective. 
However, Franzoni et al. (2010) claimed to be the first to provide a study 
which estimated the cost of capital of PEFs in a large sample, and based 
their predictive model in the data of that sample. In fact, Korteweg and 
Sorensen (2009 and 2010), as shown in chapter 2, concentrated their sample 
only on venture capital investments (holding portfolios with investments at 
early stages). 
 
Franzoni et al. (2010) used a unique dataset containing the detailed cash-
flows generated by 4,403 liquidated private equity investments including both 
successful and unsuccessful investments75 avoiding any problem of selection 
bias.  
                                                 
75 Since this database covers liquidated investments, it contains both successful and 
unsuccessful investments (if fact, about 10% of the investments are bankrupt). 
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In addition, Franzoni et al. (2010) based their study on the recent literature 
regarding the illiquidity risk priced into the valuation of public equity (e.g. 
Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Sadka (2006), 
and Bekaert et al. (2007). This means that stocks whose returns are more 
sensitive to aggregate liquidity have higher average returns.  They argued 
that PEFs are exposed to three types of liquidity risk: 
- First, Acharya and Pedersen (2005) stated that liquidity risk originates 
from uncertainty over transaction costs.  
- Second, PEFs’ investors may have a higher tolerance for liquidity risk. 
As a result, PEFs are likely to load on liquidity risk more heavily. 
- Third, PEFs’ investments are highly leveraged (LBOs) and often need 
to be re-financed. In times in which aggregate liquidity is low, creditors 
may choose to force PEFs’ investments into bankruptcy rather than 
providing new finance. In addition, PHCs have normally higher and 
more short-term leverage than public companies (e.g. Axelson et al., 
2010). As a result, PHCs have more frequent re-financing needs. 
 
Instead of the IRR, Franzoni et al. (2010) used the MIRR or modified IRR, 
which assumes that intermediate cash flows are re-invested by LPs at the 
S&P500 rate of return. This MIRR considers only the intermediate cash flows 
during the life of the deal (investments minus dividends minus 
disinvestments), and not during the life of the PEF, and therefore the speed 
effect seen in section 2.3.4 is not included in their model. 
 
Thereafter, Franzoni et al. (2010) estimated risk premium and the cost of 
capital for PEFs using the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993) 
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adding a new factor: The Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) (PS) liquidity factor. 
The results showed that the liquidity premium is 4.5% annually. The market 
risk premium is 7.5% annually. The HML and SMB premiums are 4.9% and 
2.9% annually, respectively. Table 3.3 shows the results considering the 
calculations made with the SLM-CAPM (first column), the three-factor model 
of Fama and French without a liquidity factor (second column) and the four-
factor model adding the PS liquidity factor (third column). 
 
Table 3.3 The Risk Premium Estimated with Three Different CAPMs 
 
Source: Franzoni et al. (2010) 
 
The risk premium with CAPM is the lowest at roughly 7.7% per year. This 
model leaves unexplained a high 8.5% annual alpha. In the second column, 
once the risk premiums on the book-to-market and size factors are taken into 
account, the alpha drops to about 2.3%. With the Fama & French model, the 
risk premium rises to around 15%.  In the model with liquidity (third column of 
Table 3.3), the premiums on the four factors entirely account for average 
private equity returns. The alpha is virtually zero, while the risk premium is 
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about 18%76. In this last model, the market risk premium is 10%. The book-
to-market premium is 4.7%, while the size premium is negligible. Finally, the 
liquidity risk premium amounts to 3.1% per year. In sum, the four-factor 
model produces the highest risk premium and cost of capital.  
 
Franzoni et al. (2010) also found that the returns of more mature PEFs are 
more sensitive to liquidity risk. This may be because older firms are more 
levered (James and Demiroglu (2010)), or because they have investors with 
deeper pockets and, hence, higher risk tolerance, or both. In addition, they 
observed that liquidity conditions are related to a number of macro-economic 
variables. For instance: Industrial production growth and the change in IPO 
volume are positively related to PEF returns; changes in default spread and 
changes in volatility are negatively related to returns. These results show that 
PEFs’ investments have superior returns when they are held during times of 
positive shocks to aggregate liquidity. The opposite is true for negative 
shocks. 
 
These authors also mentioned for the first time in the literature77 the concepts 
of threshold IRR and hurdle IRR78 (H.IRR). In this sense, they found that their 
threshold IRR or cost of capital (24%) is in contrast to the widely-used hurdle 
rate of 8% by which GPs are compensated. This calls current compensation 
                                                 
76 According to Gervasoni and Sattin (2008) who are not only academics but also 
practitioners and GPs, the market premium (net of fees) oscillates between 10% and 15%.  
77 To the knowledge of these researchers. 
78 These concepts have been revealed by this research study during the data  collection 
process in 2010 before the publication of this article. Both concepts will be introduced and 
explained in chapter 5. 
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practices into question. Fund managers (GPs) receive performance-based 
compensation if they achieve returns above the accepted 8% per annum, but 
this hurdle rate seems low in view of these last findings. 
 
3.2.5 Commentary on the Literature Reviewed 
 
In sum, Franzoni et al. (2010) seem to be the first to provide an ex-post-
based model that could be used in an ex-ante perspective79.  However, 
according to the author of this thesis, Franzoni et al. (2010)’s work presents 
some important limitations:  
- First, they were not able to relate the risk premium to the new 
phenomena found in the PEFs in the literature of the last couple of 
decades (section 3.2.4.2). These new phenomena might be driving the 
risk premium in the PEFs. In particular, the illiquidity risk could be 
hiding other factors and drivers which were not mentioned in their 
paper;  
- Second, they based their study on past information (ex-post realized 
returns) to calculate the future expected return and the risk premium.  
- Third, they were not able to account for the opportunity cost (found by 
Ljungquist and Richardson, 2003 and Phalippou and Gottschlag, 
2008) during the whole life of the PEF. 
                                                 
79 The paper of Franzoni et al., (2010) was written during the data collection process of this 
thesis when most of the concepts like the threshold IRR had been already found and the 
scope already defined. 
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- Fourth: They used the PC liquidity factor which is a risk priced in 
public markets. Instead, illiquidity conditions present in PEFs might be 
completely different and driven by other factors. 
 
Indeed, as stated in chapter 2, the extrapolation of historical averages is 
widely criticized and presents many limitations. From an epistemological 
point of view, by using a past premium, researchers are assuming that 
investors’ expectations and their risk perceptions are only based on past 
realized returns.  
 
In order to overcome the limitations of the study conducted by Franzoni et al. 
(2010), it is desirable to design a study with a completely different approach 
which implies a qualitative and quantitative survey aimed at assessing GPs’ 
perceptions and expectations in an ex-ante perspective. Such a survey might 
allow researchers not only to understand the drivers behind the risk premium 
but also to complement the ex-post-based models proposed by Franzoni et 
al. (2010) and other authors. This thesis is intended to apply this different 
approach. The details of the methodology are explained in chapter 4. 
 
For the time being, it seems that the only paper with such an approach is that 
of Manigart et al. (2002). These are the only authors who have conducted a 
survey80 directed at capturing risk-drivers in an ex-ante perspective.81 
                                                 
80 This paper develops hypotheses regarding the determinants of the return required by PEFs 
and tests them on a sample of over 200 PEFs located in five European countries. They try to 
understand the determinants of their required returns by using two theoretical perspectives: 
The Resource-Based Theory (RBT) and the Financial Theory (TFT) . 
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However, they were not able to develop a model, and their study remains 
somewhat superficial without addressing “why?” and “how?” questions. As a 
consequence, like most researchers, they are also forced to infer causations 
rather than reveal them from deeper questions and facts. 
 
The studies outlined in this section, like this thesis, were more concerned in 
calculating the risk premium and developing models in an ex-ante 
perspective. Like those papers seen in section 3.3.2 (the ex-post 
perspective), these papers also inferred the existence of interesting new 
phenomena which might drive the PEF risk premium. However, these 
phenomena were not included as explicit factors in the models. The next 
section will deal with some specific drivers present in the privately-held 
companies and their interaction with the PEFs.  
 
3.3 PEFs and their PHCs Targets - (EMH and Agency Theory) 
 
As seen in chapter 2, proponents of Behavioural Finance Theory (BFT) 
argued that psychological forces interfere with TFT and distort both human 
interactions (agency theory) and prevent decision-makers from acting in a 
rational manner (EMH). Since privately-held markets are more inefficient and 
irrational than public or organized markets, this section will briefly try to look 
at some of their particular features when assessed by PEFs (see chapter 2, 
section 2.7.1).  
                                                                                                                                          
81 They developed hypotheses regarding the determinants of the IRR by PEFs and tested 
them on a sample of over 200 PEFs located in five European countries. 
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The issue of transaction costs can be traced back to Ronald Coase (1937) 
who studied the boundaries of firm size. The traditional economic theory 
suggested that, if the market is "efficient" (in accordance with the EMH) it 
should always be cheaper to contract out than to hire (because of the 
specialization of the suppliers). However, Coase underlined that transaction 
costs are present in the market. For instance: the cost of obtaining a good; 
search and information costs; keeping trade secrets; bargaining costs; etc.  
 
Therefore, companies will arise when they can produce what they need 
internally avoiding those costs. On the other side, there is a natural limit to 
what can be produced internally.  In fact, Coase observes "decreasing 
returns to the entrepreneur function", due to: increasing overhead costs and 
increasing propensity to make mistakes.  
 
Consequently, Coase argued that the size of a firm is a result of finding an 
optimal balance between these competing forces. If a PEF scales up (hires 
more professionals in order to make more investments), the utilization of 
knowledge spreads out but the communication/hierarchy required increases 
(Bolton and Dewatripont, 1994; Stein, 2002; Vayanos, 2003). However, the 
issue might be a little different for non-organized markets. 
 
Since PHCMs are farther away from organized markets in meeting the EMH 
conditions, the issue of economies of scale and scope in private equity funds 
presents new challenges for research. For instance, Gupta and Sapienza 
(1994) and Manigart et al. (2002) argued that PEFs manage risk through 
monitoring and involvement rather than through diversification. In other 
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words, industry specialization and monitoring intensity might be key risk 
drivers for private equity funds and not merely a means to gain economies of 
scale and scope.  
 
Additionally, some of the concepts developed by the BFT to explain 
irrationalities in organized markets can also elucidate some phenomena 
explored in the last sections like the entrepreneurial or management 
overconfidence82. In fact, investors’ overestimated cash flow expectations 
and mis-perceived risk in regarding private equity markets could be the 
explanation for the “public puzzle” as Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen 
(2002) suggested. 
 
In the same manner, the persistence found in fund performance (GPs whose 
funds outperform the industry in one funding round, are likely to outperform 
the industry in the next and vice versa), can clearly be explained through the 
behavioural concept known as representativeness (Kahneman and Tversky 
1972). Additionally, the “money-chasing deal phenomenon” could also have 
behavioral causes. For instance, the overshooting of capital investments in 
PEF may be due to herding behavior, where investment opportunities are 
systematically over-  or under-estimated by investors.  
 
                                                 
82 Russo and Schoemaker (1992) find that managers are dramatically overconfident. 
Huberman (2001) and Benartzi (2001) document that investment portfolios are over-
weighted toward familiar assets, the most familiar of which is being the employer’s stock. 
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If investors are rational - “A rational investor assesses a stock by its 
fundamental value” (Blanchard 2000) - , expectations should be influenced 
by past performances83. However, in quoted firms, this is not exactly the case 
since one of the well-known anomalies has to do with the post-
announcements effect.  Additionally, private equity firms’ history being 
relatively short84, expectations could be influenced by survivorship bias of 
unexpected good results of the first years when competition was low and 
deals were more profitable. 
 
Another important issue in the TFT for stock-quoted companies is the 
"principal-agent problem". The principal (investor) cannot control the agent 
(management) fully due to an asymmetry in information. Essentially, this 
implies that management (insiders) has more accurate information about the 
business than the outside investor and is able to acquire information at a 
lower transaction cost. In the case of the private equity funds, in which GPs 
act as insiders, the whole paradigm might change. In fact, through the 
managerial efficiency GPs, the use of properly-managed, integrated financial 
exchanges would radically lower transaction costs. 
 
Additionally, agency theory proposes to solve the potential issues generated 
by the control-deficit through a hostile take-over. In fact, this is a 
consequence of the strong version of the EMH which states that: “a firm’s 
stock price accurately reflects its intrinsic value”. Considering this statement, 
                                                 
83 Since, the future is unobservable, ex-post returns should be the only feasible way to 
estimate expected returns in a rational manner. 
84 Consider that most studies are based on liquidated PEFs. That is PEFs between 1980 and 
1995 which were the first experiences for private equity funds.  
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any opportunistic behaviors among the insiders will be reflected in the stock 
price (under-valued) and a potential bidding firm willing to create value by 
correcting the sub-optimal value. In other words, 
, 
 “Agency theory underscores and elaborates on this theory of mergers when 
it posits that agents tend to slack off and behave opportunistically.” (Bratton, 
2008:8). 
 
However, such a level of efficiency can only occur in ideal markets where the 
strong version of the EMH might operate. This is obviously not the case of 
privately-held markets in which inefficiencies and opportunistic behaviors are 
not reflected in market prices (simply because there are no market prices), 
and where it is much more difficult for an investor to exchange the shares 
(due to the lack of marketability of private shares and the high transaction 
costs involved).  
 
Therefore, part of the success of the private equity firms comes from two 
main reasons. First, they are able to minimize transaction costs incurred by 
common private investors in buying and selling companies. For instance: 
they have the know-how, the contacts, and research tools to buy and sell 
companies.  Second, acting as insiders and aligning the management of the 
target firms, they eliminate any potential opportunistic behavior and therefore 
can gain from the huge inefficiencies present in privately-held markets.  
 
Such ideas were confirmed by a study conducted by Cable and Shane 
(1997) directed at demonstrating the nature of the relationship between 
112 
 
entrepreneurs and PEFs by introducing the Prisoner’s Dilemma Approach85 
in contrast to the traditional Agency Theory Approach86, Sapienza (1992) first 
suggested the long-term value of frequent interactions between 
entrepreneurs and PEFs. He found that PEFs with frequent, open 
communication with entrepreneurs were more successful. Still, many PEFs 
try to minimize their personal interaction with entrepreneurs in favour of low-
contact and fast-payoff investments. 
 
Therefore, it seems that as agency theory suggests, the private equity 
governance structure approaches the ideal:  
 
“here at last we see capitalism allocating risk and return in respect of large 
operating companies in a high-incentive context, free of regulatory 
distortions.” (Bratton, 2008:23) 87.  
 
However, if private equity net performance is so low as many of the 
academic papers studied in the last sections claimed, the implication will be 
that the private equity firms take all the gain they create (in fees, carried 
interests and other imposed charges). 
 
                                                 
85 This approach is directed at enhancing the long-term benefits of mutual cooperation 
(Cable and Shane, 1997), necessary to add value in PEFs.  
86 In this approach, both parties are economically rational and will always engage in short-
term opportunistic behaviour. 
87 Which can be translated into transaction costs: general freedom from the pressures and 
distractions generated by the stock market, the media and the stock exchange analyst. Free 
from these pressures they can pay more attention to the company’s operations and long term 
targets.    
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Most of the papers reviewed in the last sections inferred the existence of new 
phenomena which might be related to the nature of both PEFs and PHCMs. 
In particular, this last section has revealed some particular factors that 
operate in the interaction of these two worlds (PEFs and PHCs).   
 
3.4 Summary of the Phenomena Introduced by the Existing Literature. 
 
Overall, most papers examined in sections 2 and 3 rest on the observation of 
past information and infer the existence of several important phenomena. 
Whether GPs are conscious of their existence and price these factors in 
some way is not yet known to academia. These phenomena can be 
summarized as follows: 
 
- The “Money-chasing deal phenomenon”: Gompers and Lerner 
(1999, 2000) argued that there is a limited number of favorable 
investments in the private equity industry that has to be matched with 
a fluctuating capital supply. 
- PEF segmentation: Since PEFs are not permitted to invest in other 
asset classes, GPs are not able to redirect newly-committed funds 
outside the asset class in the event of industry over-valuation. 
Therefore, if an increase in capital inflow is not accompanied by an 
increase in the number of investment projects, then both competition 
and valuations increase (Gompers and Lerner, 2000).  
- Agency-theory factors: In the traditional agency theory approach, the 
relationship between investor and management suffers from 
asymmetry. In the case of the private equity funds, in which GPs act 
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as insiders, the whole paradigm might change. In fact, through GPs, 
the use of properly-managed, integrated financial exchanges should 
radically lower transaction costs (Bratton, 2008).  
- Specialization-effect: Being focused allows GPs to work with more 
specialized teams in a high number of similar deals. Additionally, close 
contacts within a specific industry can be built thus improving the 
performance (Manigart et al., 2002). 
- Monitoring Intensity or Fees-effect: PEFs might be more fees-
oriented than expected performance-oriented. They might take all the 
value they create in fees, carried interests, stock options, and other 
imposed charges (Manigart et al., 2002). 
- Investment speed-effect: Funds vary in both the speed with which 
they call/invest capital and in the fraction they actually call/invest. 
Poorly-performing funds seem to invest more slowly (Phaliphou and 
Gottschalg, 2008). 
- Performance persistence: GPs whose funds outperform the industry, 
are likely to outperform the industry in the next fund they manage and 
vice versa. As a consequence, better GPs may be able to invest in 
better investments and get better deal terms (lower valuations) 
(Kaplan and Schoar, 2005). 
- Learning cost effect: Performance might reflect a learning cost in the 
first years (Phalippou and Zollo, 2005 and 2006). 
- Economies of scale and scope: PEF performance suffers when the 
value-adding capacity of a management team needs to be shared 
across more investments (Lopez-de-Silanes and Phalippou, 2008). 
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- Non-linear systematic risk: PEF performance is significantly pro-
cyclical and improves with GDP growth rate and deteriorates with the 
average level of interest rates (in particular corporate bond yields) 
(Phalippou and Zollo, 2005). 
- Investors’ (LPs) misperceived expectations due to valuation 
biases: Phalippou and Gottschalg stated: “the performance of private 
equity funds as reported by industry associations and previous 
research is overstated. A large part of performance is driven by 
inflated accounting valuation of ongoing investments.” Phalippou and 
Gottschalg (2008:1747). 
- Over-confidence (Hubris): For instance, entrepreneurs and PEF 
managers may be over-optimistic about their own investment 
decisions and perspectives (Moskowitz and Jorgensen, 2000). 
- Representativeness: The persistence found in fund performance can 
clearly be explained through the behavioural concept known as 
representativeness (Kahneman and Tversky 1972). 
- Herding behavior: The “money-chasing deals” phenomenon could 
also have behavioral causes. For instance, the overshooting of capital 
investments in PEF may be due to herding behavior, where 
investment opportunities are systematically over- or under-estimated 
by investors. 
- PEF non-pecuniary drivers: For instance, investor objectives may be 
not only to maximize returns but to establish commercial relationships 
with GPs in order to increase the likelihood that the funds will 
purchase LPs’ services like consulting (M&A services). Additionally, 
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pension fund managers and government-related agencies, invest in 
PEFs to stimulate local economies (Moskowitz and Jorgensen, 2000). 
 
Table 3.4 summarizes and classifies each phenomenon according to the 
author who inferred it88 and the perspective of his/her study. 
 
Table 3.4: Summary of the Phenomena 
Phenomenon Author Perspective (*) 
The “Money chasing deal phenomenon” Gompers and Lerner, 1999 SE 
PEF segmentation Gompers and Lerner, 2000 SE 
Agency-theory factors Cable and Shane, 1997 SE 
Specialization-effect Manigart et al., 2002 SW 
Monitoring Intensity or Fees-effect   Manigart et al., 2002 SW 
Investment speed-effect Phaliphou and Gottschlag, 2008 SE 
Performance persistence  Kaplan and Schoar, 2005 NE 
Learning cost effect Phaliphou and Zollo, 2005 SE 
Economies of scale and scope Silanes and Phalippou, 2008 SE 
Non-linear systematic risk:  Phaliphou and Zollo, 2005 SE 
LPs misperceived expectation (valuation biases) Woodward, 2004, Phaliphou and 
Gottschlag, 2008 
NW and SE 
Over-confidence (Hubris)  Moskowitz and Jorgensen, 2000 SE 
Representativeness Kahneman and Tversky, 1972 SE 
Herding behavior Kahneman and Tversky, 1972 SE 
PEF non-pecuniary drivers  Moskowitz and Jorgensen, 2000 SE 
 
(*) SE = south east cell, SW = south west cell, NE = north east cell, NW = north west cell. 
 
 
 
                                                 
88 It might not be the first author in history who inferred it but it is the first known to this 
work. 
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has explored the existing literature directed at assessing the 
PEFs’ risk premium from different perspectives (ex-ante, ex-post, gross and 
net of fees). In addition, it has shown the different methodologies that have 
been applied in the last 14 years of research (from Lerner and Gompers, 
1997 to Franzoni et al., 2010) to assess the risk-return drivers in PEFs.  
Consequently, the current academic debate questions the value of both the 
past performance (ex-post) and the risk premium (ex-ante) proposing a wide 
range of possible values for each. 
 
Overall, the papers explored in section 2 and 3 reveal both contradictory 
conclusions regarding the value of the PEFs’ risk-premium as well as new 
phenomena which might drive that premium. Therefore, part of the scope of 
this thesis will be to reveal if GPs consider such phenomena (price these 
factors) when assessing a deal (ex-ante) thus affecting both the T.IRR and 
the E-IRR. 
 
Furthermore, Korteweg and Sorensen (2009) and Franzoni et al. (2010) lead 
the field in accounting for illiquidity risk and develop ex-post-based models 
which can be used in an ex-ante perspective. However, like many other 
studies, theirs are based on past performance and their models were not 
able to identify the phenomena (listed in section 3.4) nor to include them as 
single factors.  
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Overall, the literature reviewed in this chapter is purely quantitative and looks 
merely at statistical effects. Furthermore, the contradictory results and the 
need to reveal real causations instead of just inferring them through the 
observations of naked quantitative data are calling researchers to a new 
approach: The need is for complementary qualitative in-depth research 
methods (Wright and Robbie, 1998) to complement previous studies. 
 
Similarly, it is necessary to have a new perspective (the ex-ante perspective). 
In order to determine the PEF risk premium, it is also necessary to 
distinguish return expectations (driven by risk perceptions) from realized 
returns or past performance, as underlined by Dimson et al. (2003). In this 
scenario, it is also important to understand if and how the latter influence the 
former.  
 
In addition, the only way to capture expectations is to reveal the determinants 
of PEFs’ required return and this can be achieved by getting access to the 
PEFs and observing their perceptions, negotiations and interactions (ex-ante) 
with their target companies. In other words, in order to assess the relative 
importance of the PEFs’ phenomena revealed in this chapter and understand 
how they drive the PEFs’ risk premium, it is necessary to complement 
previous studies with a more qualitative approach. This thesis intends to 
proceed in this direction. 
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4 PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In any research study, choices have to be made as to what kind of 
epistemological perspective is to be taken, and how the study should be 
conducted in order to add knowledge to both academia and practice. This 
chapter details both the ontological and the epistemological stance adopted 
as well as the chosen research method, and will discuss why those choices 
are the most suitable ways to approach the scope of this thesis.  
 
Therefore, the first task is to define the object by asking the most basic 
ontological and epistemological questions: What is the object of this thesis? 
How can that object be approached? The first question can be answered by 
reminding the reader (refer to chapter 1) of the targets of this project, as 
listed below in the following two paragraphs:  
 
x To understand the nature of the risk-return drivers applicable to 
PEFs by looking at GPs’ risk perceptions and return 
expectations when assessing deals. 
x To reveal the determinants of the risk premium (having in mind 
the phenomena found in the last two decades of research), and 
to try to quantify some of those drivers thus being able to 
estimate the cost of a deal (the PEF deal premium) by using a 
modified and extended version of the Fama and French three-
factor CAPM.  
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The second question (How can that object be approached?) will be the main 
topic of this chapter. It starts (section 4.2) by underlining the limitations in the 
epistemological approach of the research studies reviewed in chapters 2 and 
3 (in general, they are considered to be too positivistic) thus showing the 
need for a different type of approach to complement them: Critical Realism. 
Section 4.3 will begin by outlining the merits of the case research study as 
the most suitable research method for this thesis, and consistent with an 
epistemological approach founded on realism. Both the epistemological 
stance (Critical Realism) and the research method (case study) together 
define the methodology of this thesis. 
 
Section 4.3.2 will show the application of the case study research method to 
this research project. Section 4.3.3 will explain the important role of a 
structured questionnaire survey in the case study method. Subsequently, 
section 4.3.4 will outline some examples of business research that have used 
the case study method. Section 4.3.5 will explore the attributes of any 
credible case study research method (i.e. internal validity, external validity 
and reliability. 
 
In addition, section 4.4 will describe in detail the whole data collection 
process followed during the project. It will start in section 4.4.1 by illustrating 
the sample selection process. Finally, section 4.5 will explain the methods 
applied to analyse the data collected. 
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4.2 Research Philosophy 
 
The first task for any researcher is to establish the philosophy of the 
research, that is, to define an ontological and epistemological framework. 
Guba and Lincoln (1985) posit that epistemological orientations provide 
researchers with the guiding principles on which they may base their 
research methods.  
 
However, before choosing the epistemological approach, it is important to 
review past research in this arena. In order to complement previous 
research, the researcher must identify gaps in the epistemology incorporated 
in the previous research, as reviewed in chapters 2 and 3.  
 
4.2.1 Ontological & Epistemological Issues in Past Research 
 
Frankfurter and McGoun (1999) claimed that financial economics is at 
present in a state of paradigm crisis, with ever more anomalies requiring ever 
more special case theories. Saunders (1994) urges that valuation theory 
needs “tests of neutral influences on asset prices that require no 
assumptions”. This author (who is perhaps asking too much) refers to the 
problem of the joint hypothesis discussed in chapter 2.  
 
In fact, the capital asset pricing model is assuming that market players are 
rational (EMH), and most researchers reviewed in chapter 3 based their 
models that aimed to calculate the PEFs’ risk premium purely on capital 
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asset pricing models (For instance: Jegadeesh et al., 2009; Korteweg and 
Sorensen, 2009; Franzoni et al., 2010; etc). Therefore, new research should 
be less dependent on the factors contained in those rational-based models 
and be open to the existence of new drivers. This is one of the intentions of 
this thesis. 
 
Much of valuation theory rests on inductive reasoning: Most authors infer 
causations and build models (generalizations) by looking at past statistical 
information: “if the market recorded a premium of x% in the past, it is 
expected to be so in the future”, “ if the three-factor model can predict the risk 
premium for public markets, it is expected be so for the PEFs”. These 
statements cannot be tested because their reasoning is based on weak 
induction89.  
 
It is therefore desirable to reinforce those statements with a research project 
based on stronger induction: Instead of inferring the determinants of the risk 
premium by looking at past performance, it is more promising to interview 
practitioners directly, to analyze PEF deals qualitatively thus revealing the 
determinants that are priced by PEFs. These determinants could be different 
from those observed in the past statistical information and could even lie 
                                                 
89 There is weak induction when the link between the premise and the conclusion is very 
weak. Example: “I always hang pictures on nails” therefore “All pictures hang from nails”. 
In this example, not only is it possible for the conclusion to be false given the premise, but it 
is even fairly likely that the conclusion is false. Not all pictures are hung from nails; 
moreover, not all pictures are hung. Thus we say that this argument is an instance of weak 
induction. 
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behind some of those factors included in the rational-based capital asset 
pricing models. 
 
Inductive reasoning has been attacked by many philosophers like Sextus 
Empiricus and Karl Popper. However, it was David Hume (1748) who 
underlined the fact that our thinking depends on drawing uncertain 
conclusions from our relatively limited experiences rather than on deductively 
valid arguments (Greetham, 2001:134). For instance, we believe that olives 
will continue to grow because they have done so in the past. However, Hume 
argued inductive reasoning cannot be justified deductively, and so our only 
option is to justify it inductively. However, to justify induction inductively is 
circular. 
 
Therefore, the problem with previous studies in the area of financial 
economics, including the papers studying PEFs, is the fact that almost all of 
them inferred phenomena and causations by looking at statistical data (they 
are based on past experience). The only exception seems to be Manigart et 
al. (2002) who conducted a survey. 
 
However, the problem with the survey of Manigart et al. (2002) is its 
superficiality. These authors prepared a simple questionnaire (administered 
by telephone) where the only possible answers were dichotomous (“yes” or 
“no”) or requesting specific figures - they did not address questions like “why” 
or “how”. Consequently, they are not able to explain in depth the true drivers 
involved, and like many other authors, at the end, they had to infer 
phenomena from the statistical data collected.  
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In addition, traditional finance theory (TFT) and valuation theory rests on the 
view of the “homo-economicus” which refers to a greatly simplified model of 
human behaviour in an individual who is characterized by perfect self-
interest, perfect rationality and free access to perfect information90. On the 
grounds of simplicity, mathematical applicability and the deductive-empirical 
reasoning, human behaviour has been over-simplified. 
 
For instance: What is “value” in valuation theory? Valuation theory rests on 
the following central a priori proposition: “valuation is the mechanism by 
which investors trade cash today for future claims on cash flows.” 
(Mauboussin, 2002:1). If we only considered this intuitive “truth”, the problem 
would be very simple. However, there are other complex realities which stand 
behind cash flows and risks that must be understood: Investors’ behaviors, 
their perceptions and expectations.  
 
In addition, the existence of the anomalies found in the last few decades 
(refer to chapter 2) call into question the epistemological approach used 
which is currently criticized by some authors as being too positivistic (see 
figure 4.1). 
 
 
 
                                                 
90 Assumptions whose foundations are based on the principle of conditional probabilities as 
established in 1763 by the mathematician Thomas Bayes, and by Adam Smith and David 
Ricardo in the 17th and 18th century. 
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Figure 4.1 Characteristics of the traditional epistemological approach       
 
        Source: Author’s own work 
 
Too many assumptions: Saunders (1994) urges that valuation theory needs 
“tests of neutral influences on asset prices that require no assumptions and 
hypotheses”.  
 
Too inductive: Much of valuation theory rests on inductive reasoning. It looks 
at past experience and statistical effects to establish laws and predict the 
future. Authors in TFT are over-pragmatic and devoted to empiricism. They 
trust “appearances” and past experience, sometimes forgetting what Kant 
said: “perceptions without conceptions are blind” (Greetham, 2001:120). 
 
Circular: Models and theories are based on the only justification that “since it 
worked in the past, it will work in the future”. But this kind of inference would 
end in circular reasoning as Hume pointed out (Greetham, 2001:134). 
However, the many anomalies found are calling new researchers (based on 
Popper’s and Kuhn’s thinking) to develop new theories as well as ways of 
falsifying them through deductive reasoning or stronger inductive reasoning.  
 
Too Many
Assumptions
Too inductive Too empirical Circular
Ask: how much
No explanations
No causations
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Not looking for causations nor explanations: at this level, events have a 
multiplicity of causes and mechanisms and the traditional approach 
concentrates its efforts on the quantification of the effects instead of on the 
understanding and explanation of the causes and mechanisms governing 
PEFs’ valuation. “we cannot directly infer a causal effect from a statistical 
effect.” (Marsh, 1988: 229). 
 
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that finance research tends to be too 
positivistic. Conditional predictions based on observations are at the core of 
positivism.  
 
4.2.2 Ontological & Epistemological Approach for This Thesis 
 
When undertaking research, it is essential to consider different research 
paradigms of ontology and epistemology. Since these parameters describe 
assumptions, perceptions, beliefs, and the nature of reality and truth, they 
can influence the way in which the researcher interpret and undertakes the 
object of study.  
 
Blaikie defines ontology as “the science or study of being’ and develops this 
description for the social sciences to encompass ‘claims about what exists, 
what it looks like, what units make it up and how these units interact with 
each other.” Blaikie (1993). Does the reality exist only through experience of 
it (subjectivism), or does it exist independently of those who live it 
(objectivism).  
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Blaikie (1993) also defines epistemology as “the theory or science of the 
method or grounds of knowledge.” Blaikie (1993). In other words, 
epistemology studies the ways in which it is possible to gain knowledge of 
reality, how what exists may be known, what can be known, and what criteria 
must be satisfied in order to be described as knowledge.  
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) defined a framework to classify research 
approaches according to two dimensions (subjectivism and objectivism). 
Thereafter, the subjective-objective dimensions are along axes of ontology, 
epistemology, human nature, and research method. These four frameworks 
can understood and interpreted in the dimension of objectivism or in the 
dimension of subjectivism. 
 
Figure 4.2: Subjectivist-Objectivist Database within Social Science 
 
Source: Holden & Lynch (2004) 
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Figure 4.2 illustrates Morgan and Smircich’s (1980) continuum of six major 
philosophical perspectives. The red circles and ovals show the positioning of 
this study. The figure shows two extreme positions in order to illustrate how a 
researcher‟s ontological stance influences the core assumptions concerning 
epistemology and human nature. The extreme subjectivist argues that reality 
does not exist outside oneself. Therefore, the relevant epistemological stance 
is that knowledge cannot be discovered, as it is subjectively acquired and 
everything is relative.  
 
On the contrary, proponents of the other extreme position, objectivism, are 
realists. They argue that one must keep struggling in understanding the real 
object avoiding “the illusions of idealism in which only the mind – not the 
stubborn, finite, contingent facts of nature – had true existence” (Jaki, 
1975:144)91. They contend that the world exists independently from the 
human mind. 
 
Therefore, valid knowledge about a concrete reality can only be discovered 
through observation and measurement and any reference to the intangible or 
subjective is excluded as meaningless (Giddens, 1976; Morgan and 
Smircich, 1980).  
 
Referring to the Burrell and Morgan (1979) spectrum as well as the Morgan 
and Smircich’s (1980) classification, this research project is positioned (as 
                                                 
91 For instance: Regarding human nature, moral relativism as “dictatorship that recognizes 
nothing as definitive” was particularly underlined by Joseph Ratzinger in a memorable 
passage from the homily he delivered at St. Peter's on the morning of April 18 2005. 
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shown by the red circles in the figure 4.2) in the objectivist approach, that is, 
realism regarding the ontological question and positivism regarding the 
epistemological question.  
 
Regarding the assumption of human nature, as shown by the red circle in the 
figure 4.2, this thesis sees humans as responding mechanisms and, in some 
cases, as adaptive agents. In the first case, human beings are a product of 
the external forces in the environment to which they are exposed. Stimuli in 
their environment condition them to behave and respond to events in 
predictable and determinate ways. A network of causal relationship links all 
important aspects of behaviour to context. Though human perception may 
influence this process to some degree, people usually respond in ways that 
conform to scientific law.  
 
However, as underlined by behavioralists (chapter 3), human beings might 
exist in an interactive relationship with the world. This is the second case in 
which humans influence, and are influenced by, the environment. Investors’ 
behaviour might not always be predictable and rational. Privately-held 
markets are not efficient. Therefore, contrary to previous papers and models 
aimed at assessing PEFs’ risk (reviewed in chapter 3), the normative model 
to be developed by this thesis might consider unpredictability and 
behavioural factors. 
 
From an epistemological point of view, this thesis (as shown by the red circle 
of figure 4.2) intends to study the nature of relationships among the elements 
constituting the ontological structure. It also implies not only understanding 
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and mapping out the phenomena influencing the ontological structure, but 
also specifying the natures of drivers, patterns, and relationships among 
phenomena.  
 
Furthermore, according to Kant’s thinking, researchers should try to 
understand markets and investors independently from experience. In this 
direction, an appropriate epistemological approach to complement the 
positivistic ontological background could be critical realism (Collier, 1994). 
Therefore, this research project will be grounded in the critical realism 
approach to scientific knowledge.  
 
Critical realism is based on the assertion that there is a world that is 
independent of one’s knowledge about it and that this implies fewer a priori 
assumptions and theories. The purpose of science is therefore to describe 
and explain the observable but as yet unobserved aspects of this 
independent world.  
 
In the case of this thesis, “more independent from a priori assumptions” 
implies being cautious about a priori assumptions like that of the illiquidity risk 
being the only explanation for the high PEFs’92 required return. A more 
“independent approach” should reveal both behaviors and risk-drivers which 
are not observable by only looking at past databases. The issue of 
                                                 
92 This was the case of Franzoni et al. (2010) who developed a model (reviewed in chapter 3) 
where the only additional factor added to the three-factor model of Fama and French is the 
illiquidity factor. 
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depending on past data to assess future premiums was especially criticized 
by Arnott and Bernstein (2002). 
 
Therefore, in order to be “more independent”, it is desirable to do what no 
previous study has done before (as least to the knowledge of this 
researcher), that is: To study GP’s assessments and interview them in depth 
in order to understand how they truly behave and why, considering different 
cases. 
 
According to the critical realism perspective and Bhaskar’s transcendental 
arguments93 (Collier, 1994:42), the level of depth to reality can be 
established: 
 
- Most of the authors reviewed in chapter 2 and chapter 3 (“rationalists”) 
belong to the “domain of empirical”. They draw conclusions and predictive 
models only through plain observations of ex-post data. At this level, events 
                                                 
93 Transcendental realism establishes that the object under investigation has real, 
manipulable, internal mechanisms that can be actualized to produce specific outcomes. 
While empiricism locates causal relationships at the level of events, critical realism locates 
them at the level of the generative mechanism, arguing that causal relationships are 
irreducible to empirical constant conjunctions of David Hume's doctrine.  This implies that 
science should be understood as an ongoing process in which scientists improve the concepts 
they use to understand the mechanisms studied. In contrast to the claim of empiricists, it 
should not be about the identification of a coincidence between a postulated independent 
variable and dependent variable. According to critical realism a mechanism will exist but 
either a) go unactivated, b) be activated, but not perceived, or c) be activated, but 
counteracted by other mechanisms, which results in it having unpredictable effects. Thus, 
non-realisation of a posited mechanism cannot (in contrast to the claim of positivists) be 
taken to signify its non-existence. 
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have a multiplicity of causes and mechanisms, and these authors 
concentrate their efforts in the quantification of the effects instead of in the 
understanding and explanation of the causes and mechanisms governing 
them. They infer causations and assume therefore the efficacy of this 
methodology, neither explaining causations nor identifying ways to test 
models; thus ignoring limitations.  
 
- Instead, authors, like some behaviouralists reviewed in chapter 2, are 
located in the “domain of actual”. They observe and analyse markets and 
investors’ behaviours behind the transactions.  
 
- However if one really wants to arrive to the “domain of real” in the 
understanding of PEFs’ behaviour in assessing the risk premium, courage is 
necessary to take a further step. If events are caused by the power of 
things94, we need to recognize what are those things or structures and their 
“hidden” powers. In the case of this thesis, the word “power” refers to those 
hidden determinants that activate the “things” or factors which are driving the 
risk premium. Some of these determinants might be still unknown and some 
others were presented in chapter 3 as potentially hidden drivers. The 
illiquidity factor might be one of those “things” that needs to be unveiled in 
order to find the “power” or determinants (“the power of things”) that activate 
it. 
  
                                                 
94 In this thesis, “things”, as intended by Bashkar’s conception, are the hidden determinants 
that drive the risk premium.  
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In the domain of real, it is also important to have in mind that investors are 
not rational computers whose behaviours can be determined only by 
establishing simple market laws and assumptions. On the contrary, according 
to Bhashkar’s anti-determinist arguments, “laws constrain but do not 
determine events” (Collier, 1994:130).  
 
In sum, through the use of what Bashkar calls “transcendental arguments”, 
we must attempt to explain phenomena, causes and conditions operating in 
the markets. This is what he called “the third domain of knowledge” or “the 
domain of real”: If events are caused by the power of things, we need to 
recognize what those things are and their “hidden” powers (see figure 4.3). 
 
Figure 4.3 Characteristics of Critical Realism 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
McKelvey (1997) holds that critical realism is appropriate for organizational 
studies and that since organizational science is at an early stage of 
development, it is more appropriate to use idealized models constructed 
without the assumptions of any idiosyncrasies. This work heads in this 
direction.  
 
More Independent
from experience
Fewer assumptions
Less Inductive
Looking for
causations
More
Explanatory
Ask: Why & How
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In addition, Miller (1983) provides some general criteria on how to evaluate 
what is a suitable model in social sciences so that it can be used to 
adequately explain the phenomenon under study without the model being too 
complex. For him, the first criterion is that the model should be able to 
identify a sufficient number of explanatory factors95. Secondly, the 
explanatory factors must occur to bring about the phenomenon. Thirdly, the 
explanations need to reach sufficiently far back along the causal chain.  
 
However, contrary to past research studies, this research approach will be 
completely different in terms of research method. In fact, similar research 
methods can belong to either an objective or subjective philosophical 
approach having a dual utilization. Positivism can be pursued by various 
research methods, including quantitative and qualitative ones (and mixed 
ones). However, because quantitative approaches can be quite superficial, a 
qualitative case-oriented approach is preferable in the light of previous 
research in this area. 
 
In fact, according to Wright and Robbie (1998:563), more qualitative in-depth 
research methods are necessary. This implies direct interviews with GPs in 
order to reveal how they think and behave when assessing different deals. 
Questions like “why” and “how” in an ex-ante perspective might be able to 
reveal new phenomena thus complementing previous studies. 
 
                                                 
95 For instance, Franzoni et al. (2010) and their illiquidity risk could be hiding other factors 
behind. In addition some of these factors behind might be those phenomena outlined in 
chapter 3. 
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Perceptions and expectations cannot be inferred by looking at past 
information. On the contrary, they need a kind of approach that allows 
researchers to interview investors and examine several cases in-depth in 
order to understand exactly how GPs behave, how they deal and why, and, 
most of all, what they price on their risk assessments. 
 
Therefore, from a methodological point of view, the scope of this project is to 
complement the highly positivistic and quantitative studies with a more 
qualitative approach capable of finding causations96 and explanations without 
inferring them only from statistical effects. In this sense, a qualitative 
approach through personal interviews was adopted to reveal all risk-drivers in 
order to be able to eventually propose a coherent model.  
 
Studying PEFs’ behaviour, would put evidence on their perceptions and 
expectations which would then be observed under a set of market conditions 
(different cases). In doing so, the researcher can look for definitive purposive 
explanations.  
 
In fact, one of the innovations of this research project is that it looks at the ex-
ante IRR through a qualitative research method (in-depth interviews) directed 
at revealing phenomena and through an explanatory approach able to reach 
sufficiently far back along the causal chain.  
 
                                                 
96 The factors and the determinants of the required return 
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4.3 Research Method - Case Study: Compatibility with a Realistic 
Perspective. 
 
Case study method (the research method chosen for this research project) 
involves in-depth interviews and it has frequently been regarded as a 
qualitative method alone. However, increasingly researchers relying on the 
case study method have quantified the answers in order to conduct statistical 
analysis of case-study results (in financial economics some examples can be 
found in Kaplan & Norton, 1993 and Barkham et al., 1996).The case study 
method is an ideal strategy when “how” or “why” questions are being posed.  
 
“The distinctive need for case studies arises out of the desire to understand 
complex social phenomena.” (Yin, 2003:2).  
 
4.3.1 Introduction to the Case Study Method 
 
A case study allows in-depth understanding: It explores phenomena within 
their context to illuminate how behaviors influence, and are influenced, by 
that context especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not evident. A survey designer, for instance, limits the number of 
variables to be analyzed by reducing the number of questions. (Yin, 2003). 
 
The choice of which method to employ is dependent upon the nature of the 
research problem. Morgan and Smircich (1980) argued that the actual 
suitability of a research method derives from the nature of the social 
phenomena to be explored. According to these authors, there are two 
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methodological approaches in social science: Positivism and Post-positivism 
(phenomenology). With positivism, the researcher observes facts, collects 
data and then through quantitative and qualitative analysis builds up an 
explanation in a chain of causality (see Figure 4.4).  
 
Figure 4.4 Positivist Approach 
         
Source: Author’s own work 
 
However, most of the studies and research papers seen in chapter 2 and 
chapter 3 use only statistical observations and quantitative analysis to infer 
causations. In contrast, post-positivism deals more with a reality which can 
be socially constructed rather than objectively determined. Hence, research 
projects dealing with social phenomena should not aim merely to gather facts 
and measure how often certain patterns occur, but to appreciate the different 
constructions and meanings that people place upon their experience (see 
figure 4.5). 
 
 
Statistical
Observation
Observations
and analysis of
the effects
Causal
Inference
From Effects Observation to Causal Inference
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Figure 4.5 Post- Positivist Approach 
              
Source: Author’s own work 
 
Therefore, post-positivism which intends to explain the subjectivity of 
complex social phenomena, tends to involve a more qualitative approach. 
Since this research project is more concerned than previous research in the 
arena with the explanation of social phenomena: investors’ behavior and 
feelings when assessing investments, the use of a qualitative method is 
particularly important to complement past studies. 
 
This does not mean that the positioning of this thesis in terms of ontological 
grounds is post-positivist. On the contrary, this project has a positivistic 
approach and the case study method can equally be used (as stated in the 
introduction of section 4.3) for both positivist and post-positivist studies.  
 
In explaining qualitative research, Denzin and Lincoln (1994) state that, 
“qualitative” implies an emphasis on processes and meanings that are not 
rigorously examined, measured (if measured at all), in terms of quantity, 
amount, intensity, or frequency. Thus, there are instances, particularly in the 
social sciences, where researchers are interested in insight, discovery, and 
interpretation rather than hypothesis testing. This is also the case of this 
Observation of reality. 
Where the causes of events
operate. 
Where the causes are active
Analysis:
How people 
really think and 
act
Finding of the 
true effects.
From Causal Observation to Effects Analysis  
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thesis which intends to understand phenomena and find their determinants 
by using multiple case studies.  
 
Furthermore, according to Yin (2003), the choosing of the most suitable  
research methods is based on two main conditions: The type of question 
being posed and the extent of control that an investigator has over actual 
behavioral events.  The case study method can be: 
- Explanatory: seeks answers to ‘how?’ or ‘why?’ questions; 
- Exploratory: when a new area is being researched; 
- Descriptive: when the researcher wants just to describe what is going 
on. 
  
Therefore, this project will rest on the exploratory and eventually explanatory 
case method, since this is the recommended strategy (by Yin, 2003) when 
the questions focus on “how” or “why” and when the investigator has no 
control over behavioral events. The choice of this method is also related to 
the fact that this project is more focused on explaining rather than proving or 
predicting. 
                   
4.3.2 The Case Study Applied to this Research Project 
 
Figure 4.6 exhibits the key steps in any case study. The research process of 
this thesis will be based on these steps.  
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Such a scope cannot be achieved by analyzing statistical data of past PEFs 
performance or superficial questionnaires addressed by telephone (like that 
of Manigart et al., 2002) as most previous studies do. This scope needs to:  
- analyze PEFs’ internal processes,  
- assess risk perceptions and value drivers with their causal chains,  
- understand GPs’ thinking, intuitions, targets, incentives, external 
pressures, their relationships and covenants with LPs, etc. 
 
To achieve this scope and obtain this kind of information, it is convenient to 
spend time in each PEF, addressing qualitative and quantitative in-depth 
interviews, and analyzing several deals. One of the reasons why this 
methodology has not been applied before in the PEFs’ field is probably due 
to the fact that the access to PEFs is very difficult because of the 
confidentiality of the information they manage97. However, this researcher 
had the support of the Italian Private Equity Association (AIFI), and without it, 
such an approach would have been impossible.  
 
The support of the AIFI is a unique opportunity that could not be declined and 
provides another reason why this type of approach, the explanatory case 
study, was chosen. Therefore, the purpose of this study is not only to 
measure statistical data but to understand how and why PEFs behave as 
they do. Such an approach can only be made through the in-depth 
explanatory case study method.  
 
                                                 
97 In fact almost all the research papers reviewed in chapter 3 based their observations on 
external databases like held by specialized associations like the EVCA.  
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4.3.3 The Role of Structured Questionnaires in the Case Study Method. 
 
Survey research involves the use of questionnaires to gather data about 
people and their thoughts and behaviors. This method was pioneered in the 
1930s and 1940s by sociologist Paul Lazarsfeld. The survey research 
addresses a questionnaire to a selected representative sample of the 
population under study.  
 
Through the use of surveys, it is possible to obtain a standard and uniform 
approach regarding both the questions asked and the mode in which 
subjects are addressed. This allows the researcher to compare and contrast 
answers by respondent groups and it also ensures higher reliability than most 
other techniques.  
 
However, a survey can also raise some problems. For instance: A survey 
may suffer from a response error or bias because, the respondents might 
hide confidential information which could be important for the purpose of the 
research project. In other cases, respondents might wish to impress or 
please the researcher by providing the kind of responses that they believe 
the researcher is looking for in order to get rid of him quickly.  
 
For the success of the survey, it is very important to motivate respondents 
and involve them in the project. Blau (1964)’s theory of social exchange 
argues that individual’s actions are often motivated by the “rewards” they are 
likely to receive from others. Therefore, in this thesis, one important target 
during the interviews was to motivate respondents and convince them of the 
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importance of having a model capable measuring the required return (T.IRR) 
for both the portfolio and the single deals.  
 
There are some advantages in the use of surveys. First, surveys are a cost-
effective way of investigating how people behave, think and feel. This is 
because surveys can use a random sampling technique to select cases 
which can be used to draw conclusions about the whole population. 
Therefore, by choosing a representative random sample, surveys can give 
internal and external validity, that is: A sample that represents98 the whole 
population thus being able to generate generalizations. 
  
In this thesis, the researcher, together with the AIFI, made the sample 
selection to ensure the presence of a representative sample of the PEFs’ 
Italian population. 13 PEFs were chosen including: Big Italian funds (BIFs), 
Small regional funds (REFs), Pan-European funds (PAFs), and captive funds 
(CAPs). In addition, two deals per PEF were analyzed and here again, a 
representative sample containing different types of deals was selected: Table 
4.1 shows the sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
98 Their representativeness is very dependent upon the accuracy of the sampling frame used. 
It is not always easy to identify an accurate and up-to-date sampling frame.  
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Table 4.1 Sample Selection 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
A second advantage of surveys is the fact that a wide range of approaches 
can be used: personal interviews, postal / E-questionnaires, telephone 
interviews, and archival research. In addition, surveys are also very flexible. 
Interviews and questions can be changed and reviewed since the first 
answers might generate doubts or unexpected outputs which enables the 
researcher to ask follow-up questions. 
 
Due to the fact that this thesis intends to understand investors’ behavior in-
depth, a very intimate approach was necessary (a telephone approach like 
that conducted by Manigart et al. (2002) would have been too superficial). 
Therefore, this thesis has worked through personal in-depth interviews to 
produce richer data (three 1-hour interviews) and e-mails as a 
complementary tool. 
 
In addition, and as a third advantage, the case study method enables the 
researcher to gain a holistic view of the phenomena under analysis (or series 
of events) thus providing a cross picture due to the many sources of 
Nr. of cases:  Type of PEF / 
Deals
Pan-European
Funds
Banks / Captive Funds Early
Stage 
Funds
Important and big Italian
closed-end Funds
Small / regional
funds
TOTAL
Start up
MBO / LBO 2 2 5 4 13
Expansion 4 1 3 4 12
Turnaround
Replacement 1 1
Total 6 4 8 8 26
145 
 
evidence used. A case study can be also useful in capturing the dynamic 
perspective of an organization especially when it is changing very fast (as it 
is for Private Equity Funds and their markets).  
 
Finally, the research method chosen for this research study did not employ 
experimental or quasi-experimental approaches99. The avoidance of these 
experimental approaches will help respondents to be merely exposed to 
events that occur in the real world and would have taken place anyway. In 
fact, both experimental and quasi-experimental approaches would aim to 
observe how the subjects respond and react to different forms of  
hypothetical questions. This thesis does not want to simulate hypothetical 
situations but to reveal GPs’ behavior in the field.  
 
4.3.4 Examples of Case Study Methods in Business Research 
 
Some qualitative studies (case-study based) can be found in: Eriksson and 
Kovalainen, (2008); Lillis and Mundy, (2005); Kaplan, (1993); Lukka, (2005); 
Mäkinen, (1980); Näsi, (1981); Ryan, Scapens and Theobald, (2002). These 
studies seek to further the understanding of the functioning of accounting in 
action.  Such studies have become quite popular in management accounting 
research, but are still relatively rare in other areas of accounting and finance. 
Kaplan (1993) claimed that applying traditional research methods, analytic 
                                                 
99 An experiment would randomly assign subjects to different groups in order control all 
variables and observe the outcomes. On the contrary, in a quasi-experiment the subjects to be 
observed are not randomly assigned to different groups in order to measure outcomes, but 
grouped according to a characteristic that they already posses. 
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modeling and statistical observations and analysis, to contemporary 
management accounting issues is not appropriate for exploring those issues.  
 
Kaplan (1993) showed that there are many complex activities inside 
companies (he refers, in particular, to activities which affect the activity-based 
cost – ABC systems) that cannot be observed with traditional research 
methods. Consequently, Kaplan (1993) stated that the researcher should 
look more closely at internal company events (what academia calls field-
research). In addition, many management accounting research studies 
conducted by Kaplan are based on field-research and case study method. 
 
For instance, Kaplan and Norton (1993) used the case research method 
(three cases) to study how the balanced-scorecard combines management 
and measurement in different organizations. In addition, several other articles 
in the mid-1980s [Kaplan, 1983; 1986; Bruns and Kaplan, 1987] advocated 
that management accounting researchers make much more extensive use of 
field research to study management accounting phenomena. 
 
Other examples of successful case study research can be found in Barkham 
et al. (1996) who used the survey approach to conduct a face-to-face in-
depth analysis of the determinants of small firm growth, and, in particular, to 
explore the relationship between the growth of established small firms and 
the characteristics of their owner-managers in the UK. The subsequent data 
that was collected was used to construct a comprehensive model of small 
firm growth. 
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Kaplan (1993) also stated that the field research should be extended to other 
topics and areas where complex phenomena might not be well identified and 
understood by just observing statistical data. Following Kaplan’s advise, this 
thesis, based on case research method, aims to reveal all the determinants 
of the PEFs’ risk premium to develop an explanatory model. A model which 
should not be only based in the four-factor CAPM of Franzoni et al. (2010), 
but also on the complex phenomena outlined in chapter 3.  
 
As shown in chapter 3, the failure (in past research papers) in measuring a 
widely-recognized value for the PEFs’ past performance, the incomplete 
understanding of the phenomena driving the risk premium (in some cases, 
opposing phenomena and contradictory conclusions), might suggest the 
need (as Kaplan, 1993, suggested and successfully applied for the 
management accounting field) to approach PEFs through field-research and 
face-to-face interviews. In this direction, the case study method seems to be 
the most suitable methodology to achieve that scope and to complement past 
research. 
 
4.3.5 Research Design 
 
After having described the research method as well as explaining why this is 
the most suitable choice for the scope of this project,  this section will also 
outline the steps that must be taken. However, when describing the steps of 
this process, it is most important to establish the bases for high quality 
research design. There are four widely-used criteria to judge the quality of 
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research designs: Construct validity, internal validity, external validity, and 
reliability. 
 
4.3.5.1 Construct Validity  
 
This test means establishing correct operational measures for the concepts 
being studied (Yin, 2003:35). This project intends to measure the factors or 
determinants of the RR for which percentage proportions are used. To 
achieve this, the project will utilize multiple sources of evidence. For instance: 
 
- By having direct interviews with those responsible for calculating the 
RR for each deal.  A set of questions were prepared to capture the 
risk-drivers assessed by PEFs with their relative importance to 
account for the final RR. 
- By looking at the Excel files and reports used for valuing different 
deals, it will be possible to observe the drivers and characteristics that 
have influenced the RR.  
- By looking at internal procedures used to arrive at the final RR 
calculated for the deals. 
 
4.3.5.2 Internal Validity 
 
 A case study involves an inference very time an event cannot be directly 
observed. Is this inference correct? (Yin, 2003:36). To assure that that 
inferences are correct, that is to achieve internal validity, this project has 
rested on analytical tactics like pattern-matching, explanation-building, and 
149 
 
rival explanations (Yin, 2003). By studying the sequence of actions, we can 
infer the different casual relationships between variables. Pattern-matching 
logic, for instance, compares an empirically-based pattern with a predicted 
one. If the patterns coincide, the results can help the researcher to 
strengthen the case’s internal validity. Additionally, by using both qualitative 
and quantitative analysis, it is possible to compare both results and see if 
they match. 
 
4.3.5.3 External Validity 
 
This test deals with the issue of knowing whether a study’s findings are 
generalizable beyond the immediate case study. Through the replication 
logic, a theory can be tested by replicating the findings in a second, or even 
third, case. That is why this research project will rely on the use of such 
replication logic in multiple-case studies100. 
 
Therefore, this project analyzes and explains several deals with different 
characteristics for each single PEF and deal. The scope of such multiple-
case study is directed at obtaining replications and further support for the 
initial set of propositions.  
 
At the same time, as shown in the second diagram of Table 4.1, the project 
will focus only on specific types of deals: management buyouts (MBOs), 
leveraged buyouts (LBOs), expansion deals, replacement deals. Such deals 
                                                 
100 The study has relied on information given by 13 PEFs and 26 deals where replications 
will be present. 
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were chosen not only to narrow the scope but also to allow concentration on 
mature and stable privately-held companies. In this way, the project will avoid 
turbulent operations like turnarounds and start-ups which have to deal with 
specific risk drivers which are beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
According to Yin (2003), the choice of the number of cases depends on: 
- Differences in the context and uncertainty in the external conditions: In 
the case of this project, there might be important differences from PEF 
to PEF and from deal to deal.  
- The existence of strong rival models: This does not apply here since 
this model is not contradicting existing ones (like that of Franzoni et 
al., 2010) but trying to complement them in order to be able to propose 
a more explanatory and detailed theory. 
- The larger the number of cases or replications, the greater the 
supporting evidence for the stated conclusions. 
 
Therefore, balancing these three aspects and looking at previous examples 
cited by Yin, it is considered that the choosing of 13 PEFs and 2 deals in 
each of them (26 cases), will be sufficient evidence for this research study.  
 
Included in the 13 PEFs, there is a pilot case which has assisted the 
researcher to define and develop the relevant lines of questions as well as to 
provide some conceptual clarification for the research design.  
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The heart of the protocol is the set of questions reflecting the line of inquiry. 
The process has considered different levels of questions in different times: 
 
- General orientation questions: these are questions posed to the 
researcher that act as reminders regarding the information that needs 
to be collected and why. An example of such questions can be seen in 
the last figure (step D). 
- Level 1 and Level 2 questions: These are specific questions posed to 
the interviewees about particular deals (for instance: What are the 
specific drivers priced in each particular deal to determine the RR) and 
are based on the general questions (see chapter 5). The questions will 
be prepared for the first set of interviews (see appendix 1 for the time 
schedule of the whole project) and are directed at revealing the basic 
information to proceed with the first data analysis. 
- Level 3 questions: These are cross-case questions and cannot be 
addressed until the data from all the single cases were examined. 
Such questions will be prepared and designed after the examination of 
the information revealed through the questions of level 1 and level 2. 
 
This section has addressed the application of the case study method as a 
key element to achieve the aims of this research project: Achieving these 
aims requires the adoption of a more realistic perspective in order to contrast 
with the arguably excessively positivistic traditional research approaches.  
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4.4 Description of the Data Collection Process 
 
4.4.1 Sample Selection 
 
With the help of the AIFI (Italian Private Equity Association) and other 
contacts, this study has been able to approach 13 PEFs in Italy. The project 
started with a pilot case, subsequently with 6 PEFs and finally with an 
additional 6 PEFs. 
  
Initially, the AIFI introduced the project to 6 PEFs (these 6 PEFs are among 
the top 10 Italian PEFs in terms of size and reputation). The pilot case is a 
small regional PEF where the researcher worked as consultant during a deal 
assessment in 2009 (one year before the starting of the data collection 
process). The researcher went back to this PEF and started the interviews 
there.  
 
Thereafter, the study proceeded with the 6 PEFs introduced by the AIFI and, 
in one sense, all this first group of six were also pilot cases in which many 
new concepts and phenomena came to light. Finally, with the help of the AIFI 
again, another 6 PEFs were contacted (some of them small regional funds to 
balance the initial big funds). The full support of the AIFI was partly due to the 
great interest shown in the project and its potential conclusions101.  
 
                                                 
101 The AIFI saw in the output of the project a potential article to be published in its 
magazine (the leading magazine in the Italian PEF sector). 
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As initially planned, the project analyzed the data of 26 deals: 6 deals 
approached by three Pan-European Funds, 4 deals approached by two 
captive funds, 8 deals approached by four big Italian funds, and 8 deals 
approached by four small regional funds. Regarding the type of deal, the 
research project has assessed: 13 LBO deals, 12 Expansion deals, and 1 
Replacement deal102. In order to preserve the anonymity103 of the private 
equities and deals approached by the project, a masking-code is used as 
shown below: 
 
Using these codes, Table 4.2 exhibits the profile of the PEFs approached 
during this research project. 
 
Table 4.2 Summary of the Sample 
 
                                                 
102 Replacement deals allow existing non-private equity investors to buy back or redeem part, 
or all, of another investor’s shareholding. 
103 A non-disclosure of information contract was signed between the author and some of the 
PEFs interviewed. 
CODE
BIF = Big Italian Fund
REF = Small regional Fund
PAF = Pan American Fund
CAP = Italian Bank Fund / Captive Funds
Code CC Invested Amount 2010 Deal Foundation  Year
1 BIF3 300           250                                      LBO / LBO 2007
2 REF4 35             -                                      Expansion / Expansion 2010
3 BIF1 1.180       600                                      LBO / LBO 1993
4 CAP2 100           -                                      Replacement / Expansion 2009
5 PAF3 200           70                                        Expansion / Expansion 1991
6 REF3 30             12                                        LBO / LBO 2006
7 BIF4 310           260                                      LBO / Expansion 2004
8 REF2 42             35                                        LBO / Expansion 2006
9 BIF2 500           450                                      Expansion / Expansion 2002
10 REF1 20             8                                          Expansion / Expansion 2007
11 PAF1 450           400                                      LBO / Expansion 2004
12 CAP1 352           320                                      LBO / LBO 2002
13 PAF2 675           193                                      MBO / Expansion 2006
Total 4.194       1.678                                  7,8%
Total 2010 (Source AIFI 2010) 21.500                                
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The columns “capital” and “Invested amount 2010” are measured in millions 
of euro. 
 
The column labeled “capital” shows the amount of the funds raised at the 
foundation of the PEF, the column named “invested amount 2010” exhibits 
the amount which is still invested in the portfolio companies, the column 
named “funds” shows the number of funds managed by the PEFs. It is 
important to note that the total amount still invested in the portfolio 
companies of the PEFs approached in this project (€ 1,678 million) 
represents circa 7.8% of the total amount still invested of all the Italian PEFs 
in the year 2010 (€ 21.5 billion).  
 
The total number of PEFs in Italy is around 272 (AIFI 2010). Since this work 
includes 13 PEFs, the size of the sample exceeds 5% of the Italian PEFs 
population. It is important to underline that there are no precedents in 
research covering such big samples in Italy by using qualitative 
methodologies (in particular, the case study method). 
 
Case studies have been criticized by some (e.g. Bent Flyvbjerg, 2006) as 
having lack of scientific rigor and reliability and for not addressing the issues 
of generalization and external validity. This study responds to that weakness 
with a relatively wide sample (for this kind of approach) which captures 
almost 8% of the population (in terms of capital invested) and 5% of the 
population (in terms of number of PEFs).  
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4.4.2 Collecting Data 
 
After having selected the sample, the data collection process started by 
addressing the pilot case where the past experience of the researcher as 
consultant of one of its deals was critical as a starting point.  
 
After having addressed the pilot case, a first stage including the first two 
rounds of meetings / interviews with the first six PEFs was conducted: This 
first round was aimed at introducing the project, discussing general 
questions, and studying some concepts of the valuation process in general. 
The second round consisted of an interview directed at confirming the 
existence of the phenomena outlined in chapter 3 and analyzing in detail two 
deals per PEF. 
 
The research started in March 2010 and, in July 2010, the author started to 
analyze the data collected. It was after that when the second stage, directed 
at approaching the six additional PEFs and at addressing the third round of 
questions to all the 13 PEFs (the pilot case included), started.  This 
separation in two stages was very important for many reasons: It allowed the 
researcher to pause and reflect on the first findings, it helped the researcher 
to prepare the third round of questions considering not only the knowledge 
acquired during the first stage, but also accounting for the gaps and new 
questions raised by it.  
 
Furthermore, it is also important to underline that at the beginning of the data 
collection process (during the first stage) it was very difficult to obtain 
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information. The first PEFs approached were very secretive, did not want to 
disclose any information, and showed little real interest in the project. 
Therefore, the beginning of the project was very difficult, stressing and 
frustrating.  
 
However, all this changed during the second stage. In fact, the first 
conclusions developed by the researcher were shared with the PEFs and 
they started to see the utility of the thesis. Some PEFs began to show great 
interest and more involvement. Doors were finally opened and it was possible 
to deepen and discuss the preliminary findings during the third round of 
interviews. Therefore, the second stage was much more amicable and 
revealing. 
 
The preliminary conclusions developed after the first two rounds (first stage) 
and a draft model were also presented to the AIFI, and to one of the PEFs 
interviewed (the pilot case). The aim of this presentation was to obtain 
feedback from specialized practitioners (the final conclusions and model are 
presented in chapter 7). They not only agreed on the development of such a 
model but also showed substantial interest in it. As a consequence, a third 
round aimed at both deepening the incomplete knowledge of the first 
interviews (the first two rounds) and being able to quantify some of the 
drivers revealed. 
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4.4.3 Summary of the Data Collection Process 
 
To summarize, the research approach included three rounds, each including 
a 1-hour meeting with each PEF. The purposes of these three rounds are 
detailed as follows: 
- First Round (March - April 2010): Introduction of the project, general 
questions, and analysis of the valuation process in general.  
- Second Round (April – July 2010): Interview and presentation of a 
questionnaire with a number of questions (level 1 and level 2 
questions) aimed at both revealing the nature of the ex-ante IRR and 
confirming the existence of the phenomena outlined in chapter 3. The 
first conclusions were drawn.  
- Third Round (September – December 2010): The researcher 
introduced and tested the first conclusions and presented a new 
questionnaire (level 1, level 2, and level 3 questions) aiming at both 
deepening the first conclusions and quantifying some of the drivers 
found in the previous rounds.  
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Figure 4.8 summarizes how the whole process was planned: 
 
Figure 4.8 Summary of the Data Collection Process 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
Note: the researcher worked as consultant in the Pilot case one year before 
contacting the AIFI. However, the first two rounds of questions were 
assessed after the first meeting with the AIFI. 
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Figure 4.9 shows the process from a questionnaire point of view: 
 
Figure 4.9 Round of Interviews 
 
 Source: Author’s own work 
 
It is important to notice that the pilot case revealed new concepts like the 
threshold IRR (T.IRR)104. The finding of new concepts changed the direction 
of the research project whose first intention was to study the expected IRR 
(E.IRR) itself. On the contrary, it is the T.IRR that measures the perceived 
risk (or threshold required return) and the E.IRR that measures the expected 
return. 
 
In addition, during the second round, one of the main targets of the 
researcher was to confirm, or otherwise, the existence of all the phenomena 
revealed in previous studies but from an ex-ante perspective. 
 
An important point that could be seen as a weakness is the fact that most of 
the PEFs interviewed preferred to answer during the meetings directly to the 
researcher who had to take notes (a voice recorder was not allowed). 
However, the elimination of a voice recorder created a more relaxing and 
                                                 
104 The paper of Franzoni et al. (June 2010) which was the first to mention these concepts 
was still to be published at the time of the data collection process (March 2010). 
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trustful atmosphere and facilitated the disclosure of the information 
(respondents were less inhibited). 
 
Some PEFs asked the researcher to sign a non-disclosure agreement before 
the starting of the data collection process. Some of them also sent per e-mail 
the Excel files with the whole valuation of the deal and some of them even 
answered the questions in written form and sent them via e-mail. This is also 
important and helps to offset the limitations of a more formal method. 
Documentary evidence acts as a tool to cross-validate information gathered 
from interviews and observations.  
 
In fact, previous research studies were addressed by telephonic 
questionnaires105 (this is an important weakness since sometimes what 
people say may differ from what people do). Additionally, documents 
provided the author with a guideline for further assistance during the 
interviews. The disclosure of different sources of information (personal 
interviews, e-mails, Excel files, and contracts in some cases), enhances the 
authenticity, validity and reliability of findings106. 
 
In addition, the relatively large number of cases addressed assures the 
robustness and consistency of findings. In other words, it enhances the 
accuracy, validity and reliability of the results by capturing the holistic 
essence of the subjects studied. 
 
                                                 
105 This is the case of Manigart et al. (2002). 
106 Although only some PEFs sent written material 
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4.5 Data analysis 
 
Both quantitative and qualitative approaches were combined during the data 
analysis (in Chapter 6). Quantitative analysis of data collected during the 
third round of interviews (some of which was quantitative information) was 
used. This allowed the researcher to initially explore data through statistical 
analysis in order to find associations, cross-tabulations, correlations, key 
differences and patterns.  
 
Qualitative data collected during the same three rounds of personal 
interviews were essential to understand causations of patterns and the 
correlations found through the statistical analysis. As stated in previous 
sections, this is the innovation of this thesis in terms of methodology as 
applied to this area. 
 
For instance: Quantitative analysis was used to explore different values of 
T.IRR according to the type of deal and type of PEF. This might suggest if 
perceived risk depends on the size of the PEF or the size of the target 
company. However, how the PEFs calculate the T.IRR in each case, as well 
as which risks they perceive, cannot be assessed by looking at statistical 
data.  Such information can only be collected and analyzed through a 
qualitative approach, that is: a deep explanation by respondents in each 
case.   
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Similarly, once such qualitative information was collected, arguments and 
methodologies explained by respondents were analyzed and compared. In 
fact, some of the propositions of the phenomenology approach state: 
 
 “Any attempt to understand social reality must be grounded in people’s 
experience of that social reality.” (Bryman, 1988:52).  
 
According to this, phenomenology views human behavior (in this case risk 
perceptions and return expectations) as a product of how people interpret 
their world. The task of this thesis, therefore, was to capture this process of 
interpretation in order to grasp the meaning of PEFs’ behavior and its drivers.  
 
However, the study did not stop at capturing this process of interpretation. It 
has also identified the whole process of calculating the T.IRR, that is: the risk 
determinants perceived and priced by PEFs. By studying the sequence of 
actions, it was possible to find the different casual relationships between 
variables (a system of multiple causal paths).  
 
In addition, the use of the grounded theory could be useful for the qualitative 
analysis of this thesis. In fact, the grounded theory aims to study several 
cases and classify them into categories. Characteristics and connections 
between these categories were examined as a guide to further theoretical 
reflection (Bryman, 1988:84).  In this direction, and through the study of 
several cases with their possible connections and classifications, the final 
model was gradually elaborated into higher levels of abstraction and 
generalization. 
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4.6 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has given the answer to the second question addressed in the 
introduction of this chapter: How can the object of this project be studied? 
First, It has shown, in section 4.2, that this thesis from an epistemological 
point of view is grounded on critical realism as the research philosophy.  
Second, section 4.3 showed that the case study method is the most suitable 
methodology for a realistic approach and when causation of complex 
phenomena needs to be investigated as is the case for this project. This kind 
of approach fits perfectly well for the explanatory purposes of the project and 
to complement past research studies. 
 
Section 4.3.3 has explained the important role of a well-structured 
questionnaire survey and section 4.3.4 has exhibited some examples of case 
study in business research. In particular, it has been shown, as a further 
argument for the selection of this methodology, how those research 
examples have many similarities with the objective to be studied in this thesis 
where the complex phenomena might not be well identified and understood 
by merely observing statistical data.  
 
Third, section 4.4 has described how the whole data collection process was 
planned and developed. Suitable attention was given to both the sample 
selection and the data collection procedures in order to reinforce the internal 
validity, the external validity and the reliability of the project. Finally, a brief 
introduction to the data analysis proposed for this project was given in 
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section 4.5. The next chapter will exhibit all the data collected using the 
approach and the steps explained during this chapter.   
 
 
 
 
166 
 
5 DATA COLLECTION PROCESS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter will exhibit all the data collected using the approach and the 
steps explained in chapter 4. The violet rectangle of the Figure 5.1 includes 
all the stages that will be discussed herein thus limiting itself to showing the 
data collected. The analysis and/or conclusions of the data outlined in this 
chapter will be discussed in chapters 6 and 7.  
 
Figure 5.1 Data Collection Process 
                 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
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The project started with an exploratory pilot case which was the first contact 
with any practitioners (GPs). A pilot case study held as a first step can be 
very helpful to ensure, as suggested before, that interview questions are 
suitable and effective in extracting the required information.  
 
In fact, undertaking a pilot case study is a useful technique for refining the 
research question. Greenhalgh (1997) legitimises modifying the (theoretically 
designed) research questions after the study of the pilot case and adapting 
them in the light of more information about the environment.   
 
The second step addressed the first two rounds of questions to the first 6 
PEFs.  As expected, this second step gave the author some preliminary 
“conclusions”107 but, at the same time, many gaps and new questions. In 
other words, and as planned (see in chapter 4), the research project could 
now be extended to a bigger sample of PEFs.  
 
It is important to underline that accessing the PEFs’ archival information is 
very difficult because of the confidentiality issues. Revealing their methods, 
models, and experience in assessing deals is like revealing the secrets of an 
industrial product recipe for a pharmaceutical or food company. Without the 
support of the AIFI, this research project would have been impossible. 
 
                                                 
107 These first findings were shared with the AIFI which showed a great interest in the 
potential results of the project. The AIFI itself suggested a more extended sample including 
more small PEFs (since the first 6 PEFs, excluding the pilot case, were among the biggest 
PEFs in Italy) 
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This chapter is structured as follows: Section 5.2 will show the data collected 
during the first round, including the analysis of the valuation process, as well 
as the methods used by PEFs to assess their deals. Section 5.3 will describe 
some of the main characteristics and drivers revealed in the pilot case. 
Section 5.4 will detail the data collected during the second round aimed at 
confirming, with an ex-ante perspective, the existence of the phenomena 
observed in the last couple of decades of research and outlined in chapter 3. 
Section 5.5 will deal with the third round aimed at both deepening the 
knowledge acquired and quantifying some of the drivers found in the 
previous rounds.  
 
5.2 First Round: Description of the Valuation Process  
 
Some parts of the first questionnaire were directed at revealing some critical 
concepts connected with the valuation process necessary for understanding 
the nature of the risk-return drivers. 
 
5.2.1 Investment Decision Process 
 
The decision process depends on the type and the size of the PEF. Big PEFs 
assess target companies through a committee composed of some senior 
business analysts (between 3 and 8 members depending on each PEF). 
Small PEFs approach target companies through a single senior professional 
who analyzes the deal and presents it to the board of the PEF who finally 
decides on the investment.  Some of the Pan-European PEFs instead, 
assess the deal locally, but the decision is centralized by a team of 
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executives in the central PEF. In this case, the decision process includes a 
centralized benchmarking that compares different proposed deals coming 
from different countries whereby the best deal is selected.  Figure 5.2 shows 
the commonest decision-process types revealed during the interviews: 
 
Figure 5.2 Decision Process by type of PEF 
         
 
 
Source: Author’s own work based on PEFs answers 
 
Figure 5.2 shows that greater size implies higher complexity in the decision 
process. Pan-European Funds have the highest complexity (centralization 
and bureaucracy) but, at the same time, the advantage of higher access to 
benchmarking (they can compare deals from different countries). 
 
Small Regional Funds
4 PEFs from the sample
Senior Executive 
Deal  Evaluation
PEF Board: 
Investment Decision
Big Italian & Captive Funds
6 PEFs from the sample
Team n
Comittee of 
Senior
Executives 
Deal 1 
Evaluation
PEF Board: 
Deals Benchmarking                   
&
Investment Decision
Team  1
Comittee of 
Senior
Executives 
Deal n 
Evaluation
Team n
Comittee of 
Senior
Executives 
Deal 1 
Evaluation
Local PEF Board: 
Deal n 
Evaluation
Pan-EU Funs
3 PEFs from the sample
Team  1
Comittee of 
Senior
Executives 
Mother or Holding PEF
Decision Committee at EU 
level. Benchmarking  at EU 
level & centralized Investment                  
Decision.
170 
 
5.2.2 The Different Concepts of IRR in the Valuation Process  
 
Prior to the data collection process, the only two concepts of IRR known to 
the researcher were the expected IRR (E.IRR) and the ex-post or realized 
IRR. The first intends to measure return expectations and perceived risks (an 
ex-ante point of view). The second measures the realized performance of the 
deals. 
 
However, during the study of the pilot case, two new concepts of IRR were 
brought to light which were apparently unknown to academia since they are 
not identified in previous papers (see chapter 3). The first is the Threshold 
IRR (T.IRR) which in general should108 try to measure the minimum IRR 
necessary to compensate for the risk of a certain deal. The study of this 
concept is the core of this thesis: the value and the determinants of the equity 
premium required by PEFs when approaching their target deals. 
  
The second is the Hurdle IRR (H.IRR) which is the minimum IRR that has to 
be achieved by GPs at the end of the PEF life in order to get part of the 
capital gain as bonus. The H.IRR is established (or legally enforced) by 
contract between GPs and LPs at the beginning of the PEF life and therefore 
it might be defined as the required return including the minimum premium by 
which LPs are pre-disposed to invest in a PEF. It seems that this H.IRR does 
not include a rational-based-method to estimate the premium to offset the 
                                                 
108 The author uses the term “should” because both the concept and the use of the T.IRR are 
not completely clear and homogeneous to the PEFs. In fact, they use different criteria to 
measure it and in a very behavioral way. 
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specific risks present in PEFs’ investments109. In addition, ex-post IRR, E.IRR 
and T.IRR can be calculated with two different criteria:  
- The Gross IRR: It is obtained by GPs when assessing a deal. 
- The Net IRR: It is obtained by LPs after internal costs (fees, carried 
interests, etc). 
 
Table 5.1 Definitions of the different concepts of IRR 
Type of 
IRR 
Time 
Perspective 
Investor 
Perspective 
Concept Contract 
Ex-post 
IRR 
Ex – post Gross / Net Realized return Æ end of PEF 
life 
 Ex-post 
E.IRR 
(*) 
Ex – ante Gross / Net 
1- Gross: Gross Expected 
IRR. 
2- Net: LPs’ expected IRR at 
the end of PEFs’ life 
Not written into any 
contract. 
1. Only expectations 
resulting from a 
business plan 
2. LPs’ expectations or 
GPs’ targets.  
T.IRR(1) 
(*) 
Ex-ante Net 
Net LPs’ expected IRR at the 
end of the PEFs’ life and GPs 
target 
 Net LPs’ E.IRR=Net GPs’ 
T.IRR(*) 
Sometimes written in the 
contracts between GPs 
and LPs 
T.IRR Ex – ante Gross  Minimum IRR required by PEF 
to accept deals / Minimum IRR 
to offset perceived risk / 
Minimum IRR to meet LPs’ 
expectations. 
Sometimes written in the 
contracts between GPs 
and LPs 
H.IRR(2) 
 
Ex – ante Net What LPs might earn in 
alternative investments Æ LPs’ 
minimum required return by 
which LPs might be willing to 
invest in a PEF  
Always written in the 
contract between GPs 
and LPs 
 
(*) Æ the net LPs’ expectations (net LPs’ E.IRR) must be met by the GPs’ targets and therefore the net 
T.IRR (net GPs’ T.IRR Æ GPs’ target at the end of the PEFs’ life must be equal to the net LPs’ 
expectations (net LPs’ E.IRR). 
 
                                                 
109 In fact the value of the H.IRR (being a rate including a premium) has a range between 6% 
and 8%. Instead, the equity premium (seen in chapter 2) for quoted companies has a range 
between 2% and 8% being the last the most commonly used. 
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In this wide spectrum of concepts, it might be desirable to explain the 
difference between the Net T.IRR and H.IRR (in the table (1) & (2) 
respectively): 
- The H.IRR (2): This is the minimum IRR required by LPs. If this 
target is achieved at the end of the PEF life, GPs have the right by 
contract to take 20% of the total capital gain achieved. This minimum 
value is very low (between 6% and 8% depending on each PEF). 
According to the GPs interviewed “this value represents what LPs lose 
to earn when investing in a PEF (their opportunity costs).” (stated by a 
GP of BIF2). Obviously, “the H.IRR is not including any extra premium 
for investing in a PEF.” (stated by a GP in BIF1). 
- The net T.IRR (1): Instead, this value refers to LPs’ expectations and 
includes a premium for investing in a PEF. This value is between 10% 
and 20% depending on each PEF. According to most GPs interviewed 
this value is calculated according to past performance (what LPs 
earned in the past by investing in a PEF). This value is also defined in 
informal discussions between GPs and LPs regarding future 
expectations “We agreed with LPs about the future potential in terms 
of performance for the new founded fund.” (stated by a GP in REF2). 
However, contrary to the H.IRR, the net T.IRR is not written in any 
contract and remains an informal expected return for LPs and 
therefore a target for GPs. GPs are very motivated to achieve the 
minimum H.IRR in order to get their portion of the capital gain. 
However, GPs seek to achieve the net T.IRR in order to keep LPs 
happy and be able to subscribe new funding for a second fund. 
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In order to deepen these two types of IRR and the way in which LPs assess 
them, a questionnaire directed at studying LPs’ risk perceptions and return 
expectations is needed. This is not the scope of this thesis which focuses on 
GPs’ assessments alone. The study of LPs’ perceptions and expectations 
should require another thesis in itself. Therefore, this study will consider 
these two variables as given values. 
 
These different concepts of the IRR were revealed by the pilot case. This 
confirms how important a pilot case might be to purge the pre-conceptions 
grounded only on theoretical background. 
 
The core of this thesis is to understand the real meaning of all these three 
last types of IRR (E.IRR, T.IRR and H.IRR) and, hopefully, their drivers or 
determinants. Further sections and chapters will discuss the initial definitions 
given in Table 5.1 more deeply. 
 
But why are all these different types of IRR not explicitly well distinguished by 
academia? In fact, all previous papers reviewed in chapter 3 talked about the 
IRR as a unique concept without identifying the T.IRR, H.IRR or even the 
difference between the E.IRR and the ex-post IRR.  
 
According to the researcher, this is partly because almost all research papers 
concentrated their studies on ex-post IRR (where the E.IRR or the T.IRR 
which measure ex-ante perceived risks is no longer important) and this is due 
to three main reasons:  
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- First, the difficult access to approach PEFs directly forces most 
authors to get data from the public ex-post databases.   
- Second: The influence of the positivistic approach which seeks to 
observe statistical data and derive conclusions based on them 
- Third: the influence of the studies conducted in publicly-organized 
markets which also look at the ex-post information to predict the future 
premium. 
 
Therefore, this work has started the first part of the data collection process by 
clarifying the function of the E.IRR and the T.IRR during the valuation 
process. 
 
5.2.3 Introduction to the E.IRR and the T.IRR 
 
The E.IRR is calculated as a consequence of: 
1. Business plan (which considers operational risks) 
2. Public market multiples (EBITDA / EV) adjusted by size and lack of 
marketability.  Multiples are also adjusted in the case of early stages 
(start-ups) 110. Operational risks and non-systematic risks can be 
considered for further discounts of the multiples.  
3. Exit value considering different hypotheses for the exit multiple which 
could differ from the entry multiple (it is normally higher). 
 
                                                 
110 This is an important finding because until now there was no clear evidence of such level of 
discount for early stages. In fact Pintado et al. (2007) only suspected the existence of such a discount 
by studying statistical data. 
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In addition, the T.IRR is a fundamental tool for the PEFs’ investment 
decisions: if the expected ex-ante IRR (E.IRR) is superior to the T.IRR, the 
deal is expected to create value. In all cases, the T.IRR is estimated by GPs 
using intuition and past experience. 
 
Table 5.2 illustrates (using an example) the calculation of the E.IRR in the 
valuation process.                    
 
Table 5.2 Calculation of the E.IRR 
 
Source: Author’s own work based on PEFs’ answers 
 
In this example, the E.IRR of the project (41%) is higher than the T.IRR 
(25%). In this example, the deal should be accepted. The E.IRR is calculated 
as the IRR of the free cash flows from the project (i.e. the deal) between the 
entry year and the exit year. 
 
Finally, in the elaboration of the steps (from point 1 to  point 3) applied to 
calculate the E-IRR, different hypotheses are used for both the business plan 
(operational risks) and multiples. For this reason, at the end of the valuation 
process, different potential results are presented and evaluated (worst case, 
average case, best case). See examples below: 
Main Data for Valuation Entry Year Second Year Third Year Exit Year
Ebitda 1.000           1.100           1.200           1.300           
Market Multple (quoted multiple) 8 8 8 8
Size & Liquidity discount (15%-30% 22,5% 6,2 6,2 6,2 6,2
Dividend 300 300 300
Interest+ Investments + WC 500               550 600
Debt 4.000           3.700           3.350           2.950           
Free Cash Flow 2.200-           300               300               5.110           
Deal Returns
Money Multiple 2,3                
E-IRR 41%
T.IRR 25%
Excess Return 16%
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Table 5.4 Sensibility Analysis
 
Source: Excel file provided by one of the PEFs interviewed 
 
The higher is the EBITDA at the exit year (2007), the higher the IRR.  In 
addition, the higher is the exit multiple, the higher the IRR.  
 
5.3 Main Characteristics and Drivers Revealed in the Pilot Case  
 
In this thesis, the choosing of the pilot case was driven by the easy access to 
information as advised by Yin (2003).  The PEF chosen as the subject of the 
pilot case is a small regional PEF where the researcher worked as consultant 
during a deal assessment.  
 
5.3.1 Brief Description of the PEF and the Target Company 
 
This fund (REF1) was established in 2007 (one year before the time of this 
case) and has a total committed capital of Euro 20 million. Its main objective 
was to acquire small privately-held companies in North-East Italy and add 
value by re-inforcing the management competences (partly provided by the 
fund) and the capital structure (equity and leverage) in order to promote 
growth and the internationalization of the business plans. 
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The target company was dedicated to the production and bottling of the first 
biological tomato puree and a wide range of pasta sauces based on 
tomatoes. The turnover increased exponentially from € 500,000 in 2004 to € 
3.3 million in 2008. Its reports showed three main problems which were 
causing financial distress: 
- First: The company was growing at a rate of 25% p.a (2008) and it 
was expected to grow by more than 50% in 2009. The entrepreneur 
could not afford to fund such required investments. 
- Second: There was an abnormal level of inventories due to the lack of 
a healthy logistics system. 
- Third: Because of these problems, the financial debt was 
unsustainable (Debt / Equity = 400%) and the banks wanted to exit the 
company. Furthermore, due to the lack of good financial reports, 
neither the entrepreneur nor the banks knew exactly what the problem 
was: Bad business or bad management? 
 
There was only one possible solution to the problem: A capital increase. In 
addition, this case seemed to be a very attractive expansion deal for a small 
PEF. Appendix 5.1 shows all the figures of the target company as well as the 
valuation tables provided by REF1. 
 
5.3.2 Main Drivers 
 
Entrepreneurial feelings: The entrepreneur was quite reluctant to give the 
control of the company to a PEF due to the sentimental attachment to his 
business. Under these circumstances, it is very important to stress that the 
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entrepreneur would have never accepted to contact a PEF if he would have 
had any other choice to survive. “This company is my hurt, my baby I cannot 
sell it to someone who only wants a fast profit from it………but I do not find 
another alternative to save it.” (stated by the entrepreneur). 
 
The impact of the contractual covenants: Covenants directed at reducing 
the risk of the deal. The PEF looked for protection, in case the business plan 
was not achieved. Therefore, part of the equity value of the company was 
subscribed as a loan (not capital increase) and was conditional on the 
accomplishment of certain objectives. With this policy, REF1 adopted an 
“outsider” position and waited to see what happened before converting the 
loan into equity. This mechanism is obviously directed at reducing the risk, 
thus reducing the initial T.IRR of 40% to 30%.  
 
These “protection” covenants might influence the gross T.IRR (in that case 
the gross T.IRR was reduced from 40% to 30%). The main driver was the 
capital structure of the deal: That is the relationship between equity, loan and 
mezzanines. A deal in which a convertible loan instead of pure equity is 
structured reduces risks considerably according to the risk of the loan. The 
following figure exhibits some financial tools according to risk. 
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The calculation of the T.IRR: 
The net T.IRR is the base to estimate the gross T.IRR: 
Gross T.IRR = net T.IRR + Fees + Carried Interests + Other costs (1) + deal 
risk premium 
Abort costs which are not included in the fees. For this case: 
T.IRR = 10% + 2% + 2% + 1% + 25% = 40% 
     
REF1 also stated that this 25% serves to set a high spread beyond what LPs 
usually expect in order to protect from unexpected events. The higher the risk 
perceived in the deal, the higher this spread. REF1 has no formula nor 
system to calculate this 25%, this is simply estimated using intuition and past 
experience. The main target of this thesis is to find the factors driving that 
25% and to set them in a rational model. 
 
LPs behavioral profile in relationship with their expectations: LPs are 
regional private investors from small towns. Some of them are part of the 
board of the PEF and some others are GPs’ friends. This type of LP is the 
typical regional investor that does not invest in such small funds as a result of 
a complex analysis of the fair risk-premium.  On the contrary, they invest in 
this small fund out of friendship and trust.  
 
The pilot case was the first experience with practitioners and revealed some 
new concepts not mentioned in the academic papers reviewed in chapter 3. 
This first contact with practitioners was the best way to compare theory with 
practice and to be able to design the definitive approach to the whole sample 
of PEFs. 
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5.4 Second Round:  PEFs’ Value Drivers  
 
This second interview with its questionnaire was aimed at assessing the 
existence of some of the phenomena analyzed in chapter 3. It intended to 
reveal if GPs perceive such drivers when evaluating a deal and how this 
influences their judgment in assessing the T.IRR.  
 
The complete questionnaire is shown in appendix 5.2. Appendix 5.3 shows 
an example of one of those few PEFs which answered the questions by 
sending an e-mail. The following paragraphs will answer those questions, 
summarizing all the different outputs outlined by all the 13 PEFs interviewed 
(including the pilot case).  
 
1. How does the LPs’ required return (net T.IRR) influence the gross 
T.IRR? Does the PEF’s size influence the T.IRR of the target 
companies? This refers to question 5 of appendix 5.2: Through this 
question, the researcher intended to study the performance 
persistence effect or a potential behavioral driver such as 
representativeness. 
 
In presenting a new deal to the LPs, the expected return should at 
least match the target return of the whole fund. This means that  
a. if a PEF offered a 15% target return to its LPs, it cannot present 
deals with lower returns. 
b. The PEF also has to consider the internal fees and all costs 
retained by the PEF. 
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c. If the fund is performing below target, the target T.IRR for new 
investment will have to be higher in order to offset bad deals 
d. Big PEFs tend to buy target companies at higher multiples 
since they look for the best deals which can afford higher entry 
prices. High competition to obtain the best target companies 
also forces bigger PEFs to pay higher multiples. On the 
contrary, small PEFs tend to pay lower multiples and are forced 
to look for deals in which competition is low or does not exist at 
all. In other words, they get deals less interesting for the bigger 
players. 
 
Therefore, the final IRR required should match both LPs’ expectations 
and PEF internal costs. LPs’ expectations and PEF internal costs 
might depend on the size of the PEF and the size of the PEF might 
depend on the GPs’ prestige. 
 
2. How do cash flow fluctuations (LPs’ inflows) influence the T.IRR 
during the lifetime of the PEF? How does the number of deals 
available affect the T.IRR? This refers to question 6 of appendix 5.2: 
Money-chasing deal phenomenon. 
 
The pressure to invest is the main factor influencing the way a fund 
puts its money at work. However, this pressure does not affect the 
targeted T.IRR directly but GPs’ risk perception. In other words, 
because of this pressure, GPs tend to underestimate risk. Business 
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plans and the expected cash flows tend to be too optimistic and 
therefore, the E.IRR is overestimated. The pressure to invest the 
capital committed as soon as possible pushes E.IRR levels closer to 
the threshold IRR. In contrast, PEFs tend to be more selective when 
the amount of money to invest is smaller. On the other side, not 
investing and waiting for better deals implies an important opportunity 
cost due to the capital which is still waiting to be invested (low 
returns). Therefore, it is important to balance both forces.  
 
3. How do competitors influence the T.IRR? This refers to question 7 of 
appendix 5.2: Segmentation phenomenon and money-chasing deal 
phenomenon. 
 
If a fund is performing below the average of comparable funds of the 
same vintage (i.e. its direct competitors), new deals will tend to be 
made with a higher expected return, in order for the fund to improve its 
competitive positioning and, therefore, gain better chances to get new 
money at the next fund-raising. Direct competitive pressure also 
obviously pushes fund managers to close deals with E.IRR levels 
closer to the T.IRR. According to one of the PEFs, this effect can be 
quantified between 0% and 10% (% increase in the EBITDA multiple) 
depending on the E.IRR and the T.IRR. Other PEFs showed a case in 
which that effect is observable.  
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4. Portfolio strategy: How does the strategy (diversification vs. 
specialization) affect the E.IRR and T.IRR? This refers to question 8 of 
appendix 5.2: Specialization effect. 
 
Most of the PEFs argued that, advantages from diversification prevail 
over specialization. Except for add-on deals, usually smaller in size, 
synergies between portfolio companies are limited, while there is a 
serious risk from having portfolio investments concentrated in one 
sector. Other PEFs stated that both strategies (diversification and 
specialization) are equally used. All PEFs agreed on the fact that the 
T.IRR in its ex-ante perspective is not affected at all by the type of 
strategy chosen. 
 
5. How does the time employed by PEF members in the target company 
affect the T.IRR? This refers to question 9 of the appendix 5.2: Fees-
effect and monitoring intensity effect. 
 
Most of the PEFs interviewed put a medium-to-high intensity in 
monitoring portfolio companies, depending on the specific need and 
investment strategy. Time employed also varies depending on the 
phase of the investment cycle: In cases in which problems in the 
portfolio performance arise, PEFs dedicate considerable efforts to 
monitoring. Time employed in the target company “active monitoring” 
(after the deal) does not affect T.IRR. On the contrary, high levels of 
monitoring planned during the elaboration of the company strategy 
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and the business plan might eventually increase the T.IRR or reduce 
the E.IRR. GPs’ fixed fees have a direct impact on the gross T.IRR.  
 
6. How do other PEF internal costs like the carried interests influence the 
T.IRR? This refers to question 10 of the appendix 5.2: Fees-effect. 
 
All 13 PEFs interviewed calculate their carried interest as follows: if the 
final consolidated ex-post net IRR (after fees and all costs) is superior 
to the hurdle rate H.IRR (the hurdle IRR is normally between 6% and 
8% depending on the PEF), the GPs get 20% of the whole capital gain 
obtained. Carried interest and fees may condition exit strategies more 
than acquisitions. In order to assure the hurdle rate, GPs could exit the 
target company before the full potential is achieved thus avoiding 
unnecessary risks. GPs waiting for a minimum IRR to be achieved 
may accelerate the exit at a value that might not reflect full potential. 
 
7. How does the investment speed influence the T.IRR? This refers to 
question 11 of appendix 5.2: Investment-speed effect. 
 
The longer the time in finding good deals, the lower the final return for 
the LPs. This is a critical issue and depends on the ability of GPs in 
finding new deals, the number of available deals, and the intensity of 
the competition with other PEFs. Since the ex-post IRR is in some 
PEFs calculated after the draw-down date and not after the 
commitment date, apparently there might not be any pressure in 
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investing quickly to get a higher IRR. However, most PEFs recognized 
the existence of an opportunity cost afforded by LPs which depends 
on the speed in which GPs are able to invest their capital.  
 
8. Does the calculation of the T.IRR change during the life of the PEF? If 
so why? This refers to question 12 of appendix 5.2: Learning cost 
effect. 
 
The evolution of the calculation of the T.IRR during the life of the PEF 
depends on factors such as the need to invest all the capital 
committed. The T.IRR might tend to decrease at the end of the PEF 
life. This happens when there is still capital under commitment not 
invested. The same happens when the investing speed is too low 
because of the difficulty in finding suitable deals, GPs might decrease 
the T.IRR. However, all these factors will be explained in the next 
section (third round). 
 
9. Does the number of deals affect the T.IRR? This refers to question 13 
of appendix 5.2: Economies of scale and scope effect. 
 
Three different phenomena were found:  
i) Economies of Scale: Most PEFs agreed on the fact that bigger 
funds create more economies of scale (lower percentage of 
internal costs retained in the PEF) and therefore the target for the 
LPs is more achievable. This effect can be quantified. 
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ii) Diversification: more deals with smaller sizes imply higher 
diversification. 
iii) Economies of scope: fewer deals with bigger size implies 
economies of scope and lower internal fees through greater 
efficiency. 
Although these last two forces (ii and iii) oppose each other, and first 
intuition might suggest that there is no correlation between target size 
and fund performance, some of the PEFs’ managers interviewed tend 
to see the second one as stronger. In any case, these forces cannot 
be quantified. To answer this question, a study directed at comparing 
realized IRR of PEFs with different numbers of deals is needed. 
 
The tables shown in appendix 5.4 summarize the results of the inquiry for 
each PEF interviewed.  
 
As introduced in this section, the targets of the second round were: First, 
through a completely different approach (Inductive reasoning and case study 
method applied to an ex-ante perspective) to confirm the existence of the 
phenomena inferred by previous studies when observing statistical effects in 
an ex-post perspective. Second, to obtain an initial understanding of the 
factors driving both the E.IRR and the T.IRR. A third round was necessary 
not only to deepen the information gathered in the second round but also to 
assess if some of the drivers revealed in this second round could be 
quantified. 
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5.5 Third Round:  Quantitative questions directed at measuring the 
T.IRR. 
 
The complete new questionnaire is shown in appendix 5.5. The following 
paragraphs will answer those questions summarizing all the different outputs 
outlined by all the 13 PEFs interviewed. 
 
5.5.1 The capital collected and under commitment 
 
A contract between the LPs and the PEF is signed in which a certain amount 
of capital is under commitment and is given to the PEF only when it is 
necessary (that is when the deal is made). With this system, LPs can keep 
their money during the time in which GPs look for a deal.  
 
However, executives from all the PEFs interviewed confirmed that an 
opportunity cost exists since the LPs must keep the committed capital 
relatively liquid (no long-term investment can be made) since the funds can 
be required at any time with very little time of warning in advance (only a few 
days in some cases). In all cases, the cash is returned to the LPs when the 
exit of each deal is made. 
 
The country subsidiaries of the Pan-European Funds receive part of the 
capital from the mother PEF and, in this case, the capital is not under 
commitment but already subscribed. This means that, in such cases, the 
opportunity cost could be higher than those cases in which the whole capital 
is under commitment and therefore not received until one deal is closed. The 
other part of the capital is collected from LPs like any other local fund. In 
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addition, the Pan-European funds acquire debt from local banks. This is the 
only case found in which leverage is present in the fund itself. 
 
5.5.2 The net T.IRR required by LPs 
 
GPs’ targets and/or LPs’ expectations are not written in any contract and they 
are informal. However, the accomplishment of such targets is very important 
since it will allow the GPs to raise a new fund at the end of the life of the first 
fund. The higher is the final ex-post IRR (realized premium), the better the 
chances for the GPs to commit new capital for a new fund. 
 
In one case (PAF1), the PEF’s target for its net T.IRR was 15% and the 
T.IRR for any deal was a C&C multiple of 2. This makes no sense and when 
the GPs were questioned about this issue they recognized that as quoted: 
“yes, it is true, if we want to achieve 15% net IRR for the LPs we need to 
double the investment in three years at the most”. Although they use a 
multiple, they are forced to think in terms of time and therefore an implicit IRR 
exists. 
 
One PEF argued that they prefer to use C&C multiples because: GPs prefer 
to make a deal in 3 or 4 years with an IRR of 20% rather than a deal in one 
year with an IRR of 50%. Why?  Because in this way, GPs keep the capital 
assured at a 20% IRR for four years. Otherwise, GPs have to give it back to 
the LPs making both the life of the PEF and the duration of fees shorter. In 
other words, what really matters to the GPs, is to arrive at the end of the 
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PEF’s life with a net ex-post IRR of 15%111 and to meet the LPs’ expectations 
for that period and be able to receive new capital for a new fund.  
 
That is also why PEFs have cycles to collect new money (a new fund) each 4 
or 5 years. GPs in this way follow the natural pace of deal duration target. 
Instead, if GPs invest in a deal with a 50% IRR for one year, for the other 3 
years, they will show an IRR of zero: This means that they will not be able to 
meet the target and will remain without capital (and thus earn no fees).   
  
5.5.3 Carried Interest and the Hurdle IRR (H.IRR) 
 
The H.IRR is a minimum target established by LPs and GPs in a contract, by 
which, GPs can share part of the capital gain obtained at the end of the life of 
the fund, if they were able to achieve it. Such value is normally in a range 
between 6% and 8% (depending on each PEF) and GPs can get 20% of the 
total capital gain realized if they reach that percentage.  
 
This is an important incentive for the GPs and this value differs significantly 
from the net T.IRR which is the GPs’ target to meet LPs’ expectations. This 
net T.IRR is in a range between 10% and 20% to LPs (depending on each 
PEF). But why is there such a difference between the net T.IRR and the 
H.IRR112?  
 
                                                 
111 This number depends on each PEF 
112 Generally, the net T.IRR is an informal target (not written in any contract). Only in REF4, 
was the net T.IRR written in a contract. 
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The answer is simple: “The H.IRR is the minimum performance (agreed by 
contract) by which an investor is willing to invest in a PEF113. LPs perceive 
that over the hurdle rate they are earning at least what they should have 
earned in other investments114.” (stated by a GP of BIF2). “On the contrary, 
the net T.IRR is what LPs expect to earn115. It is perceived as a sufficient 
performance to pay for the additional risk incurred by investing in a PEF116.” 
(stated by a GP of BIF2). However, it is not clear for both academia and 
practitioners what the premium should be to offset additional risk. 
 
In addition, the existence of the H.IRR can generate a particular behavior in 
GPs: the longer the time required to invest all the capital (speed effect), the 
more difficult it is to achieve the H.IRR forcing (in some cases) GPs to accept 
deals which are below the T.IRR. The same situation could also affect the 
timing for the deal exit: In some cases, GPs could accelerate the exit of the 
deal to assure an ex-post IRR superior to the H.IRR (even if it is below the 
net T.IRR) although the timing for the exit has not yet matured. 
 
According to one of the PEFs interviewed (BIF3), the hurdle rate is calculated 
as follows: 
 
 
                                                 
113 The H.IRR might not include any PEF premium. 
114 Through the H.IRR, the LPs are communicating to the GPs what they cease to earn when 
investing in a PEF. 
115 LPs establish a minimum through the H.IRR but they expect to earn more than that. 
116 The net T.IRR has more to do with risk perceptions. 
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H.IRR = 10 years Risk Free Rate + Spread Æ where spread is equal to 3%. 
That is so because that is the return that LPs are able to obtain outside the 
PEF. Therefore, according to BIF3, the H.IRR measures the opportunity cost, 
that the LPs face. 
 
According to most PEFs, both GPs and LPs base their expectations 
(whereby the T.IRR is estimated) on past experience and past performance. 
However, each type of LP has its own drivers. For instance: Private LPs 
normally invest in PEFs because the return is higher than that of other 
alternatives although they do not seem to assess the risk-return relationship 
in a rational way. Conversely, institutional LPs such as pension funds invest 
in PEFs because of a diversification plan aimed at achieving an expected 
long-term return target. 
 
5.5.4 The GPs’ Fees 
 
In general, the fees for the GPs are in a range between 1.5% and 2.5% per 
year of the capital committed: “Big PEFs are able to ask for lower fees due to 
their economies of scale and this is a key issue for us small PEFs.” (stated by 
a GP of REF2). GPs use these fees for their salaries and all the costs 
incurred by the PEF (e.g. monitoring, due diligences and consulting fees). If 
the capital committed increases, the number of executives does not increase 
proportionally and this creates economies of scale (GPs managing bigger 
PEFs can earn more than GPs in smaller PEFs). 
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In most cases, the fees are applied as follows: During the investment period 
of the fund (the first years), the percentage of fees is applied to the capital 
committed. Instead, at the end of the fund life, that percentage is applied to 
the capital still invested in deals (this is logical since at the end of the PEF 
life, costs are lower). However, each PEF has specific systems to calculate 
the fees and this affects both the T.IRR117 and the ex-post IRR.  
 
Some PEFs apply the fee percentage to the capital invested and not to the 
capital committed. In such cases, capital is collected at the beginning of the 
PEF life (between 25% and 35% of the total capital under commitment) and 
this will be partly used to pay the PEF costs. In some other cases, the fee is 
applied to the capital invested and there is a transition clause for the first 
years in which no investments are made but fees must be paid equally. 
 
In general, big PEFs can afford systems in which the average fee during the 
total life of the PEF is lower than that of the small PEF. This is due to the 
economies of scale which the first type enjoys. One system, for instance, 
implemented by the biggest PEF works as follows: They cash fees during the 
first 5 years and nothing during the last 5 years. This is possible only 
because after 5 years, they start a new fund and live out of the fees of the 
new fund. These PEFs leave 10% reserves of the capital of the first fund in 
advance for the first 5 years fees of the second fund. This system is called: 
“automatic roll-off”. In this way, the impact of the fees in both the ex-post IRR 
and the T.IRR is much lower.  
                                                 
117 Since none of the PEFs interviewed applied any rational formula to assess the T.IRR, this 
effect is not explicitly considered. 
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The effect that the average percentage of fees (during the life of the PEFs) is 
lower for big PEFs was confirmed by most PEFs interviewed (both big and 
small). In addition, another phenomenon was revealed: BIF3 argued that the 
level of the fees also depends on the risk level of the deals and investments 
made by the PEF according to Table 5.5: 
 
Table 5.5 Fees per Investment Type 
Investment Type Risk Return Fees 
Industrial Higher Higher Between 1%-2% average over cap committed 
Infrastructure Lower Lower Circa 0.5% over capital committed 
 
Source: Given by BIF3 
 
BIF3 argued that this depends on the sector and not on the size of the 
companies in the portfolio: if PEFs invest in smaller companies, the risk 
increases, but this does not mean higher fees for GPs. BIF3 and other PEFs 
have a particular system to calculate the fees which is shown in Table 5.6: 
 
Table 5.6 Example for calculating the fees 
 
Source: Given by BIF3 
 
Table 5.6 shows that the fees percentage is applied to the sum of capital 
committed and capital invested. In the example of the table, the initial capital 
 Commitment Invested value Total Fee (2%) 
Year 1 100 0 100 2 
Year 2 80 25 105 2.1 
Year 3 50 70 120 2.4 
Year N 20 140 160 3.2 
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committed is always 100 but the capital invested changes according to value 
created. In this way, GPs have an additional incentive to increase the value 
of the portfolio. Appendix 5.7 summarizes all the different systems applied to 
calculate the fees by each of the PEFs in the sample. 
 
5.5.5 The Abort Costs 
 
The abort costs include: The costs incurred in deals assessed but never 
closed (external advisors and due diligence). Some PEFs (specially the small 
ones) ask LPs to pay these costs as extra fees. This is because small PEFs 
cannot afford to pay all these costs from the basic fees. For a small PEF, the 
abort costs are very relevant due to the lack of economies of scale. 
 
Both the T.IRR and the ex-post IRR are affected for those cases in which 
LPs have to fund the abort costs separately. This driver also depends on 
PEFs’ efficiency in closing a deal: The relationship between deal analyzed 
versus deals closed (Deals Analyzed / Deals closed): The higher is this 
figure, the lower the final ex-post IRR, and the higher should be the T.IRR118 
to offset this effect. Inefficiency (high costs in both time and expenses) in 
closing deals directly affects the LPs’ returns. 
 
In contrast, bigger PEFs can afford to pay these abort costs from the fees 
they receive and this implies no further costs for the LPs. In this case, 
inefficiency in closing deals affects the earnings of the GPs.  
                                                 
118 Idem reference 13. 
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5.5.6 The Cash Reserves 
 
All PEFs keep reserves out of the capital committed. Such reserves are used 
to pay fees when all the capital has been invested and for unexpected events 
like: contingencies in the controlled deals (need for further capitalization). 
The reserves are calculated as a percentage over the capital committed and 
they vary from PEF to PEF (between 10% and 20%). Small PEFs tend to 
keep more reserves since they normally invest in smaller deals with more 
risk. “We use the reserves to pay our fees, other costs and especially in case 
of financial needs in our target companies.” (stated by a GP of BIF1)  
 
“The level of reserves also depends on the risk of the portfolio. For instance: 
PEFs investing in start-up companies or turnarounds tend to keep higher 
levels of reserves. Clearly, the level of the reserves (capital not invested and 
therefore an opportunity cost for the LPs) affects both the T.IRR119 and the 
final IRR.” (stated by a GP of BIF4). 
 
5.5.7 Write-Offs and Write-Downs – GPs’ Expectations 
 
In some cases, the stakes acquired are lost due to the target company 
bankruptcy (write-off deals). In other cases, the expectations are simply not 
accomplished, and the value of the stakes held in the target companies is 
written down (“write-down deals”). 
 
                                                 
119 Idem reference 13. 
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Most PEFs agreed on the fact that, according to past experience, the write-
off and write-down experience together is between 7% and 10% of deals 
(about 1 deal in every 10 or 15 has to be written off). This affects the T.IRR 
since, the higher the write-off expectations, the higher should be the T.IRR to 
offset such a loss. However, none of the PEFs interviewed consider this fact 
in calculating the T.IRR. Small PEFs seem to have more write-offs than big 
PEFs probably because they tend to accept riskier or inferior deals. 
 
5.5.8 Opportunity Costs  
 
A few years ago, all the capital raised by the PEFs would be transferred to 
them at the beginning of their lives, and kept in a bank account and invested 
as soon as they found a deal. This method implied an important opportunity 
cost during the time in which the capital was not invested. Nowadays, the 
capital is under commitment (as explained in section 5.5.1). 
 
However, most PEFs argued that LPs are always calling and trying to know 
in advance if a new deal is near to be closed so their cash can be ready. 
However, GPs cannot give any answer in advance since the closing of one 
deal could be defined in three or four days. This issue forces LPs to keep the 
capital relatively ready to invest and this might generate an opportunity cost 
as well. 
 
Another problem regarding the opportunity costs (which are the 
consequences of the speed effect) is the relationship between fees and final 
ex-post IRR (fees / ex-post IRR). For instance: if the PEF spends 5 years to 
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close its first deal instead of  some months, the Fees / IRR  will be bigger and 
this might imply an opportunity cost for the LPs. This problem affects the 
T.IRR120 and the E.IRR which should be higher to offset those effects. 
“Normally, a PEF spends between 2 and 5 years to invest all the capital 
committed. Since the life of a PEF is normally 10 years, the first 5 years are 
used to invest and the last 5 to disinvest.” (stated by a GP of PAF1). 
 
In addition, in some PEFs, the ex-post IRR is calculated over the capital 
under commitment. In these cases, it will be very difficult to achieve the 
H.IRR if the PEF spends a long time in finding the first deals (this means a 
high opportunity cost and high pressure to invest fast).  
 
In other cases, the final ex-post IRR is calculated based on the capital under 
commitment but on the capital invested in the deals (cash in and cash out). 
Therefore, in this case, GPs are less concerned in investing quickly (since 
this does not affect the ex-post IRR and the accomplishment of the H.IRR). 
However, pressure from the LPs exists due to the following reasons: 
- During the time in which the capital is not invested, LPs have to pay 
the fees. The longer the “search for deals period”, the more expensive 
the GPs’ services. 
- It is not clear if LPs calculate their net T.IRRs on the capital committed 
or on the capital invested. Since this is an informal (un-written) 
expectation, each investor might have its own point of view.  
- LPs must keep the capital committed relatively liquid and ready to 
invest since a deal might be close in a few days time. 
                                                 
120 Idem reference 13. 
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These three situations might generate an opportunity cost while the capital is 
not invested and this situation presses GPs to invest as fast as possible in 
order to reduce this effect.  
 
In any case, it is important to consider that each PEF has its own type of 
contract and they are evolving continuously. In the future, and due to the 
higher competition (among PEFs) and due to the current financial crisis, LPs 
might not want to pay fees during the time in which capital is not invested.  
 
The new contracts might force GPs to finance the first years of the PEFs 
from their own pockets. Such a situation might change the speed effect 
considerably. From one side, the opportunity cost incurred by LPs will be 
lower and from the other side, the speed effect might be higher, since GPs 
will be forced to invest very fast in order to receive an income. 
 
“The opportunity cost of the capital not invested is mitigated in the case of 
captive funds. Captive funds do not have private LPs, but banks. Banks 
might have more possibilities to invest in efficient portfolios (efficient risk-
return portfolios) than do private investors.” (stated by CAP1).  
 
One of the captive funds (CAP2) is specialized in only one industry and it 
claims to be faster to invest the capital because of such specialization. “Since 
we work in a niche, we possess a network of contacts and do not lose time 
searching for deals.”(stated by a GP of CAP2). They claim that due to this 
specialization, they are able to add know-how to the target companies and 
add more value out of the synergies they have. Furthermore, since they do 
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not buy the majority of the target company, this gives them access to a 
bigger spectrum of deals121. In addition, such specialized funds suffer less 
competition from other PEFs due to their own specialization, know-how, 
synergies, niche presence and relationship with entrepreneurs. 
 
As stated in section 5.5.4, the opportunity cost of LPs might be the H.IRR 
because that is the return that LPs are able to obtain outside the PEF. Other 
PEFs instead argued that the opportunity cost should be measured using the 
net T.IRR or LPs’ expectations. In addition, there are some PEFs which 
stated that such an opportunity cost does not exist if the LPs’ portfolio is 
ideally well managed in terms of risk-return payoff.  
 
Regarding the speed effect, one PEF answered that: “LPs want a high return 
(that is why they invest in PEFs), and not speed. High returns can be 
obtained through good deals made at the end of the PEF life although GPs 
spend a lot of time looking for high quality deals. In other words, good deals 
at the end could offset the delays at the beginning.” (stated by a GP of 
PAF2). . 
 
5.5.9 The T.IRR and its Calculation 
 
Some PEFs have a general gross T.IRR and apply it to all deals equally. On 
the contrary, other PEFs assess the gross T.IRR for each deal according to 
                                                 
121 Entrepreneurs do not like to lose the majority of their business. This is especially true in 
Italy where families are so attached to their fount of wealth and where companies are a part 
of their livings, feelings and traditions. 
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the risk of that single investment. Therefore, for these last PEFs, the gross 
T.IRR can be split into two further types: 
1. The gross T.IRR for the whole PEF: this is the minimum GPs’ target 
for the PEF as a whole. 
2. The gross T.IRR for the single deal: this is the minimum GPs’ target 
which considered the risk involved in each deal.  
 
Figure 5.4 Determinants of the Gross T.IRR 
 
Source: Author’s own work based on PEFs’ answers 
 
As shown in Figure 5.3, the difference between (3) and (2) is only the internal 
PEFs’ costs. The difference between (1) and (2) is the portfolio diversification 
(for some PEFs) and the synergy effects due to specialization (for other 
PEFs). 
 
Among those PEFs which argued in favor of diversification, one of them 
stated that: “Sector diversification is not the most important driver but the 
number of deals is the more relevant point.” (stated by BIF4). According to 
this PEF, capital concentration in a few deals increases the probability that 
LPs
Deal 1
GPs Deal 2
Deal n
Net T.IRR
=
Net E.IRR Gross T.IRR  
Gross T.IRR deal 2  
(3) (2) (1)
203 
 
the total T.IRR might not be achieved. In concentrated portfolios, the failure 
of one deal might threaten the success of the entire fund. See Figure 5.4 
 
Figure 5.5 Downside Risk 
  Probability of Failure (Downside Risk) 
 
 
 
 
             Number of deals  
     10 deals         100 deals   
 
Source: Author’s own work based on PEFs’ answers 
 
In most cases, both the net T.IRR and the gross T.IRR are estimated 
according to experience and intuition. For instance, one of the GPs of BIF2 
stated:  
 
“We estimate a net T.IRR of 20% because in the past we have got 30% (ex-
post) and therefore 20% is absolutely achievable and should be set as a 
target”. 
 
Another interesting phenomenon revealed in the interviews is the fact that the 
T.IRR might tend to decrease at the end of the PEF’s life. This happens 
when there is still capital under commitment but not yet invested. There is 
always pressure from LPs to invest all the capital as fast as possible. In order 
to avoid such problems, PEFs tend to reduce the T.IRR (at the end of its life), 
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and accept deals which might not have been accepted at the beginning of the 
PEF’s life. 
 
Figure 5.6 The T.IRR evolution 
      T.IRR 
        20% 
        15%  
 
      Year 7          Year 10 
             
               Source: Author’s own work based on PEFs’ answers 
 
Figure 5.5 shows a case in which the effects appear in year 7 but the timing 
for this to happen depends on the liquidity left in the PEF. Sometimes, there 
are covenants (between LPs and GPs) regarding the T.IRR and therefore 
this variable cannot be reduced so easily. In such cases, PEFs prepare more 
optimistic business plans thus getting the same effect as if they have reduced 
the T.IRR.  
 
However, one of the PEFs interviewed (BIF2), argued that it spent more than 
5 years to invest 80% of the capital and the rest was not invested because 
they did not find the right deal. In this case, the PEF preferred to “sit on” the 
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capital instead of investing it. The same PEF said that they analyzed 
approximately 80 deals per year from which only 10 were closed (10/80)122.  
 
This timing effect (shown in Figure 5.5) can work against the so-called speed 
effect. In the speed effect, the slower the PEF is to invest, the worse the 
performance. However, reducing the T.IRR to accelerate the investment 
process could mean bad deals and therefore low performance as well. 
 
Captive PEFs tend to have lower T.IRRs (the net T.IRR is between 6% and 
10% and the gross T.IRR between 9% and 12%). When asked why, they 
argued that “It has to do with the level of the Euribor + internal costs+ 
premium (which is estimated at 3%).” (stated by CAP1). According to the 
observations, some of the reasons might be:  
- Banks do not have opportunity costs while the capital is not invested,  
- Lower internal costs (lower fees and lower carried interest: one of 
them does not have carried interest),  
- Lower management costs: they buy only minority shares,  
- Lower risk deals with low leverage, 
- More flexibility in terms of timing (holding period). They do not have to 
exit the deal in 3 or 4 years, and therefore they can concentrate their 
business plans on long-term value creation,  
- Deals analyzed per deal closed is 1/5 compared to the 1/8 of some 
BIFs,  
                                                 
122 There might be two different rates to consider: Deals Closed / Deals analyzed in detail 
and Deals closed & deals proposed. For instance: REF 4 gave the following rates: The first is 
normally 1/5 and the second 1/25. 
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- No immobilized reserves (if there is an unexpected event, the bank 
itself will provide the funds required). 
CAP2 is specialized in only one industry: The food industry. It claimed that 
the advantages of specialization are: less risk, more synergies, more 
information, deep network, and lower internal costs. All these drivers have a 
direct impact in the T.IRR. In fact, CAP2 argued that they have generalist 
PEFs in other countries and, in such cases, the T.IRR is much higher. 
 
Most PEFs also stated that in past years, T.IRR has decreased (in 1990 it 
was about 30% and now is about 20%). Why is this happening? Is it because 
most analysts are saying that future premiums will be lower than the past 
premium (see chapter 2)? The answer to this question was unanimously: 
No!. This is happening for three main reasons: 
1. Nowadays there are more funds and competition between them is 
higher. 
2. There are less available deals. 
3. LBOs are near extinction: The financial crisis and the lack of credit are 
affecting the type of deal. Furthermore, most target companies are 
already leveraged. This situation not only reduces the number of 
target companies but changes the type of approach PEFs used to 
have. They must look now for expansion deals, that is, companies with 
growth potential. Leverage was the main driver “to create” short term 
value (in 3 or 4 years). “Expansion deals instead, have long-term 
business plans (5 or 6 years), better management, higher risk, more 
know-how, and synergies.” (stated by a GP of BIF1).  
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However, other PEFs argued that there are other new drivers that might have 
an impact in the T.IRR. Some of them could even offset the drivers of the 
previous paragraphs: 
4. PEFs are now enhancing their deals with lower sourcing and 
production costs using imports from China. They are able to offer 
these cost reductions to companies that produce in the EU at high 
costs. 
5. In the past, funds were smaller thus approaching smaller deals with 
higher risk. Nowadays instead, funds are much bigger and can 
approach bigger companies with lower risk. 
6. PEFs have more experience and are more selective than in the past. 
 
The last three items might reduce the T.IRR. Regarding item 5, GPs have 
also an incentive to invest in a few bigger deals rather than in many small 
deals. This is due to the fact that by managing big deals, they can create 
economies of scale. They need fewer executives and therefore the fees are 
distributed to fewer executives. On the other side, they lose diversification, 
thus increasing risk and affecting the T.IRR negatively.  
 
The tables shown in Appendix 5.6 summarize the main quantitative data of 
the sample 
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5.6 Summary 
                      
This chapter has exhibited the data collected during the three rounds of 
interviews. It has limited itself to outlining the data collected as well as the 
opinions of the GPs interviewed, deferring any conclusion, analysis or 
researcher opinions. However, the approach used, as well as the information 
collected, are very revealing and, it is claimed, pioneering when compared 
with past research (see chapter 3). 
 
The next chapter concentrates on the analysis, interpretation and 
comprehension of this data. As stated in chapter 4, this work uses both 
quantitative and qualitative analysis. Finally, chapter 7 will eventually present 
a model to assess the risk premium and, therefore, the T.IRR, in a more 
systematic way. 
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6 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS - FINDINGS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The aim of chapter 5 was to exhibit some of the data collected. It has limited 
itself to outlining the opinions of the GPs interviewed, deferring any analysis 
of the information. In contrast, the aims of this chapter are to present the 
quantitative analysis and to exhibit the basic data in order to provide the 
foundations for a more detailed evaluation, discussion and interpretation 
which, in turn, will be deferred to chapter 7. 
 
Quantitative analysis of data collected allows the researcher to initially 
explore data through statistical analysis in order to find associations, cross-
tabulations, correlations, key differences and patterns.  
 
However, and as stated in chapter 4, since “we cannot directly infer a causal 
effect from a statistical effect” (Marsh, 1988: 229), qualitative data collected 
will also be necessary to find causations of patterns and comprehend the 
correlations between variables found through the statistical analysis.  
 
For instance: How PEFs calculate the T.IRR in each case, as well as which 
risks they perceive cannot be only assessed by looking at statistical data.  
Statistical data should be complemented with a qualitative approach, that is: 
a deep explanation of respondents in each case: “Any attempt to understand 
social reality must be grounded in people’s experience of that social reality” 
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(Bryman, 1988:52). This is one of the innovations of this thesis in terms of 
methodology.  
  
Therefore, the chapter will start with the analysis of the identified phenomena 
(see chapter 3) and their impact on the T.IRR. They will be studied as 
potential determinants of the risk premium and, hence, of the T.IRR. But is it 
possible to trust this variable as assessed by GPs?  
 
Section 6.3 will address this question: To start with section 6.3.1 lists the 
general drivers of the business plan and how they influence the T.IRR. 
Thereafter, section 6.3.2 will outline all the techniques used in this sample of 
PEFs to estimate the T.IRR. In addition, section 6.3.3 will analyze how the 
size of the funds and the deals affect the T.IRR. Subsequently, section 6.3.4 
will explore how the net T.IRR is defined and how this influences the gross 
T.IRR. Finally, section 6.3.5 will exhibit the general determinants of the T.IRR 
as considered by GPs.  
 
6.2 Analysis of the Phenomena 
 
As seen in chapter 5, the first four phenomena (money-chasing deals, fees 
and speed effect, performance persistence), and some behavioral factors 
have been confirmed by all PEFs. Regarding the last two phenomena 
(specialization vs. diversification and monitoring intensity), there were 
contradictory opinions and, at the same time, very revealing answers that 
needed to be analyzed. Through the use of quantitative analysis, this section 
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will shed light on the existence of those phenomena thus confirming the 
opinions of the PEFs interviewed.  
 
The tables in the Appendix 5.6 show the data for 13 PEFs and 26 deals. The 
size of this sample might be considered enough for a qualitative in-depth 
(case study method) analysis. However, for quantitative / statistical analysis, 
this is a small sample which might show some bias. For instance: the lack of 
a bigger number of specialist funds might result in incomplete conclusions. 
 
The table in Appendix 5.7 exhibits the percentage of fees applied by each 
PEF. However, in order to calculate the true cost generated by the fees it is 
necessary to account for each method applied by the PEFs to assess the 
fees. Therefore, a new concept must be defined: The expected fees (EF). 
Appendix 6.1 exhibits and explains how to calculate the EF factor according 
to each method used by each PEF. 
 
6.2.1 Money-Chasing Deals Phenomenon  
 
Do bigger PEFs have access to better deals or, at least, can they afford to 
pay more for them? This refers to chapter 5, section 5.1, questions 1 and 3. 
The following analysis will try to answer this question. 
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Figure 6.1 shows the entry value that the PEFs can afford to pay. The 
boxplots123 illustrate the distribution of the market value discount124 for big125 
and small PEFs. The variable entry discount refers to the market value126. If 
the entry discount is below zero, the PEF has paid an EBITDA multiple 
superior to that of the market. Instead, if the entry discount value is positive, 
the market value has been discounted. 
 
Figure 6.1 Entry Discounts per PEFs’ size 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
                                                 
123 In descriptive statistics, a boxplot is a convenient way of graphically displaying 
differences between populations A boxplot may also indicate which observations, if any, 
might be considered outliers. The spacing between the different parts of the box help 
indicate the degree of dispersion (spread) and skewness in the data.  
124 Market value discount refers to the multiple of the EBITDA. 
125 The analysis has assumed that big PEFs are those whose capital under commitment (CC) 
is higher than € 100 million. In the sample under analysis, there are 8 big PEFs and 5 small 
PEFs. In Italy, PEFs with a CC higher than € 100 million are considered big. PEFs with 
lower amounts of CC are normally small regional funds. 
126 The market value of the target companies is calculating using the EBITDA multiples from 
comparable companies in the organized public markets. These multiples are shown and their 
discounts are shown in the tables of the appendixes 5.6 and 5.7.   
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Figure 6.1 clearly shows that big PEFs tend to pay more for their target 
companies than the small ones.   In addition, Figure 6.2 confirms a negative 
correlation (-0.75) between the two variables (the bigger the PEFs, the higher 
the price paid). 
 
Figure 6.2: Correlation – Entry Discount /PEF size (CC)127 
   
Source: Author’s own work 
 
In the figure 6.2 an x-axis and a y-axis were inserted because there are in 
both cases negative values that had to be shown in the diagram. 
 
The Pearson correlation128 of the variables shown in Figure 6.1 has a value 
of -0.75 and is significant129 at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). Figure 6.2 also shows 
                                                 
127 Capital Committed (CC). 
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an outlier130 point: That is CAP2 which is a big and specialized captive fund 
that claims to buy into its target companies at low EBITDA multiples because 
of the specialization and the niche in which it operates. The know-how in its 
sector allows it to buy companies that other PEFs do not seek (no 
competition). 
 
This analysis might answer the question: Do bigger PEFs have access to 
better deals or at least can they afford to pay more for them? This sample 
suggests the former! This might mean that they have access to higher 
expected cash flows and E.IRR to achieve a higher T.IRR. It could also mean 
that they have access to cash flows with lower operating risk.   
 
                                                                                                                                          
128The Pearson correlation coefficient is a measure of the correlation (linear dependence) 
between two variables, giving a value between +1 and −1 inclusive (the nearest the 
correlation to +1 or -1, the higher the correlation). It is very useful to measure the strength of 
linear dependence between two variables (Field 2005). 
129A result is called statistically significant if it is unlikely to have occurred by chance. 
Levels of significance of 10% (0.1), 5% (0.05), 1% (0.01), 0.5% (0.005), and 0.1% (0.001) 
are informally referred to as “statistically significant”. The lower is the significance level, the 
stronger the evidence. (Field, 2005)  
130 Winsorising is the transformation of statistics by limiting extreme values to reduce the 
effect of possibly spurious outliers. The distribution of many statistics can be heavily 
influenced by outliers. A typical strategy is to set all outliers to a specified percentile of the 
data; for instance, a 90% Winsorisation would see all data below the 5th percentile set to the 
5th percentile, and data above the 95th percentile set to the 95th percentile (Hastings et al., 
1947). 
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6.2.2 Internal Fees, LPs’ Pressure and Speed Effect 
 
Does the net T.IRR (LPs’ expectations which are equal to GPs’ targets) really 
influence the definition of the gross T.IRR (LPs’ pressure)? Are bigger PEFs 
able to have lower fees (economies of scale) thus increasing the net T.IRR 
and the relationship between this variable and the gross T.IRR? These 
questions are related to section 5.4 (questions 5, 7 and 9) and sections 5.5.2, 
5.5.4, 5.5.8, and 5.5.9 of chapter 5. 
 
The first question might be observed by looking at the correlation between 
the Gross T.IRR (GPs’ minimum target when assessing deals) and the net 
T.IRR (LPs’ expectations net of fees, carried interests, and other costs). 
 
Figure 6.3 Correlation – Gross T.IRR / Net T.IRR 
       
Source: Author’s own work 
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The correlation coefficient of the variables shown in Figure 6.3 has a value of 
0.703 and is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). This suggests that GPs 
use the net T.IRR as a base input (base cost of capital) to assess the gross 
T.IRR and the risk of their deals. Clearly, this does not explain how the speed 
effect works to offset the opportunity costs but it might confirm that GPs are 
pressured by LPs’ expectations (net T.IRR).  
 
The correlation between speed (measured in expected years to invest) and 
gross T.IRR is analyzed in Figure 6.4.  
 
Figure 6.4: Correlation – Speed.Y / Gross T.IRR  
                 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
The correlation coefficient between the variables shown in Figure 6.4 has a 
value of 0.66 and is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). This might imply 
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that GPs consciously seek the right balance between the speed and the 
gross T.IRR.  In fact, if the gross T.IRR is too high, it would be difficult to 
close deals and investment speed might be too slow, thus implying a high 
opportunity cost. On the contrary, if gross T.IRR is low, the investment 
process might be fast but with higher probabilities of acquiring bad deals. A 
low gross T.IRR might make it difficult to achieve the net T.IRR. 
 
However, it is important to consider what the “the speed years” refers to: In 
how many years the GPs are expected to invest131. Therefore, these are only 
vague expectations that the GPs had at the beginning of the fund’s life and 
these results should be taken with caution. In other words, the last correlation 
might not be enough to conclude that GPs were rational in defining the gross 
T.IRR in relation to the expected investment speed. 
 
Another important variable to analyze is the expected fees by PEF size and 
type. Do bigger PEFs create economies of scale in terms of fees? Do bigger 
PEFs convert these economies of scale into better returns for the LPs? 
  
                                                 
131 The figure 6.4 shows again that CAP2 is an outlier (expected investment speed = 6 years). 
In fact, this PEF does not consider investment time as variable. As a captive fund, it does not 
have LPs behind pressuring and it can concentrate on a long-term oriented policy.  
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Figure 6.5 Expected Fees by Size and type of PEF 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
Figures 6.5 might answer the second question. In fact, these figures show 
that there are significant differences in the expected fees (as percentages of 
fees) between big and small PEFs and this might confirm that bigger PEFs 
are able to have lower expected fees (EFs) thus improving LPs’ returns. The 
first question might be answered through Figure 6.6: 
 
Figure 6.6 Fees per executive / PEF size 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
Figure 6.6 clearly shows that big PEFs create economies of scale (higher 
fees per executive). Therefore, big PEFs are able to have lower expected 
fees (EF) percentages which imply higher returns of the LPs. At the same 
time, big PEFs (even if they have lower fees in terms of EF percentage) 
create internal economies of scale which allow them to have higher salaries 
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and more cash to face internal costs (consultants, due diligence and other 
costs). 
 
6.2.3 Performance Persistence 
 
Do bigger PEFs expect to give bigger returns to the LPs than small PEFs, 
thus becoming more attractive to LPs?  This question refers to chapter 5, 
section 5.4 (questions 1,2,3,6, and 8) and sections 5.5.2 and 5.5.9 and could 
be answered by investigating whether bigger PEFs have higher targets in 
term of net T.IRR and H.IRR than do smaller PEFs (see Figure 6.7). 
                       
Figure 6.7  H.IRR by Type of PEF 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
Figure 6.7 suggests that Big Italian Funds (BIFs) and Pan-European Funds 
(PAFs) (both types include big funds) have higher H.IRRs than Small 
Regional Funds (REFs). Captive funds (CAPs) have the lowest H.IRRs 
because they do not have single LPs as investors but their parents are 
banks. In fact, CAPs claimed, during the interviews, to have lower risk than 
the other types of funds. 
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Figure 6.8 Net T.IRR per Type of PEF 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
Figure 6.8 suggests again that BIF and PAF funds (both types include big 
funds) have higher net T.IRRs than REF funds (small regional funds). CAP2 
shows a very low net T.IRR (6%) and, this again, might confirm the low risk 
they perceive by working in a specialized niche.  Conversely, CAP1 being a 
generalist exhibits a high net T.IRR of 20% which is in line with that of big 
PEFs.  
 
But is this due to the fact that big PEFs have access to better deals (as 
shown when analyzing the money-chasing deals phenomenon)? Is it due to 
the fact that big PEFs can accept lower fees thus increasing the LPs’ return 
(as shown in section 2.2)? Or is it because of both things? 
 
Do big PEFs have access to better deals? Figure 6.9 investigates if they 
have better expectations (higher E.IRR average which is based on their 
business plans). 
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Figure 6.9 E.IRR / PEF size and PEF type. 
 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
The plot figure on the left shows that, the E.IRR averages of small and big 
PEFs are the same. The figure on the right exhibits a higher E.IRR for the 
BIFs. It is important to consider that big PEFs have access to bigger deals 
which imply lower risk due to size. Figure 6.10 shows the correlation between 
capital committed and E.IRR. 
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Figure 6.10 E.IRR / Capital Committed (CC) 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
Figure 6.10 shows that the correlation between these two variables is weak 
(0.47). However, if only one PEF (the outlier circled in red) is taken out from 
the sample (REF1)132, one obtains a correlation of 0.629 (level of significance 
of 0.05 2-tailed) which might imply that bigger PEFs have access to better 
deals133. 
 
                                                 
132 REF1 was the pilot case studied in chapter 5. Since the GPs had no prior experience, their 
business plans might have been overestimated. In addition, since the owner was forced to 
make the deal (due to the financial distress situations), the price paid was very low thus 
increasing the E.IRR. 
133 The reason why this conclusion can be suggested is the following: Deals with bigger 
E.IRRs might imply companies with higher potential to add value. The correlation shows 
that bigger PEFs have deals with higher E.IRRs and, therefore, one might conclude that 
bigger PEFs have access to better deals. 
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At first sight, it might seem too heroic to conclude with such a statement. 
Since the E.IRR depends on expectations based on cash flows which 
express the way that different GPs working in different PEFs perceive the 
future of those businesses, it is not possible to know whether high E.IRRs are 
due to optimistic GPs, good deals, or both. Conversely, it is logical to think 
that bigger PEFs with more experienced professionals are able to elaborate 
more realistic business plans than small PEFs. Therefore, considering this 
last assumption, the statement of the previous paragraph becomes stronger. 
 
Using another point of view, it is also possible to study the reason why bigger 
PEFs expect to deliver higher performance to their LPs. Table 6.1 might also 
offer an explanation: 
 
Table 6.1 E.IRR, gross T.IRR, and net T.IRR 
                   Big PEFs              Small PEFs 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
Table 6.1 shows how a higher E.IRR of big PEFs might be translated into 
higher gross T.IRR and net T.IRR. The difference between the gross T.IRR 
and the net T.IRR should be the fees and other internal costs. Since the 
      .(1)       .(2)       .(3)       .(1)       .(2)       .(3)
Size E.IRR gross T.IRR net T.IRR Size E.IRR gross T.IRRnet T.IRR
BIF2 26,1% 30,0% 22,5% REF1 38,5% 32,5% 10,0%
BIF1 43,0% 20,0% 15,0% REF3 25,0% 20,0% 15,0%
CAP1 42,0% 25,0% 20,0% REF2 30,0% 17,5% 10,0%
PAF1 26,4% 15,0% 16,0% REF4 19,0% 18,0% 15,0%
BIF4 23,5% 19,9% 14,5% average 28,1% 22,0% 12,5%
PAF2 37,5% 30,0% 25,0%
BIF3 23,0% 20,0% 15,0%
PAF3 29,0% 24,0% 15,0%
Average 31,3% 23,0% 17,9%
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difference between big PEFs and small PEFs regarding the gross T.IRR and 
the net T.IRR is much higher than the difference between the E.IRR and the 
Gross T.IRR, this could imply that big PEFs expect, or are able, to give better 
returns to their LPs (net T.IRR) by building on both better deals and lower 
fees. 
 
As seen in chapter 5, some PEFs also claimed that the T.IRR has decreased 
in the last years (see chapter 5, section 5.4.1 question 8). In order to 
investigate this phenomenon, Figure 6.11 shows the old PEFs (older than 10 
years)134 and the young PEFs with the T.IRR distribution. 
 
                      Figure 6.11 Old vs. Young PEFs 
                   
                            Source: Author’s own work 
 
Figure 6.11 might suggest that old PEFs tend to maintain a higher T.IRR. 
Conversely, new entrants tend to have lower T.IRRs But who are the old 
PEFs? The answer seems to be obvious. The old PEFs are the biggest 
whose GPs have a long experience, and prestige. By analyzing this figure, it 
                                                 
134 Why 10 years? The oldest fund in this sample dates from 1991 and the newest from 2010. 
Under these circumstances, it seems logical to compare both decades (the 1990s and the 
2000s).  
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is not possible to conclude that the T.IRR has decreased in the last few 
years135, but it is possible to infer that the performance persistence exists 
since the old PEFs are able to maintain a higher T.IRR. 
 
6.2.4 Specialization vs. Diversification 
 
The interviews revealed that there is not a unique strategy but both 
specialization and diversification can work and add value. In fact, there are 
two types of funds in this sense: The generalist and the specialist. 
Unfortunately, this sample provides only one specialist fund (CAP2). This 
fund is a captive fund specialized in the food industry with the lowest T.IRR in 
the sample: Net T.IRR of 6%; Gross T.IRR of 12%136. In addition, this PEF 
argued that the bank also holds generalist funds whose T.IRR is higher than 
that of the specialist (approximately 10% for the net T.IRR and 16% for the 
gross T.IRR). 
 
But how can that be so? At first glance, this might seem to contradict 
traditional finance and its portfolio theory137 in favor of the resource-based 
theory as Manigart et al. (2002) suggested. Obviously, there is another 
question to address before expressing a position regarding these issues:  Is 
                                                 
135 To arrive at such a conclusion, it would be necessary to study the evolution of the T.IRR 
during the last two decades. Since this project does not have such information, it must trust 
in the answers, experience and memory of the people in the GPs interviewed. 
136 These values are at least half the average which is circa 25% for the gross T.IRR. 
137 According to portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952, 1959) an investor can reduce 
portfolio risk simply by holding combinations of instruments (diversification) which 
are not perfectly positively correlated. 
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the T.IRR so low because this is a captive fund or because of the 
specialization forces, as CAP2 claims? 
 
The answers to these questions seem to be very simple and related to the 
nature and the determinants of the T.IRR itself (the core of this thesis). The 
net T.IRR measures only risk (risk perceived by LPs), but the gross T.IRR 
measures both risk and costs138 (the PEF internal costs: opportunity costs, 
fees, reserves, carried interest, etc). 
 
Therefore, the gross T.IRR is driven by both forces: the resource-based 
theory (RBT) for the internal costs and the portfolio theory (PT) for the 
systematic risk. In other words, the gross T.IRR has a risk component and a 
cost component. The first answers to the PT, as finance theory would predict, 
and the second to the RBT. That is why, both strategies are used and PEFs 
might obtain a profit from both depending on the circumstances. But in order 
to assess which strategy is stronger, it is necessary to calculate the 
importance of the cost component in comparison with the gains from 
diversification. 
                                                 
138 As seen in previous sections, captive funds (CAPs) tend to have lower internal 
costs. This might explain the low difference between the net T.IRR and the gross 
T.IRR (Net T.IRR = 6% and Gross T.IRR = 12% which makes a difference of only 
6% next to a median of 7,5%). However, the net T.IRR (which might imply risk net 
of costs) is also the lowest net T.IRR in the sample. Since, CAP2 argued that the 
bank also holds generalist funds which T.IRR is higher than that of the specialist 
(circa 9% for the net T.IRR and 16% for the gross T.IRR), it is possible to assume 
that both forces are working here: Lower risk perception due to the specialization 
(because the low value of the net T.IRR), and lower internal costs due to both 
specialization and the nature of a captive fund. 
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If the net T.IRR expresses the risk perception of the PEF portfolio, and the 
gross T.IRR is equal  to the net T.IRR plus internal costs, then the difference 
between the gross T.IRR and the net T.IRR might be equal to internal costs 
(or, at least what GPs, estimate as internal costs). However, this statement 
might not be completely true for those PEFs which assess the risk of each 
single deal as seen in the previous section. In these cases, the gross T.IRR 
might also include a risk component related to the deal. Therefore, it is 
necessary to estimate the PEFs’ internal costs independently from the gross 
T.IRR. Table 6.2 shows these estimations. 
 
Table 6.2 Gross T.IRR 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
Table 6.2 estimates the value of the internal costs without accounting for the 
opportunity costs and write-off costs. These last costs have been excluded 
Type Carried Interest Net Consol EF per Int Costs - without Net T.IRR - [(1) - (2)] / [1] Deal Gross single d
of PEF H.IRR net T.IRR year write-off & opp.c (1) gross T.IRR (2) gross T.IRR
BIF2 8% 22,5% 1,00% 7,00% 7,50% -7,14% Deal 1 30,0%
Deal 2 30,0%
BIF1 8% 15,0% 0,94% 4,94% 5,00% -1,17% Deal 1 20,0%
Deal 2 20,0%
CAP1 5% 20,0% 1,26% 6,26% 5,00% 20,06% Deal 1 25,0%
Deal 2 25,0%
PAF1 7% 16,0% 1,16% 6,16% 9,00% -46,05% Deal 1 25,0%
Deal 2 25,0%
REF1 8% 10,0% 1,41% 7,91% 22,50% -184,39% Deal 1 40,0%
Deal 2 25,0%
REF3 6% 20,0% 1,53% 4,53% -5,00% 210,50% Deal 1 15,0%
Deal 2 15,0%
BIF4 7% 25,0% 1,23% 9,13% 14,50% -58,80% Deal 1 44,0%
Deal 2 35,0%
REF2 6% 10,0% 1,97% 5,47% 7,50% -37,06% Deal 1 17,5%
Deal 2 17,5%
PAF2 8% 25,0% 1,00% 7,00% 5,00% 28,57% Deal 1 30,0%
Deal 2 30,0%
BIF3 8% 15,0% 1,91% 5,91% 5,00% 15,40% Deal 1 20,0%
Deal 2 20,0%
REF4 8% 15,0% 1,48% 5,08% 3,00% 40,94% Deal 1 18,0%
Deal 2 18,0%
PAF3 8% 15,0% 1,00% 5,80% 9,00% -55,17% Deal 1 25,0%
Deal 2 23,0%
CAP2 0% 6% 0,71% 3,21% 6,50% -102,49% Deal 1 10,0%
no carried interest Deal 2 15,0%
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from the calculations because PEFs do not consider them when estimating 
the T.IRR.  
 
Internal Costs (1) = [ CG.GP x Gross T.IRR] + [Expected Fees (EF)] 
Where: 
CG.GP: is the capital gain acquired by GPs if the final IRR (ex-post IRR) is 
achieved. This value is 20% for the non-captive funds and 0% for captive 
funds. 
 
[CG.GP x Gross T.IRR]: are the carried interests or the expected capital gain. 
That is the portion of the gross T.IRR which will go to GPs in case of success 
and must be accounted as internal cost.  
 
Some PEFs in the sample stated that internal costs are between 5% and 
10% as obtained with this last formula. Table 6.2 also includes the difference 
between the Net T.IRR and the Gross T.IRR (2) or “internal premium”139. The 
value [(1)-(2)] / (1)] or “deal risk coefficient”140 intends to capture how great is 
the difference between net T.IRR and gross T.IRR with the internal cost 
estimated with the formula. 
                                                 
139 The “internal premium” is a name given by the researcher to the difference between the 
gross T.IRR and the net T.IRR. In fact, this difference could be understood as the premium 
which remains inside the PEF in the form of fees, carried interest, and the gain on the 
specific risks acquired in the deals.  
140 The “deal risk coefficient” is a name given by the researcher and refers to the difference 
between the internal costs and the internal premium. In fact, such a difference should be 
assigned to the single extra no-premium obtained by investing in deals where single risks are 
involved. This variable should be present only in those PEFs which calculate the gross 
T.IRR for each single deal.   
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The average of this value is -12% which means that, on average the internal 
costs are 12% lower than the difference between the gross T.IRR and the net 
T.IRR. In addition, there are many cases in which the internal costs and the 
internal premium are almost equal. However, there are some important 
considerations regarding the sample that need to be made: 
 
1. As expected, the most important differences between the internal 
costs and the internal premium were found in those PEFs which 
estimate the gross T.IRR for each deal thus considering an extra-
premium according to the risk involved in the deal. Those PEFs are: 
REF1 (its difference or deal risk coefficient is 214%), CAP2 (its risk 
deal coefficient is 90%), BIF4 (its risk deal coefficient is 51%) and 
PAF3 (its risk deal coefficient is 41%).  
2. There is one small PEF (REF3) that does not estimate the gross 
T.IRR and the net T.IRR. In fact, (when asked to estimate these 
values) it gave a gross T.IRR inferior to the net T.IRR which makes no 
sense at all141. This case presents a positive risk deal coefficient of 
204% (it should be negative). 
 
Item 1 might confirm the fact that those PEFs which estimate a general gross 
T.IRR for all deals might be mainly taking into account the internal costs. In 
contrast, for those PEFs which claimed to estimate a single gross T.IRR for 
each deal, these results might confirm that they add something else (an extra 
premium) to the internal costs. For these last PEFs, the average risk deal 
                                                 
141 However, the researcher leaves this particular PEF in the sample to show a case in which 
the irrational behavior is extreme.  
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coefficient is -87% which means that the internal premium is 87% higher than 
the internal costs. 
 
But which force prevails (diversification or specialization)? Is there a way to 
calculate which force is more important in each case? The answer to the 
question is simple: The more important the internal costs relative to the gain 
on diversification, the more suitable is a specialization strategy and vice 
versa. However, the final conclusion and the answer to these questions will 
be addressed in chapter 7. 
 
There might also be a behavior difficult to explain. It has been shown how in 
CAP2 the net T.IRR for specialist funds is 6% and for generalist funds is 9%. 
If the net T.IRR reflects only the risk perception of the portfolio without 
internal costs, why is there this difference? Do banks (captive LPs) perceive 
a specialization strategy to have lower risk than a diversification one? If the 
answer is “yes”, this might contradict traditional finance. 
 
6.2.5 Monitoring Intensity. 
   
Does the number of executives involved in one deal affect the gross T.IRR? 
To answer this question, it is necessary to account for a new variable: the 
number of executives in a PEF per number of deals managed. Table 6.3 
shows this information which was collected and exhibited in chapter 5 
(section 5.5). 
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Table 6.3 Necessary data to assess Monitoring Intensity 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
Where: 
1 – CC: Capital Committed 
3 - N of firms: Number of companies held at the time of the interviews. 
3 - Expected Deals (ED): Number of firms expected to be held by the PEF 
4 - Number of executives: Number of executives working in each PEF 
5 - Expected deals per number of executives: (2) / (3). 
6 – Investment per deal: Capital committed (CC) divided by (2). 
 
With this information, it is first possible to calculate the correlation between 
the gross T.IRR and the variable (Deals per Executive) which is shown in the 
next figure. 
 
 
 
Type CC N of Expected ED x N.of N of Investment Gross single deal IRR
of PEF Firms Deasl (ED) Executives executives x deal (IxD) gross T.IRR
BIF2 500 8 10 1,43 7 40                  30,0%
30,0%
BIF1 1180 13 15 1,25 12 66                  20,0%
20,0%
CAP1 352 23 25 6,25 4 12                  25,0%
25,0%
PAF1 450 18 17 1,31 13 21                  25,0%
25,0%
REF1 20 1 4 2,00 2 5                    40,0%
25,0%
REF3 30 7 7 1,00 7 4                    15,0%
15,0%
BIF4 310 6 8 1,33 6 35                  44,0%
35,0%
REF2 35 6 5 0,83 6 6                    17,5%
17,5%
PAF2 675 12 12 2,00 6 47                  30,0%
30,0%
BIF3 300 10 12 1,50 8 20                  20,0%
20,0%
REF4 35 0 5 1,67 3 5                    18,0%
18,0%
PAF3 200 3 5 1,00 5 36                  25,0%
23,0%
CAP2 100 0 5 1,67 3 20                  10,0%
15,0%
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Figure 6.12 Gross T.IRR / (Deal x Executive) 
  
Source: Author’s own work 
 
The outputs of Figure 6.12 show a very low correlation (0.25 without 
considering the outlier CAP1) between these two variables. Consequently, it 
might be possible to state that the number of executives per deal does not 
affect the T.IRR. This seems to be true142 and it confirms the answers of the 
interviewees. However, there could be an indirect influence as stated by 
some PEFs during the interviews: That is the case when a particular deal 
needs special attention and follow-up from the executives of the PEF, for 
instance a turnaround operation which not only needs intensive monitoring 
but also has higher risk than other types of deals. There is one turnaround 
deal in the sample of this project whose gross T.IRR is 45% (one of the 
highest). 
                                                 
142 At least in a direct way, that is, the direct relationship between the professionals working 
in the PEFs and the number of deals managed. 
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Therefore, it is important to distinguish between two concepts of monitoring 
intensity: 
1. Direct: This is simply the relationship between the number of 
executives working for the PEF and the number of firms managed 
shown in the previous figure. This relationship or rate cannot help to 
answer the question as to whether riskier firms need further 
monitoring.  
2. Indirect: This refers to the extra-executives specially hired for specific 
deals that need more attention. 
 
In fact, regarding this second type of monitoring, respondents argued that it 
depends on the type of deal and the risk of the deal. Higher risk implies more 
indirect monitoring intensity as well as more attention from the internal PEFs’ 
executives. Respondents claimed that the riskier operations needing more 
attention are: first, the turnarounds and start-up; second, the expansion 
deals, and third, the LBOs and replacement deals. The following figure 
(applied to the 26 deals of the sample) might confirm those statements. 
 
Figure 6.13 Gross T.IRR / Type of Deal 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
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Figure 6.13 shows the gross T.IRR per type of deal: that is how GPs perceive 
both the risk and the costs involved in the operation. However, this last 
analysis is not enough to reveal if the higher gross T.IRR is due to the higher 
risk, or due to the monitoring intensity, or both. 
 
6.2.6 The PEF portfolio – Big Deals and Small Deals 
 
The other important variable that should be analyzed is the size of the deal. 
During the interviews, there were a lot of contradictions. There were those 
who perceived small capital firms (“small caps”) as riskier and preferred to 
buy bigger companies. These GPs argued that a few big deals create 
economies of scale. There were those, instead, who argued in favor of small 
capital firms (“small caps”). This group preferred to acquire a lot of small 
companies because in this way they were “feeling” or perceiving that they 
were diversifying, thus reducing risk. Figure 6.14 will try to address this issue. 
   
Figure 6.14 Gross T.IRR / Size per Deal 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
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Figure 6.14 shows the gross T.IRR per deal size. The researcher has 
assumed that small deals are those with an amount invested lower than € 15 
million and big deals are those whose capital committed is higher143. There 
are no significant differences between small and big PEFs regarding the 
gross T.IRR. In addition, the question as to whether PEFs holding more 
small-sized deals perceive lower risk has not been answered. This question 
can be explored by looking at the correlation between the gross T.IRR and a 
coefficient (Invest.x.Deal): 
 
Invest.x.Deal = Total Capital committed / Expected Number of Deals 
 
Figure 6.15: Gross T.IRR / (Invest.x.Deal) 
                      
 
Source: Author’s own work 
                                                 
143 This assumption was based on the size average of the deals of this sample. 
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Figure 6.15 shows a very low correlation of 0.24. However, if REF1144, 
BIF4145, CAP2146 and BIF1147 are taken away from the sample, the 
correlation increases to 0.60 (still low). Only 70% of the PEFs (they are 
shown by the green oval) show a pattern: the higher the capital committed 
per deal, the higher the gross T.IRR. Is being involved in fewer big deals 
perceived as incurring higher risks? 
 
Figure 6.16 Gross T.IRR / (CC.x.Deal) 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
                                                 
144 REF1 calculates the gross T.IRR for each deal. Since their deals are very risky (small 
size), the T.IRR is very high. Conversely, the other PEFs estimate a general T.IRR which 
might assess the portfolio and not the single deals. Since in this case, the analysis is aiming 
at assessing the whole portfolio (small deals vs. big deals), those PEFs (like REF1) that 
estimate the T.IRR for each deal should be taken away from the sample.  
145 Like REF1, BIF4 has an extraordinarily high T.IRR due to a major turnaround deal. 
146 The particular case of CAP2 has been already explained in previous sections.  
147 BIF1 is the biggest fund in terms of capital commitment (It doubles the size of the second 
fund in place. For this fund investing in bigger deals might not mean to lose diversification. 
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In the figure 6.16 an x-axis and a y-axis were inserted because there are in 
both cases negative values that had to be shown in the diagram. 
 
Figure 6.16 shows (T.IRR vs. investment made in the two deals analyzed per 
PEF) a very low correlation of 0.115. Again, if REF1, BIF4 are taken away 
from the sample, the correlation increases to 0.47 (still low). Only 70% of the 
deals (they are shown by the green oval) show a pattern: the higher is the 
capital invested per deal, the higher the T.IRR.  
 
The problem is that the results shown in the last two figures might mix a 
diverse spectrum of phenomena. For instance: In section 2.3 (performance 
persistence), bigger PEFs that have access to bigger deals tend to have 
higher net T.IRRs and this might influence the value of the gross T.IRR. In 
other words, big PEFs define higher threshold targets due to a better past 
performance. Therefore, it is not possible to conclude that the size of the 
target companies and the number of deals is an important issue when 
assessing the risk of the portfolio. 
 
Until now, the analysis made in this first part of the chapter trusted the T.IRR 
(gross or net) as a reliable variable by which GPs measure risk and internal 
costs. It was considered as a finance driver where GPs reflect their 
perceptions in a rational and systematic way. But is that so? This will be the 
main topic of the next section. 
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6.3 The Gross Threshold IRR and the Behavioral Factors 
 
Is it possible to trust this variable for what it purports to be?148 The answer 
seems to be “no”, since as shown in chapter 5, no PEF uses a rational and 
systematic way to calculate the T.IRR. All of them use intuition and past 
experience: For instance, one of the GPs of BIF2 stated: “we estimate a net 
T.IRR of 20% because in the past we have got 30% (ex-post) and therefore 
20% is absolutely achievable and should be set as a target”. 
 
6.3.1 The Business Plan and its influence on the T.IRR 
 
All PEFs149 assess the risk of the deal considering the following drivers:  
- The external factors: the extrinsic potential of the company: That is, its 
strategic position in the market, the market trend, the analysis of the 
sector (e.g. using Porter’s five forces analysis), the deal exit and its 
timing. 
- The internal factors: The intrinsic potential of the company to improve 
the efficiency in its operation: Growth; historic performance; brand 
potential; leverage; synergies with other deals already held in the 
portfolio: economies of scale, know-how, distribution channels, fixed 
costs; quality of management; how cyclic is the business (periodic 
cycles); product issues: Quality; technology issues, new products, etc. 
   
                                                 
148 Is the gross T.IRR really reflecting risk and all the costs?  
149 Specially, bigger PEFs which have more possibilities to analyze more deals. 
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Both external and internal drivers are reflected in the business plan and 
therefore, in the E.IRR. Conversely, the T.IRR should not directly be affected 
by these drivers but be defined according to their potential volatility. 
However, practitioners base the final value of the T.IRR (whether the T.IRR is 
20% or 25%) on their intuition and past experience. 
 
6.3.2 Techniques to Estimate Performance with an ex-ante Perspective 
 
All the types of techniques seen in chapter 5 to measure the T.IRR can be 
classified into three different methods:  
1. A gross T.IRR depending on each deal: Few PEFs consider a 
T.IRR for each deal because each deal has its own risk. Therefore, 
they estimate a value using intuition and experience to measure 
T.IRR. In this case, to estimate the value of the T.IRR, they consider: 
the PEF’s internal costs, LPs’ expectations, and the specific risk of a 
deal.  
2. A general gross T.IRR used for all cases equally: Most PEFs have 
a uniform T.IRR that they apply to any deal. In such case, they do not 
consider the risk involved in the deals. They estimate this general 
T.IRR only according to internal costs and LPs’ expectations. They 
also use intuition and experience. For instance: Some PEFs argued 
that if the T.IRR is 30%, they normally get less (20%) as ex-post IRR. 
Therefore, in establishing a T.IRR they add a buffer to be covered 
from unexpected events. Other PEFs argued that they estimate the 
value of the T.IRR according to what is achievable (what is possible). 
In the same way, these PEFs estimate the gross T.IRR adding to the 
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net T.IRR the internal costs (estimated): fees and abort costs. Some 
PEFs argued that the difference between gross T.IRR and net T.IRR 
is about 10%. 
3. A threshold cash & cash (C&C) multiple (as seen in chapter 5): 
Some PEFs measure the threshold performance as a multiple of the 
initial capital invested. Such a multiple does not consider the time 
factor as the IRR does, thus distorting the true performance of the deal 
when compared with alternative investments. In some cases, both LPs 
and GPs accept this system of measuring performance and this might 
imply a very behavioral (not rational) way of assessing deals ex-ante. 
 
In all these three cases, the PEFs have in mind the LPs’ expectations (net 
T.IRR for the first two cases, and net C&C multiple for the third case) as a 
base input to estimate the threshold when assessing new investments.  
 
Figure 6.17 shows the 13 PEFs interviewed according to their use of  these 
three methods of calculating the T.IRR. 
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The last paragraphs and tables seem to confirm that the gross T.IRR is 
generally assessed in a very behavioral way (using intuition) and therefore 
cannot be completely trusted for what it intends to represent: A rational 
required return to offset the risk of the deal. Although all PEFs interviewed do 
not use a rational formula to measure T.IRR for each deal, most of them 
agreed that a more rational way to assess the gross T.IRR would have to 
consider: 
 
LPs’ expectations or net E.IRR + PEF internal costs + risk of the deal 
 
The following sub-section will study different aspects in the assessment of 
the gross T.IRR.  
 
6.3.3 The gross T.IRR – Big Funds vs. Small Funds 
 
Figure 6.18 clearly shows that big PEFs tend to have higher gross T.IRRs 
than the small PEFs. 
      
Figure 6.18 Gross T.IRR / PEF size 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
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To reinforce the finding of Figure 6.18, Figure 6.19 shows the correlation 
between capital committed (CC) and gross T.IRR. 
 
     Figure 6.19 Gross T.IRR / Capital Committed 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
The correlation of Figure 6.19 is only 0.30 (very low). However, if the two 
outliers, REF1 and BIF1 are taken away from the sample, the correlation is 
0.83 (very high). It has been already explained in the previous section the 
problem with REF1 (the case is not representative and ideally should be 
taken away from the sample). Instead, BIF1 shows a case in which the gross 
T.IRR was particularly low due to a deal with advantageous covenants and 
other positive aspects of the business plan. 
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The correlations found in this section contradict traditional financial theory in 
which small PEFs and smaller and riskier deals should have higher required 
returns. Why do big PEFs have higher gross T.IRR than small PEFs? Is it 
because big PEFs have access to better deals (as suggested in section 2.2 
and section 2.3)? Or is it due to the fact that big PEFs create more 
economies of scale in terms of fees (as shown in section 2.2)? What are the 
drivers behind these results? Is it possible to trust the T.IRR as assessed 
nowadays? These are not easy questions to answer but chapters 7 and 8 will 
try to address them. 
 
6.3.4 The definition of the net T.IRR 
 
If the net T.IRR is defined according to history and experience as most GPs 
claimed, it is important to look at past performance (ex-post IRR). In this 
sense, chapter 2 stated that the most commonly used method to estimate the 
equity premium in organized markets is an extrapolation of the historically 
realized equity premium into the future. However, chapter 2 also showed that 
historical averages might be inadequate to predict future returns. The same 
issues should be considered for the PEFs. 
 
However, according to the information collected and outlined in chapter 5, 
there might be two ways in which the T.IRR is estimated: 
 
1 – Through past experience, GPs estimate first the gross T.IRR (what is 
possible) and thereafter they estimate the net T.IRR (net of fees and costs). 
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2 – Recurrent LPs’ investors will expect to receive a net T.IRR in line with their 
past experience. In this case, the net T.IRR is used as a basis to define the 
gross T.IRR. 
 
Figure 6.20 The net IRR 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
Figure 6.20 shows how both GPs and LPs converge to a similar estimated 
value of the Net IRR. The GPs, by looking at the past performance of their 
deal, assess what can be done in terms of gross T.IRR. On the contrary, the 
LPs by looking at the past performance of their past investments, they 
assess what can be obtained in terms of net T.IRR 
 
6.3.5 The gross T.IRR and its drivers 
 
There are several behavioral approaches influencing the assessment of the 
gross T.IRR 
 
Net IRR
LPs’ Assessment
Net T.IRR
Past performance
Gross T.IRR - Deals 
Past performance
GPs’ Assessment
Net IRR: Value Convergence  
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6.3.5.1 The gross T.IRR acts as a Buffer 
 
For instance: some PEFs interviewed argued that when the E.IRR for one 
deal is expected to be 30%, the ex-post IRR will be 25% or less. Therefore, 
they increase the T.IRR by approximately 5% as a kind of buffer. 
 
6.3.5.2 The gross T.IRR defined with multiples  
 
It was already seen in chapter 5, and in section 6.3.2 of this chapter, the 
problem of using the cash and cash multiple (C&C) instead of the IRR to 
measure expected return.  Such a multiple does not consider time as the IRR 
does, distorting the real performance of the deal when compared with 
alternative investments. PEFs that use this method argued that their target is 
to double the investment and it is the same if they do it in three years (in 
which case the IRR would be 25%) or in five years (in which case the IRR 
would be 15%).  
 
When BIF4 was asked why they do this, the answer was the following:  
 
“We prefer to use multiples because of the following reason: GPs prefer to 
make a deal in 3 or 4 years with an IRR of 20% rather than a deal in one year 
with an IRR of 50%.”  
 
But why should this be?   
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“Because in this way GPs keep the capital assured at an 20% IRR for four 
years. Otherwise, GPs have to give it back to the LPs making both the life of 
the PEF and the duration of fees shorter.”  
 
It seems obvious that this kind of behavior can generate an agency issue 
between LPs and GPs. This problem will be discussed in the next chapter. 
 
6.3.5.3 When the risk of the single deals is assessed 
 
Figure 6.21 shows the basic components of the gross T.IRR. As shown, the 
main determinants are:  
- For those PEFs that do not assess the risk of the single deal: gross 
T.IRR = net T.IRR + fees + carried interests + other internal costs + 
buffers (eventually in some cases) 
- For those PEFs which assess the risk of the single deal: the gross 
T.IRR = the net T.IRR + fees + carried interests + other internal costs 
+ buffers (eventually in some cases) + the risk of the deal. 
Figure 6.21 exhibits the second case which is more comprehensive and 
detailed than the first.  
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Figure 6.21 The gross T.IRR 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
1- The net T. IRR: Recent papers (reviewed in chapter 3) have tried to 
assess not only the value of the market premium for the PEFs but also 
if such a premium offsets their risk. Conclusions are still contradictory 
and it is not clear what the premium should be. Italian private equities 
(in this sample) assess the net T.IRR by looking at their own past 
history and experience. 
2- Internal Costs comprise mainly fees and carried interest. 
3-  Risk of the Deal: For those PEFs which assess risk for each single 
deal, an extra premium is estimated. This is also made in a very 
behavioral way: These PEFs use intuition, the expected volatility of 
some of the drivers included in the business plan, and the covenants 
agreed with the entrepreneur. 
 
This last section tried to exhibit the different criteria as how GPs currently 
assess the gross T.IRR. Some determinants seem to be rational and some 
others more behavioral. Overall, these determinants are not quantified by the 
Fees Carried Interests
Other Drivers from
BP
Deal special
covenantsNet T.IRR
Internal Premium
Gross T.IRR
Risk of the Deal
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PEFs: there is not a systematic model to estimate the T.IRR and, therefore, 
the risk-premium of the deals. 
 
6.4 Conclusion 
 
The aim of this chapter was to analyze the data by using both quantitative 
and qualitative approaches. The analysis made in section 2 suggests not 
only the existence (in an ex-ante perspective) of the phenomena found in the 
last couple of decades of research, but also the presence of new drivers that 
might be influencing the T.IRR. 
 
Section 3 has studied how the T.IRR is estimated and which are the drivers 
considered by GPs. But what are the true determinants of the T.IRR? In this 
sense, some new drivers affecting the T.IRR and not considered by the GPs 
have also been suggested by the output given by the qualitative analyses of 
the interviews and the numerical data.   
 
The way in which the T.IRR is incompletely and imprecisely estimated needs 
to be discussed and ultimately enriched by a new and more precise 
calculation method based on all the findings revealed during this research 
project. All the true determinants (and not only those considered by GPs) 
must be included in a new theory able to explain the phenomena and 
ultimately, how they drive the T.IRR. 
 
Traditional finance alone does not seem to be enough to explain some of the 
drivers behind the T.IRR. This does not mean that the new drivers are not 
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rational, some of them might be in fact very rational and some others might 
not. Overall, the determinants of the T.IRR are a mix of: traditional finance 
drivers, rational drivers which do not belong to traditional finance, and 
behavioral or non-rational drivers. These determinants will be discussed in 
detail in the next chapter. Therefore, the challenge of the next chapter 
(chapter 7) will be develop a qualitative model (chapter 8 will develop a 
quantitative model) able to explain the T.IRR with all its determinants.  
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7 EXPLANATORY MODEL – PEFs’ RISK PREMIUM DRIVERS 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter, based on the findings of chapter 5, and on the analysis of 
chapter 6, is aimed at explaining in detail how the T.IRR drivers really work 
and at proposing an explanatory model. It has been already stated that 
traditional finance alone cannot explain all the factors driving the T.IRR. That 
is why previous papers (Franzoni et al., 2010 or Korteweg & Sorensen, 2009) 
that based their models only on the three-factor-model do not offer sufficient 
insight to allow the understand of PEFs and the nature of their risk premium. 
 
In addition, many of the factors affecting the risk-premium and the T.IRR also 
depend on GPs’ strategic decisions and vice versa (such as: diversification 
vs. specialization, big deals vs. small deals, type of deal, etc). Consequently, 
this chapter is also about GPs’ strategy and decision theory151 on which the 
T.IRR depends. As stated in chapter 3, GPs work in a sector where 
information is bounded and the EMH just does not apply (for instance: 
                                                 
151 Decision theory is concerned with identifying the best decision to take. An ideal 
decision maker is fully informed and fully rational. Most of decision theory is 
prescriptive or normative (Hansson, 2005): The practical application of this 
prescriptive approach is called decision analysis, and aimed at finding tools, 
methodologies and software to help people make better decisions. However, since 
people usually do not behave in ways consistent with axiomatic rules, there is a 
related area of study called a positive or descriptive discipline, attempting to describe 
what people will actually do. See Akerlof & Yelen (1987), Anand (1993), Berger 
(1985), Clemen (1996), and Bernardo & Smith (1994).  
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diversification is limited to a number of deals). Therefore, this chapter will not 
only describe how they behave but also will propose a model as how they 
should behave. 
 
Consequently, section 7.2 will explain how the phenomena, as revealed in 
chapters 5 and 6, work in affecting the T.IRR. This section will construct a 
driver-flow for each phenomenon and will explain how some factors as well 
as GPs’ strategic decisions affect the T.IRR and vice versa.  Section 7.3 will 
describe GPs’ strategic decisions regarding their portfolio selection. Finally, 
section 7.4 will show how the determinants of the T.IRR are assessed by 
both GPs and LPs and will propose a model to show how they might be 
assessed. The quantification of the factors included in this model will be 
addressed in chapter 8. 
 
7.2 How the Phenomena are Driven 
 
As seen in chapter 6, the first four phenomena (money-chasing deals, fees 
and speed effect, performance persistence, monitoring intensity, 
diversification vs. specialization, big vs. small PEFs) were analyzed in the 
light of the qualitative answers given by GPs and of the statistical analysis of 
the quantitative information collected during the interviews.  The analysis 
suggested the existence of such phenomena and this section will discuss 
and eventually interpret how they work. 
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7.2.1 Money-Chasing deals phenomenon (MCD) 
 
In chapter 6, section 6.2.1152, the different statistical analyses assessed 
suggested the following drivers: Big PEFs tend to pay more for their target 
companies (higher multiples), and this implies that big PEFs have access to 
better deals where more competition among PEFs is present. This fact was 
confirmed by all the GPs interviewed:  
 
“We cannot compete with other PEFs since we have to acquire stakes at 
very low values, therefore we need to look for deals not interesting for other 
PEFs especially for the big ones which can afford higher prices.” (Stated by 
one General Partner of REF2).  
 
In addition, the drivers behind the MCD phenomenon were also explained 
and confirmed by all GPs. Based on these findings, the researcher has 
proposed a drivers-flow model for this phenomenon. The following figure 
summarizes the drivers of the MCD phenomenon. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
152 See also chapter 6, section 3.3 for the analysis of big vs. small PEFs. 
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Figure 7.1 MCD Drivers 
 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
Figure 7.1 shows how the size of the PEF affects the skill of the GPs (bigger 
and older PEFs might have more experienced and skilled GPs partly 
because they can afford to pay higher fees per GP). Both drivers affect the 
access to better deals.  The access to better deals implies high E.IRR and 
low T.IRR. On the other side, the number of potential deals and the intensity 
of the competition are also important drivers. A high number of potential 
deals increases the probability of finding a good deal and this implies a 
higher E.IRR and lower T.IRR. In contrast, a high number of competitors 
(other PEFs) decreases the probability of finding a good deal. The PEF has 
to pay more for a deal and that implies lower E.IRR and higher T.IRR. Figure 
7.2 explains the phenomenon with two examples: one on the left and one on 
the right. 
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Figure 7.2 MCD Driving the Gross T.IRR and the E.IRR
          
Source: Author’s own work 
 
The left-hand side shows an old and big PEF with experienced GPs in a 
market with few competitors and a high number of potential deals (violet 
arrows: pointing up signifies high, and pointing down signifies low). Such 
situations imply deals with high potential or high E.IRR and low risk or low 
T.IRR (the best deals). An important difference between the E.IRR and the 
T.IRR means a high expected value creation. Conversely, the right-hand side 
shows the contrary situation. In other words, both E.IRR and T.IRR are 
driven by the size of the PEF and by GPs’ experience. 
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7.2.2 Internal Fees, LPs’ pressure & Speed Effect 
 
In chapter 6, section 6.2.2153, the different statistical analyses assessed 
suggested the following drivers:  
- GPs are influenced by the net T.IRR to define the gross T.IRR, 
- GPs might be pressured by LPs (through the net T.IRR) to seek the 
appropriate combination between investment speed and gross T.IRR 
(a trade-off between the two forces): 
High gross T.IRR Æ slow speed Æ high opportunity costs Æ final IRR < net T.IRR. 
 
Explanation: A high gross T.IRR will make it more difficult to find an appropriate deal (a 
deal with such a high performance potential). Therefore, the investment speed will tend 
to be slow. In addition, a long investment period creates high opportunity costs thus 
decreasing the final IRR. As a consequence, such a situation might imply a final IRR 
inferior to the LP’s expectations (net T.IRR)  
 
Low gross T.IRR Æ fast speed Æ riskier deals Æ final IRR < net T.IRR 
 
Explanation: a low gross T.IRR will make it easier to find a deal. But in this case, low 
barriers in terms of T.IRR might imply accepting high risk deals. As a consequence, the 
final IRR might not meet the expectations.  
 
- Bigger PEFs are able to exploit economies of scale in terms of total 
amount of fees.  
- Bigger PEFs also have a lower percentage of expected fees (EF)154. 
Lower EF implies higher net T.IRR. 
                                                 
153 See also chapter 6, section 3.3 for the analysis of big vs. small PEFs. 
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Opportunity costs are generated by two factors: First, LPs pay fees even 
during the time in which the capital is not invested (this is true for all the 
methods revealed in this sample to calculate fees); Second, even if in most 
cases, the final ex-post IRR is calculated over the capital invested (after 
capital draw-downs or capital calls), LPs would like to achieve the highest 
performance possible during the whole life of the PEFs (that is: starting when 
the capital was first committed). This is because LPs do not want to have 
their money relatively liquid waiting for the draw-downs since this creates a 
hidden cost for the LPs155, thus pressuring GPs to invest fast:  
 
“We have not been able to find more deals to invest in and LPs are very 
angry and upset.” (stated by one GP in REF4);  
 
“We receive calls from our LPs every day to see how far we are from the next 
draw-down of capital.” (stated by one GP in BIF1).  
 
For those PEFs in which the ex-post IRR is calculated based on capital 
committed, this effect might be critical. Instead, for those PEFs in which the 
ex-post IRR is calculated over capital invested (most of them), this effect is 
mitigated since the only direct costs are the fees paid during the time in 
which capital is not invested. Although each PEF has its own legal 
agreements in terms of fees and IRR and, as seen in chapter 5, they are 
constantly evolving. This thesis proposes a generalization as a base which 
                                                                                                                                          
154 Expected by both LPs and GPs 
155 They cannot manage their portfolio as they wish and this forces them to earn low rates of 
return during the waiting time. 
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can be modified according to each particular case and contract between LPs 
and GPs. Figure 7.3 shows the base model: 
 
Figure: 7.3 Speed Effect and the Opportunity Costs 
 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
Figure 7.3 shows how LPs’ expectations through the net T.IRR presses GPs 
to define gross T.IRR high enough to achieve such a goal. The level of the 
gross T.IRR will affect the investment speed and the opportunity costs of the 
capital not invested. If the speed is too low, the opportunity costs incurred by 
LPs will be too high and the final net IRR might not be achieved. That is why 
the opportunity costs as well as the speed effect also drive back the T.IRR to 
meet the appropriate balance. 
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Figure 7.4 MCD Phenomenon and the Speed Effect 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
Figure 7.4 shows how interrelated these variables are. The MCD 
phenomenon seen in the previous section affects directly both the gross 
T.IRR and the speed effect. A favorable MCD situation decreases the gross 
T.IRR (low risk deals) and increases the investment speed of the fund. A 
lower gross T.IRR makes it even easier for a PEF to close a deal and this 
increases the speed further. High investment speed also reduces the 
opportunity costs of the capital committed and not invested. In contrast, an 
unfavorable MCD situation increases the T.IRR (difficult access to deals 
implies bad deals left or deals with higher risk) and decreases the investment 
speed. In addition, high T.IRR makes it even more difficult to close a deal 
and this decreases the speed further. Low investment speed also increases 
the opportunity costs and finally, high opportunity costs increases the T.IRR 
further on. High opportunity costs increases the T.IRR156 because GPs need 
                                                 
156 As stated in section 7.2.1, most PEFs calculate the ex-post IRR using capital draw-downs 
and not capital committed. Therefore, one might assume that the opportunity cost does not 
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to offset these costs with higher returns (higher T.IRR) to achieve the final 
target (the net T.IRR). 
 Figure 7.5 Economies of Scale 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
Figure 7.5 shows the effect of the economies of scale generated by big PEFs 
(violet arrows: pointing up signifies high and pointing down signifies low): 
Economies of scale allow big PEFs to afford lower fees (as a percentage) 
and still have higher fees per executive. Therefore, bigger PEFs might have 
more capabilities to give better returns to their LPs (higher ex-post IRR). With 
a history of high ex-post IRRs, LPs will require a higher net T.IRR for a 
second fund managed by the same GPs and that implies higher gross T.IRR.  
 
However, whether the profits generated by these economies of scale are 
kept by GPs or are given to LPs (as ex-post IRR) is quite another matter. 
This matter has more to do with the performance persistence phenomenon to 
be addressed in the next section. 
 
                                                                                                                                          
influence the final IRR. However, the researcher (based on the findings of chapter 5) has 
assumed that LPs’ expectations (which are reflected in the net T.IRR) account for these 
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7.2.3 Performance Persistence Phenomenon 
 
The analyses shown in chapter 6 section 6.2.3157, suggest that bigger PEFs 
seek both a higher H.IRR and net T.IRR. However, the question was: Is this 
due to the fact that big PEFs have access to better deals (as shown in 
section 7.2.1 dealing with the MCD phenomenon)? Is it due to the fact that 
big PEFs create more economies of scale in terms of fees (as shown in the 
section 7.2.2)? Or is it because of both factors? To answer these questions, 
chapter 6, section 6.2.3 has shown that bigger PEFs have access to better158 
deals in terms of E.IRR.  
 
Based on those conclusions, it is possible to conclude that performance 
persistence exists: bigger PEFs have access to better deals and therefore 
can afford to give better returns to their LPs (H.IRR and net I.IRR). 
Consequently, LPs investing in bigger PEFs (based on a more successful 
past experience) have higher expectations159. 
 
In any case, this phenomenon of the performance persistence contradicts the 
traditional financial theory by which riskier deals should have better returns. 
In fact, if this statement is considered, small PEFs should have higher T.IRRs 
than big PEFs because of the following reasons: 
                                                 
157 See also chapter 6, section 3.3 for the analysis of big vs. small PEFs. 
158 If GPs were optimistic and were over-estimating future performance, such behavior 
should be distributed randomly among all PEFs and not only among the big PEFs. 
159 It is important to remember that big PEFs are normally older and have both experienced 
GPs and LPs that have worked together in previous funds. The same LPs might trust their 
money to the same GPs.   
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- Small PEFs have higher risk due to the smaller companies present in 
their portfolios. 
- GPs are normally less well-known and with a less successful 
background. LPs should thus require higher performance.  
- They have higher risk due to the higher risk profile of the companies 
they hold. 
 
Despite these reasons, the evidence collected from this sample, seems to 
suggest the opposite: Bigger PEFs have higher T.IRRs than the smaller 
ones. Furthermore, this statement confirms what was expressed in interviews 
by most GPs (in both small and big PEFs) regarding this issue: “Bigger PEFs 
are able to get better deals with higher potential and lower risk. In addition, 
due to their past high performance, they have higher targets in terms of 
T.IRR.” (stated by a GP in REF2). 
 
In addition, some other drivers like the learning cost effect might influence 
these results. For instance: Old PEFs with high experience and know-how 
would be able to achieve better performance. Instead, new funds with less 
experience might be satisfied with less ambitious targets.  
 
But why do all LPs not invest in big PEFs? Or why do some LPs invest in 
small regional PEFs? The answers to these questions seem to be very 
simple and were confirmed by all PEFs interviewed. It has to do with the 
segmentation of this sector which can be explained by considering the 
following reasons: 
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- Big PEFs collect high amounts per LP. It is not easy for small 
investors to enter a big PEF. 
- The information is not open, public and instantaneously available as in 
the organised markets and, therefore, these markets are not efficient 
(see in chapter 2 the definitions for the EMH). 
- Small regional LPs like to trust their money to people they know 
(friends) and in their own region. In Italy, accent, culture, and dialect 
(there are hundreds of dialects) are important factors in business 
transactions. Investors feel safer when trusting their money to 
someone who speaks the same language.  
 
Therefore, the relationship between LPs and GPs is not completely driven by 
rational factors. The EMH does not apply in these markets, and some 
behavioural factors need to be considered, for instance: The behavioural 
concept known as representativeness (Kahneman and Tversky 1972) seen in 
chapter 3. Through this behavioural phenomenon, old successful PEFs will 
be able to collect more capital than the new entrants.  
 
To summarize: First, the net T.IRR is higher for big PEFs partly because they 
have access to better deals (the higher E.IRRs are in line with the higher net 
T.IRRs); Second, as outlined in chapter 6 section 6.2.3, big PEFs also expect 
to give better returns (net T.IRR) to their LPs due to a lower annualized 
percentage of expected fees. Third, the internal economies of scale (higher 
fees per executive) allows big PEFs to have more money to analyze more 
deals, pay better consultants and attract better professionals through higher 
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salaries. Figure 7.6 summarizes the drivers for the performance persistence 
phenomenon. 
 
Figure 7.6 Performance Persistence Phenomenon and its Drivers 
      
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
Figure 7.6 shows on the left-hand side, the drivers of the Performance 
Persistence phenomenon (using as an example big and old PEFs) in the 
private equity sector and how they increase the T.IRR (green arrow inside 
the yellow hexagon). On the left side, the figure shows, in contrast the drivers 
for young and small PEFs and how they decrease the T.IRR (pink arrow 
inside the yellow hexagon). The violet quadrant shows the forces of 
traditional finance which oppose those of performance persistence present 
among PEFs. 
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7.2.4 Monitoring Intensity 
 
Chapter 6, section 6.2.5 showed how the level of gross T.IRR depends on 
the type of deal. Higher risk deals (like turnaround deals) not only have 
higher T.IRR because of the risk itself but also because of the increasing 
direct and indirect monitoring intensity (according to the GPs interviewed), as 
explained in chapter 6. It is possible, therefore, to assess the drivers-flow for 
the monitoring intensity effect as follows: 
 
Figure: 7.7 Monitoring Intensity - Drivers 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
Figure 7.7 shows how the risk of the deal also depends on the type of deal. 
For instance, turnarounds or start-up deals might require an extra premium in 
comparison with LBOs, MBOs, expansion, and replacement deals. According 
to the interviewees, start-up and turnaround deals might increase the T.IRR 
by between 3% and 5%. High risk deals might also require high monitoring 
intensity (both direct and indirect) thus increasing the final gross T.IRR of the 
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deal. According to the interviewees, high levels of monitoring intensity might 
increase the T.IRR by between 1% and 2%. 
 
7.3 The PEF Portfolio – Decisions and Drivers Affecting the T.IRR 
 
7.3.1 Specialization vs. Diversification 
 
Chapter 6 section 6.2.4 has shown how a specialist fund like CAP2 has a low 
net T.IRR because of the low risk perception of a specialization strategy. It 
has also shown that specialist funds have a very low difference (much lower 
than the average) between the net T.IRR and the gross T.IRR because of 
lower internal costs due to both specialization and the nature of a captive 
fund.  
 
Therefore, the gross T.IRR is driven by both forces: the resource-based 
theory (RBT) for the internal costs and the portfolio theory (PT) for the 
systematic risk. Manigart et al. (2002) suggested that PEFs might not behave 
according to the traditional finance theory regarding these two forces. 
 
According to this researcher, the conclusions of Manigart et al. (2002) were 
very interesting but incomplete160. PEFs (regarding these two forces) may 
well behave according to the finance theory. The problem is that, it is first 
necessary to understand that the gross T.IRR has a risk component and a 
                                                 
160 As discussed in chapter 4, this is due to the limited approach (methodology) used. They 
did not have a close contact with GPs and therefore they could not address questions like 
“why” or “how”. 
267 
 
cost component. The first answers to the PT as finance theory would predict 
and the second to the RBT. That is why, both strategies are used and PEFs 
might obtain a profit from both, depending on the circumstances (see figure 
7.8). 
 
Figure 7.8 Diversification vs. Specialization 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
Figure 7.8 shows the balance of the two forces: the diversification forces and 
the specialization forces. The first are driven by the portfolio theory and the 
second, by the resource-based theory. In addition, the resource-based theory 
is driven by PEFs’ internal costs. The opportunity cost might be related to the 
cost of fees and influenced by the MCD phenomenon and the speed effect, 
as explained in previous sections, and as shown in Figure 7.8. 
 
Going back now to the question: Which force prevails? Is there a way to 
calculate which force is more important in each case? The answer might 
emerge from measuring the relative importance of the internal costs and the 
risk deal coefficient (this coefficient was defined in chapter 6 section 6.2.4). If 
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the gain generated by an internal cost reduction due to a specialization 
strategy is superior to the gain generated by a reduction in the risk deal 
coefficient due to a diversification strategy, then a specialization strategy 
should be supported. Figure 7.9 explains this last statement. 
 
Figure 7.9 Choosing for the Best Strategy 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
As shown in Figure 7.9161, if the gain in cost-savings due to a specialization 
strategy is superior to the gain in risk due to a diversification strategy, the first 
should be taken. The formulae necessary to assess these gains will be 
examined in chapter 8. 
 
However, as stated in chapter 6 section 6.2.4, there is still a behaviour 
difficult to explain. Why, in CAP2, is the net T.IRR for specialist funds 6% and 
for generalist funds 9%? If the net T.IRR reflects only the risk perception of 
                                                 
161 A similar figure was shown in chapter 6 section 6.3.5.3. However, that figure did not 
include the opportunity costs because GPs do not assess them when defining the gross 
T.IRR. In contrast, this chapter intends to show all the drivers in existence. 
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the portfolio without internal costs, why is there this difference? Do banks 
(captive LPs) perceive a specialization strategy to have lower risk than a 
diversification one? If the answer is “yes”, this might contradict traditional 
finance, and the explanations given during this section are incomplete.  
 
Although the answers to these questions might need a bigger sample (with 
more specialist funds) with further analysis, it is possible to offer the following 
tentative explanations:  
- PEFs are not like private investors holding a portfolio of shares in 
which there is little to do beyond getting dividends and eventually 
selling and rebuilding part of the portfolio. In such situations, 
diversification is the only important driver to reduce risk. In contrast, 
PEFs are, in some respect, like industrial holding groups in which 
management, cost-efficiency, know-how, and synergies are important 
factors. Specialized management, cost-efficiency, and synergies, that 
is, a RBT strategy, might also be an important factor to reduce risk 
and therefore the net T.IRR is also influenced by this factor.  
- CAP2 is specialized in the food industry where betas are lower than in 
some diversified portfolios. In addition, the diversification effect in the 
PEFs is bounded to a limited number of deals (incomplete 
diversification), and this implies higher risk and, therefore, higher net 
T.IRR. 
Figure 7.10 re-states the model seen in the two previous figures. 
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Figure 7.10 The forces of behind Diversification and Specialization 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
Figure 7.10 shows in the middle panel how the lower risk perception due to 
specialization as well as an incomplete diversification might influence the 
chosen strategy. These forces contradict traditional finance theory and 
emerge from the particular nature of a PEF in which: 
- Specialization might reduce risk due to: Know-how, synergies and low 
betas. 
-  Diversification is bounded to a limited number of deals. 
  
In this sense, it is necessary to assess again the question: which force 
prevails? Figure 7.11 might answer this question. 
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Figure 7.11 Choosing the Best Strategy – A more complete Scheme
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
In comparison with Figure 7.9, Figure 7.11 shows two new factors to be 
added to the formula: the factor (1) and the factor (4). In this case, the forces 
of specialization seem to be stronger than those of diversification162. In such 
a case, a new question might be addressed: why there are not more 
specialist funds? The answer to this question can be divided into four parts: 
- First: The last explanation, including the new factors (1) and (4), does 
not demonstrate that the specialization forces are more important than 
those of diversification. 
- Second: Given the largely closed, blockaded nature of the PEFs 
markets in which the access to any deal depends on many variables 
(high transaction costs as well as high entry and exit barriers), the 
strategy in terms of specialization or diversification, cannot be easily 
                                                 
162 Chapter 8 and its quantitative model will show how to assess these factors. 
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chosen (GPs might be forced to choose the deals they are able to find 
and afford). 
- Third: The Italian company structure (potential target of the PEFs) is 
based on family-owned small-to medium firms. A PEF entrance in this 
sector is not easy due to the fact that Italian family owners do not want 
to relinquish any degree of control of their firms which means not only 
the store of their wealth but also the family tradition. 
- Fourth: The investment holding period which is related to the duration 
of the fund is too short to create value through sector specialization. 
These short periods are more adapted for LBO operations (3 or 4 
years). Value creation generated by know-how, synergies, 
identification of new opportunities, etc might need more time. Both 
GPs and LPs should review their investment periods and, in fact, this 
is what is happening nowadays (see chapter 5): LBO deals are 
decreasing and expansion deals are increasing. This last trend might 
push PEFs into longer investment periods and more specialization. 
 
In addition, if a PEF decides to have a specialized strategy, the target deals 
will be reduced (due to the limit of the chosen sector) and the investment 
speed might be increased, considerably affecting the opportunity costs. This 
might also depend on the sector: there might be sectors with a high number 
of available deals (niche).  
 
In any case, it appears that the speed effect and the expected investment 
holding periods as well as the fund’s expected life are important factors when 
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choosing the strategy. This is why (according to the interviews), captive funds 
can better afford a specialist strategy than non-captive funds. As seen in 
chapter 5, captive funds have lower opportunity costs due to the nature of 
their LPs (banks), less pressure to invest fast and longer investment holding 
periods. Banks are able to manage funds (while not invested in deals) with 
higher risk-return efficiency and with lower transaction costs than private LPs. 
 
To conclude, the choosing of the right strategy might always depend on the 
relationship (1) + (2) > (3) – (4) (as shown in figure 7.11) but with one new 
consideration: the forces working around the factor (2) might work against 
specialization. In other words, the decision depends on other drivers like: 
deals available in a specific sector, the type of PEF (captive or non-captive), 
the entry barriers, and the transaction costs present in PEFs’ sectors. Figure 
7.12 shows how these factors work. 
 
Figure 7.12 Forces against Specialization 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
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Figure 7.12 shows a new quadrant including some new drivers that might 
work against the forces of specialization (RBT) by increasing the PEFs’ 
internal costs instead of reducing them. The availability of deals, the entry 
barriers, and the transaction costs might adversely affect the investment 
speed, increasing the opportunity costs. The type of PEF has also an 
important influence on the internal costs. For instance: Non-captive PEFs 
that choose a specialization strategy might increase their opportunity costs 
(due to low investment speed). Instead, a Captive Fund does not increase 
the opportunity costs since there are none. In addition, captive funds do not 
have reserves (the reserve is the bank itself), no carried interests (GPs are 
like bank employees with no participation in the capital gains) and, lower 
fees. 
 
7.3.2 The PEF Portfolio: Big Deals vs. Small Deals 
 
As seen in chapter 6, section 6.2.6, bigger PEFs that have access to bigger 
deals tend to have a higher net T.IRR and this might influence the value of 
the gross T.IRR. In other words, big PEFs seek higher threshold targets due 
to a better past performance. Does relying on a few bigger deals increase the 
T.IRR? Or is the T.IRR increased because big PEFs (which have access to 
bigger deals) ask for higher T.IRRs (performance persistence)? Through the 
quantitative analysis, where these two phenomena might be mixed, it was not 
possible to answer these questions. 
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However, some simple reasoning based on the answers of GPs might better 
approach an answer. There is no doubt that a few big deals increase the 
economies of scale by reducing the number of executives, as well as the 
transaction costs (once more, this has to do with the RBT). In addition, bigger 
deals might have (according to traditional finance) lower size and 
marketability risk. On the other side, small PEFs suffer diseconomies of scale 
and have higher risk due to the size-marketability issue. However, more 
deals (from different sectors) might reduce risk because of diversification 
(according to traditional finance). 
 
Yet all these forces have also to do with the type of PEF (big or small). Small 
PEFs cannot afford to hold big deals and, in such cases, the only possible 
strategy might be to hold several small deals. For instance, two extreme 
situations for a small PEF might be possible: The first is to have only one 
deal using the whole capital committed. The second might be to have many 
small deals. The first might increase economies of scale but might be too 
risky due to the total lack of diversification. The second might incur 
diseconomies of scale and high size-marketability risk but with a significant 
level of diversification. A balance between these forces is necessary. Figure 
7.13 shows the driver-flow of all these factors. 
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Figure 7.13 Big vs. Small PEFs 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
Figure 7.13 shows that big PEFs might be more capable to pursue a strategy 
of few big deals than small PEFs. This is due to two main reasons: First, 
bigger PEFs can afford to have bigger deals; Second, bigger PEFs have 
easier access to deals and, therefore, they are more capable of choosing the 
investment strategy.  In addition, Figure 7.13 shows how the three drivers 
(economies of scale, diversification risk, and size-marketability risk) affect the 
T.IRR. But which force is stronger? Figure 7.14 and the related explanation 
will try to address this question. 
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Figure 7.14 Big Deals vs. Small Deals 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
With the same criteria used in section 7.3.1 of this chapter, if the gain from 
costs-savings plus the gain from size-marketability risk (with the “few big 
deals” strategy) is higher than the loss due to the increase in diversification 
risk, then a strategy with few bigger deals might create value. 
 
7.4 The Threshold IRR 
 
Sections 7.2 and 7.3, based on the qualitative and quantitative analysis,  
have proposed not only what are the main drivers of the phenomena found in 
the last couple of decades of research (this project has also revealed new 
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phenomena), but also how they might operate. This section will assess how 
the T.IRR is assessed by GPs. 
 
As seen in chapter 6, section 6.3, no PEF uses an explicit formula to 
calculate the T.IRR (only intuition and experience) and therefore the question 
was: is it possible to trust the T.IRR for what it purports to be? The next sub-
sections, will address this question. 
 
7.4.1 The Basic Determinants of the gross T.IRR 
 
Chapter 6, section 6.3.4 showed how both GPs and LPs converge to a 
similar estimated value of the Net IRR. Both GPs and LPs base their 
expectations and targets on past experience and intuition about the future: 
“what we think is possible” (stated by one GP of BIF3). This “what is 
possible” comment also recalls the fact that PEFs’ performance is evolving 
and current expectations are lower than past expectations:  
 
“10 years ago, our target was to have an ex-post IRR higher than 30%, 
nowadays, instead, our expectation is to have an ex-post IRR higher than 
20%.” (stated by one GP of BIF2).  
 
In addition, contracts between LPs and GPs are constantly evolving:  
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“LPs do not want to pay fees during the time in which the capital under 
commitment is not invested and, in this case, GPs will have to back the first 
years from their own pockets” (stated by one GP of BIF2).  
 
Such a situation will change factors like the speed effect and the opportunity 
costs. 
 
The statements of the last two paragraphs conform to Arnott & Bernstein 
(2002) who stated that by, using the past premium, we are assuming that 
investor expectations and their risk perceptions are only based on past 
realized returns (see chapter 2). In addition, these important differences 
between past and future weaken163 most of the studies seen in chapter 3 that 
have developed models by looking at past performance. Figure 7.15 shows 
an interesting perspective on the determinants of the gross T.IRR, the net 
T.IRR being one of its components. 
Figure 7.15 The Gross T.IRR and its Determinants 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
                                                 
163 If the present and the future in terms of expected returns are different than in the past, 
then models based on past information are incomplete. 
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Deal 1
PEF Deal 2
Deal n
Net T.IRR  
Gross T.IRR  
Gross T.IRR deal 2  
Internal costs & other drivers Net T.IRR + Internal costs Deal risks & other drivers
Total value of the gross T.IRR
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Figure 7.15 shows what main drivers are used currently by GPs to assess 
the gross T.IRR. In addition, the “other drivers” (shown in the previous figure 
in the factor “deal risks & other factors”) are the determinants of the business 
plan of the target company (external and internal factors) which were outlined 
in chapter 6, section 6.3.1. The figure 7.16 shows another perspective of the 
determinants used by GPs to calculate the gross T.IRR. 
 
Figure 7.16 The Gross T.IRR and its Determinants: Another Perspective 
 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
Figure 7.16 shows another perspective to estimate the gross T.IRR where 
the variable “other Drivers from BP” refers to other drivers included in the 
business plan.  
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7.4.2 The Business Plan and the Gross T.IRR 
 
In chapter 6, section 6.3.1, it was shown how both the internal and external 
variables of the business plan directly affect the value of the E.IRR. On the 
contrary, the T.IRR might not be directly affected by these drivers but defined 
according to the potential volatility of them. One of the main problems of 
PEFs relates to their specific nature: closed markets (they cannot buy and 
sell freely as if they were in an open public market, difficult access to deals, 
limited number of deals in their portfolios, etc), is the fact that their 
diversification strategy can only be very limited. This implies that 
unsystematic risk might be higher. On the contrary, systematic risk164 (the 
risk that cannot be diversified and the one assessed by the coefficient beta of 
the CAPM) might be approached as in public markets. 
 
However, since the unsystematic risks might not be efficiently offset by 
diversification, a study of the business plan variables and their volatilities 
might be a crucial point for the definition of the T.IRR. In fact, most GPs using 
intuition, assess the volatility of the main business plan drivers and assess 
the T.IRR for that deal accordingly. 
 
                                                 
164In finance, systematic risk, sometimes called market risk, aggregate risk, or undiversifiable 
risk, is the risk associated with aggregate market returns. By contrast, unsystematic risk, 
sometimes called specific risk, idiosyncratic risk, residual risk, or diversifiable risk, is the 
company-specific or industry-specific risk in a portfolio, which is uncorrelated with 
aggregate market returns. Unsystematic risk can be mitigated through diversification, and 
systematic risk cannot be.  
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In the same way, some covenants agreed with entrepreneurs might positively 
impact the T.IRR. Figure 7.17 shows how GPs currently assess these drivers 
(using intuition) to define the T.IRR of the project. 
 
Figure 7.17 How GPs assess Unsystematic Risks 
 
Source: Author’s own work  
 
Figure 7.17 shows how the “other drivers”, that include contract covenants 
and business plans, affect unsystematic risk. GPs using intuition, experience 
and sensitivity analysis assess the volatility of the variables involved in a 
business plan and, thereafter, define the risk of the deal and the gross T.IRR. 
Instead, Figure 7.18 shows a proposition (based on the data collected and 
data analysis) as how GPs could assess risk. 
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Figure 7.18 How GPs could assess Unsystematic Risks 
 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
Figure 7.18 shows that one part of the risk deal is systematic and, therefore 
included in the CAPM. In addition, the volatility of the unsystematic risk 
variables could be measured using tools like Monte Carlo simulation165. 
  
7.4.3 Conflict of Interest between LPs and GPs 
 
Chapter 6, section 6.3.5.2 has shown how PEFs prefer a 4-year deal with a 
25% IRR than a 1-year deal with a 50% IRR. GPs try to keep the capital 
                                                 
165 It is used to model phenomena with uncertainty in their inputs such as, the calculation of 
risk in business. When Monte Carlo simulations were applied in space exploration, oil 
exploration, and macroeconomics their predictions of failures and cost overruns are better 
than human intuition (Lanser, & Kranendonk, 2007). 
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assured for longer periods in order to increase the PEF’s life as well as their 
fees. This obviously implies an agency problem between LPs and GPs. 
 
In other words, what really matters to the GPs is to arrive to the end of the 
PEF life with a net IRR of 15% (depending on each particular PEF) and meet 
the LPs’ expectations for that period and be able to obtain new capital for a 
new fund.   The following figure might better explain this issue. 
 
Figure 7.19 Conflict of Interests between LPs and GPs. 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
This conflict of interest also reveals an important information asymmetry 
between LPs and GPs. Clearly, LPs cannot know when the optimal time for 
exiting a deal has arrived. On top of this, LPs cannot force GPs to manage 
the portfolio as they wish during the holding period. 
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Therefore, the gross T.IRR is influenced by two forces: First, GPs’ personal 
targets of having longer holding periods (for the capital committed) in order to 
earn more fees; Second, GPs’ target to achieve the net T.IRR and keep LPs 
happy. See Figure 7.20. 
 
Figure 7.20 GPs’ Interests 
 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
7.4.4 Behavioral Factors 
 
Chapter 6, section 6.3.5, has also shown that there are several behavioral 
approaches by which the gross T.IRR is defined: 
- The gross T.IRR acts as a buffer: Therefore, when defining the gross 
T.IRR, GPs add 5% more as a buffer (see the following formula): 
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This system might suggest the existence of hubristic behavior166 
(behavioral factor) when assessing business plans and the E.IRR. 
- When the risk of individual deals is assessed: A rational approach 
(based on traditional finance) could use the CAPM to calculate both 
the net T.IRR and the extra-premium due to the risk of the deal. 
 
Gross T.IRR = Net T.IRR + Internal Costs + Risk premium of the single deal 
 
A rational assessment of the net T.IRR could be based on the CAPM. In this case, the 
CAPM should include the premium for investing in a PEF.  In the same way, the Gross T.IRR 
of a single deal could be assessed by GPs using the same model. 
 
CAPM (Net T.IRR) includes the premium for investing in a PEF 
CAPM (Gross T.IRR) includes an extra-premium to offset risks of a single deal 
 
CAPM (gross T.IRR) ≥ CAPM (net T.IRR) + Internal Costs 
 
The last formula shows that if GPs wish to achieve LPs expectations, the risk premium to be 
obtained by a single deal (measured using the CAPM for that single deal) should be equal or 
superior to the LP’s required return (measured using the CAPM for that PEF) plus the 
internal costs. This explanation must not be intended as a duplication in the use of the 
CAPM since: 
CAPM (gross T.IRR) – CAPM (net T.IRR) = the premium for investing in a single deal rather 
than in a portfolio of companies held by a CAPM. 
CAPM (gross T.IRR) could be inferior to the CAPM (net T.IRR) if the former is calculated 
over a company sector with a beta lower than that of the PEF. 
 
                                                 
166 They already recognized that their business plans are typically overestimated since the 
E.IRR is normally 5% higher than the ex-post IRR. 
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Using the same criteria seen in Figure 7.16, Figure 7.21 shows a more 
complete schematic which includes: The opportunity cost and an assessment 
of the risk of the deals based on a more systematic measure like the CAPM. 
 
Figure 7.21 The Gross T.IRR and its main Determinants 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
Other behavioral drivers were studied in the pilot case (chapter 5) in which 
the entrepreneur’s strong feelings (attachment to family tradition) made the 
closing of the deal difficult. Figure 7.22 explains how these forces work in this 
sort of case. 
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Figure 7.22 Entrepreneur’s Sentimental Attachment 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
Figure 7.22 shows how the entrepreneur’s feelings decrease the E.IRR (red 
arrow) because the PEF might offer a higher entry price for the company. On 
the other side, financial distress increases the E.IRR (green arrow) for the 
opposite reason. 
 
Finally, in section 7.2.3 (performance persistence), two additional behavioral 
factors were found and explained: LPs’ bounded information and attachment 
to local institutions, and LPs’ representativeness behavior that takes them to 
follow the most successful GPs. 
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7.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has proposed a new explanatory model which shows in detail all 
the factors (beyond the traditional CAPM factors) revealed in the first 
chapters of this thesis  (outside traditional finance) that drive the risk 
premium in the private equity funds. Recent papers have proposed models 
accounting only for risk and CAPM factors without being able to explain 
neither their drivers nor their nature.  
 
In addition, most of the academic papers between 1997 and 2011 had only 
vaguely grasped the existence of new phenomena outside the traditional 
finance. From a completely different approach, this thesis has not only 
confirmed the existence of those phenomena and identified others, but also 
has been able to explain how they work through an explanatory model.  
 
Consequently, the next chapter, based on the explanatory model of this 
chapter as well as on the data collected and exhibited in chapter 5, will 
quantify most of the determinants of the risk premium. In addition, the next 
chapter is designed to illustrate the application of the model and to explain 
how to operationalise it.  
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8 MODELLING THE PEFs RISK PREMIUM DRIVERS 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter, based on the findings of chapter 5, on the analysis of chapter 6, 
and on the explanatory model of chapter 7, is aimed at quantifying the 
determinants of the PEFs’ risk premium and thus, the T.IRR. 
 
It will both illustrate the application of the model (seen in chapter 7) and  
explain how to operationalise it. The quantitative model illustrated in this 
chapter is aimed at complementing the CAPM factors with new factors able 
to explain the unique phenomena which drive the PEFs’ premium. To 
achieve this goal, it is important to understand the nature of the factors 
involved: Do they reflect risk factors, cost factors or other factors? In fact, in 
understanding their nature, it will be possible to separate them, see how they 
behave, and ultimately understand how they combine in setting the risk 
premium. 
 
Section 8.2 will start by classifying the nature of the drivers of the model seen 
in chapter 7. The classification of T.IRR determinants is necessary in order to 
use the correct paradigm and tools to quantify them. Section 8.3 will illustrate 
the gaps of the models offered by academia which are only based on CAPM 
factors. Subsequently, sections 8.4 and 8.5 will develop a quantitative model 
(based on the qualitative model introduced in chapter 7) with new factors to 
complement those included in the “old” CAPM.  
 
291 
 
Section 8.6 will offer quantitative tools to assess GPs’ strategic decisions 
regarding the portfolio (diversification vs. specialization / big deals vs. small 
deals). Subsequently, section 8.7 will discuss the different applications of the 
model which can be used to assess the T.IRR of a portfolio or a single deal. 
Finally, in section 8.8, the model will be tested by applying it to some 
illustrative examples. The results given by the model will be compared with 
the figures given by some of the PEF executives in the research sample.  
 
8.2 Determinants of the Risk Premium 
 
In order to measure the determinants revealed during this research project, it 
is first necessary to understand their nature: Do they reflect traditional 
finance theory, the behavioral theory, or some other new theory not yet 
recognized?  
 
All the determinants of the T.IRR analyzed during the previous sections can 
be classified into groups of a different nature.   Figure 8.1 intends to capture 
that classification. 
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Figure 8.1 General Classification of the T.IRR Determinants  
                          
Source: Author’s own work 
 
As shown in figure 8.1, the bigger sphere divides the determinants of the 
T.IRR into three important groups: 
1 – Factors that are governed by the traditional finance theory and the 
CAPM. (CAPM)  
2 – Factors that are not governed by the traditional finance theory but are 
rational. (RF) 
3 – Factors that are not rational but behavioural (IR) 
 
The small sphere has a further classification: 
 
1 – The so-called PEF drivers: These are the newly-identified phenomena 
associated with the specific nature of PEFs and the way they operate: speed 
effect, MCD phenomenon, performance persistence, etc. Some of these 
phenomena have rational drivers and some others have irrational drivers: For 
instance, the performance persistence has two drivers. The first is the 
learning cost effect which is a rational factor. The second is the 
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representativeness which is a behavioural factor. These factors also include 
the PEFs’ internal costs like the fees perceived by GPs. 
 
2 - Factors that are governed by the traditional finance theory and the 
CAPM: For instance: The net T.IRR which is, in some cases167, based on 
past performance and ex-post IRR analysis as well as rational future 
expectations (fundamentals). In the same way, the gross T.IRR should 
assess the risk of the deal by using the CAPM. 
 
3 – Behavioural drivers: For instance: the intuition used to assess the risk-
deal (extra-premium), the representativeness in the performance persistence 
phenomena, etc. 
 
Figure 8.2 shows the classification with the most important drivers studied in 
chapter 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
167 Sometimes, there is also intuition and no clear value for the net T.IRR 
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Figure 8.2 The Classification of the Most Important Drivers 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
Figure 8.2, shows a classification according to the nature of the T.IRR driver. 
In addition, figure 8.2 illustrates in red which factors drive abnormal returns 
(Jensen’s alpha), that is, returns which are superior or inferior to the risk-
adjusted returns plus internal costs. For instance: Drivers like performance 
persistence (GPs’ skills), speed effect, money-chasing deals phenomena, 
market inefficiency, etc do not have a risk nature and therefore their outputs 
in terms of performance generate abnormal returns. In the north-west sector, 
figure 8.2 also illustrates in black which factors drive the risk premium or the 
risk-adjusted return. 
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By exploiting the factors driving abnormal returns (delimited in red in the 
figure 8.2), PEFs expect to generate alpha. In addition, one can understand 
this separation between alpha factors and risk-adjusted factors as follows:  
 
The expected return should the sum of a risk-adjusted return (the T.IRR) and 
an expected abnormal return. In other words, the expected return (E.IRR as 
an output of a business plan) should be equal or superior to the T.IRR. If the 
E.IRR is superior to the T.IRR then the excess return is an abnormal return 
 
E.IRR = Risk-Adjusted Return + Abnormal Return 
E.IRR = T.IRR + Jensen‘s alpha 
   
 
Until now, this thesis studied which are the determinants of the T.IRR and 
how they work (see the qualitative model of chapter 7). However, in order to 
measure some of these drivers, it will also be necessary to understand the 
process by which PEFs create value. 
 
Considering the explanations given in chapter 3 section 3.3, regarding 
transaction costs (Coase, 1937), the agency theory (Bratton, 2008), and the 
prisoner’s dilemma approach (Cable & Shane, 1997), it is possible to 
understand the reasons (including the Jensen’s alpha factors) why PEFs are 
able to create value and to achieve high returns168. Considering these 
explanations, the following classification design should better reveal the PEF 
premium drivers:  
                                                 
168 Although ex-post evidence seen in chapter 3 does not always support this. 
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Gains in Inefficiency (GI) Including Jensen’s alpha factors:  This is one 
of the so-called PEFs’ drivers seen in the last classification. These are the 
ways in which private equity funds respond to the inefficiencies of the 
privately-held markets. They take advantage of certain inefficiencies and 
thereby obtain a gain. The EMH is obviously not applicable in privately-held 
markets in which inefficiencies and opportunistic behaviors are not reflected 
in market prices, and where it is much more difficult for investors to trade the 
shares. Therefore, part of the success of the private equity firms stems from 
three main reasons. First, they are able to minimize transaction costs 
incurred by common private investors in buying and selling companies. 
Second, they profit from a new agency paradigm. Acting as insiders and 
aligning the management of the target firms, they eliminate any potential 
opportunistic behavior and therefore can gain from the huge inefficiencies 
present in privately-held markets. Third, as a consequence of this new 
agency approach (owners acting as insiders), they become specialized 
managers in specific types of target companies and deals and are able to 
further gain from specialization as well as from the economies of scale and 
scope generated. 
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Figure 8.3 PEFs’ Gains in Inefficiency 
                     
   
 
Source: Author’s own work 
   
Considering the last classification, a PEF can be seen as an entity that 
attempts to create value by taking advantage of the inefficiencies present in 
the PHCM’s: GI (red segment which is classified into four segments indicated 
by the red arrow in the new sphere): New agency theory approach, 
economies of scale and scope, lower transaction costs, specialization and 
synergies, etc). The following figure shows this new classification paying 
special attention to the factors or drivers grouped to gains in inefficiency. 
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Figure 8.4 Rational Factors outside the CAPM 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
8.3 The Capital Asset Pricing Models 
 
By using a four-factor model, Korteweg and Sorensen (2009) estimate the 
risk premium for PEFs in general circa 15.8% (without including the liquidity 
factor explicitly). They also stated that small firms (privately-held companies) 
have important levels of unsystematic risk which should be considered. In 
addition, they stated that the PEFs’ premium is very sensitive to the industry 
sector of their portfolios. 
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Franzoni et al. (2010) computed that liquidity risk (for PEFs) is in a range 
between 5% and 15% depending on the type of PEF: bigger PEFs with 
bigger deals are more sensitive to liquidity shocks and therefore they ask for 
higher T.IRRs. This is also confirmed by Manigart et al. (2002) who stated 
that small deals require lower returns. In the light of the conclusions 
discussed in sections 7.2.1, 7.2.2, 7.2.3 and 7.3.2 of chapter 7, this project 
also found that smaller PEFs holding smaller deals require lower T.IRRs, but 
with different drivers.  Therefore, a further task of this thesis is to reveal 
which drivers are behind the liquidity factor.  
 
A problem with studies like that of Korteweg and Sorensen (2009) or 
Franzoni et al. (2010) is that while they were able to estimate, in general 
terms, the PEFs’ equity premium using general factors like that of liquidity, 
they were not able to explain nor understand what is behind that factor. 
These authors based their conclusions on assumptions like “bigger PEFs 
with bigger deals are more sensitive to liquidity shocks and therefore they 
ask for higher T.IRRs”. This statement might be true but is not complete and 
is based on no evidence. In contrast, this research project reveals evidence 
regarding the true drivers as shown in the first sections of this chapter. 
 
Franzoni et al. (2010) estimated the risk premium and the cost of capital for 
PEFs using the three-factor model of Fama & French (1993), and adding a 
new factor: The Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) (PS) liquidity factor. Using this 
model, Franzoni et al. (2010) were able to reduce alpha to a minimum value 
300 
 
compared with capital asset pricing models169 (see chapters 2 and 3 for more 
details). However, this model was developed by Fama and French (1993) to 
explain past returns and to be used in organized markets and where some 
drivers might be different. The phenomena present in the very nature of 
PEFs and their markets could be explained not only by traditional models, but 
also by new theories based on the patterns shown in chapter 7. 
 
For instance, the three-factor model of Fama and French considers that 
value companies have higher risks than growth companies. This is due to the 
fact that growth companies can sooner have an IPO. But this contradicts 
evidence that was revealed in this research project in which expansion firms 
(high growth) tend to have higher risk than LBOs. This is another example in 
which the FF three-factor model alone does not apply. 
 
In addition, models based on the three-factor model like those of Franzoni et 
al. (2010) or Korteweg and Sorensen, (2009), try to estimate the value of the 
gross T.IRR and as a consequence, they mix drivers of a risk nature with 
drivers of a cost nature (or a nature rather than risk).  
 
Therefore, they cannot explain what happens inside the PEFs and how 
drivers like the expected investment speed, expected cost of opportunity, 
expected nature of target deals in term of size and sector, the synergies 
among different deals, the size of the PEF, the monitoring intensity, expected 
strategy (diversification vs. economies of scale), expected cost of fees, 
                                                 
169 This might mean that their illiquidity factor is hiding other factors (seen in these last two 
chapters) which are the true generators of such abnormal returns or Jensen’s alpha. 
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expected cost of immobilized capital (reserves), expected exit, etc, influence 
the premium and, ultimately, GP’s decisions. In other words, they lack 
internal validity. 
 
Consequently, recent models which are only based on the three-factor model 
alone might not be enough nor suitable to assess the PEFs’ premium. In 
addition, instead of making assumptions about the drivers behind the general 
factors of three-factor-model, it is first advisable to take the opposite route, 
that is: Reveal and understand the drivers and their nature in order to use the 
appropriate theory which, as shown in the first section of this chapter, might 
differ from the theories developed for organized markets. 
 
8.4 A New Quantitative Model 
 
Section 8.3 of this chapter, as well as chapter 7, has shown that there are 
factors not included in the classical CAPM that drive the PEF premium, not 
all of them of a risk nature. In fact, the illiquidity factor might be only a blanket 
variable that hides the factors revealed by this study. Therefore, this model 
will try to unbundle the “liquidity” factor which some authors have used in 
attempting to explain the abnormal returns.  
 
Before presenting a new quantitative model, it is first necessary to 
summarize the factors that have to be considered. There are factors that 
must be based on the drivers shown in the qualitative models and graphs 
shown in chapter 7 and in section 8.2 of this chapter. 
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8.4.1 The classical CAPM 
 
Not all the PEF premium can be explained with the classical CAPM but as 
shown in section 8.2, some part might be (a part of the cake of Figure 8.1) 
and, therefore, it should not be completely removed from the final quantitative 
model. The CAPM is about systematic risk (β) and those risks cannot be 
mitigated by diversification.   
 
However, there are many factors (exhibited in the qualitative models of the 
first sections of this chapter) which revealed a great deal of unsystematic or 
specific risks. PEFs are not able to diversify those risks completely. The 
power of diversification is very limited due to the small number of deals that a 
PEF might hold. That is why other forces like economies of scale and the 
search for synergies, forces that apply to the resource-based theory, might 
oppose, and therefore, mitigate the strength of those specific factors.  
 
In other words, a PEF cannot diversify extensively and cannot totally 
eliminate its unsystematic risk. Chapter 2 presented the three factor model: 
 
    E(R) = Rf + β * Rm + bs * SMB + bv * HML + α 
 
According to Brown (2005): The Fama-French Three Factor Model is a 
regression analysis that tries to separate out the systematic risk of a stock 
from the unsystematic risk by compensating for three factors. The last two 
factors are unsystematic risk. Alpha refers to abnormal returns. 
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However, the CAPM is not enough and new factors need to be added to any 
PEF model. Therefore, any model intuitively should consider the following 
initial factors: 
 
(1) Gross T.IRR = Rf + βp Rm + βs SMB170 + βv HML171 + ω + IC 
 
or 
 
(1b)  Gross T.IRR = Three Factor Model CAPM factors + ω + IC 
 
Where: 
 
βp = systematic risk of the expected PEF portfolio. 
 
βs = unsystematic risk originated by the size of the companies of the 
expected portfolio.   
 
βv = unsystematic risk originated by the value factor of the companies of the 
expected portfolio. 
 
IC represents the internal costs (they are not risk components) as annualized 
percentages of the CC.   
 
ω = other potential unsystematic risks present in privately-held markets 
 
However, the nature of PEFs’ returns as well as their expectations (E.IRR) 
also includes abnormal returns: 
 
(2) E.IRR = Risk-Adjusted Return + Abnormal Return 
(2b) E.IRR = Gross T.IRR + Jensen‘s alpha 
(2c) E.IRR = Gross T.IRR + σ 
Where σ represents those factors (some of them are PEF phenomena and 
some others are behavioral determinants) which drive abnormal returns 
(Jensen’s alpha) 
 
 
                                                 
170 The use of this factor is absolutely coherent with the findings of this research project. In 
fact, the existence of a size premium was confirmed by all PEFs of the sample of this thesis. 
Some of them price this risk when estimating the T.IRR (for more details see chapter 6). 
171 The use of this factor in the case of the PEFs needs some important considerations which 
are addressed in appendix 1 
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The first part of (1) is the three-factor model172 of Fama and French (1993) 
(seen in chapter 2) which is not rich enough either to assess the full premium 
or to explain all the drivers in the case of PEFs. That is why two more general 
factors must be added: IC and σ. The quantitative study and estimation of the 
drivers behind these two factors will be the main concern of the next 
sections.    
 
But why unsystematic risk can be very important in PEFs’ investments?  That 
is partly because of the PEFs’ imperfect diversification opportunities, that is, 
the limited number of deals in their portfolios. One of the reasons why PEFs 
might prefer a high number of small deals (instead of a few big deals), is the 
fact that, in this way, they can reduce the value of σ. As seen in the “cake” of 
section 4.1, σ is comprised of the following general factors: 
(3) σ = PEFF + BF 
 
Where: 
PEFF = PEF factors 
 
BF = Behavioural factors 
 
 
The distinctive feature of this model is that these factors might not 
necessarily contain risk factors. Additionally, it is possible to reformulate (1) 
as follows. Therefore, it is also important to separate risk factors from non-
risk factors. The first calculates the risk premium and the second, the 
abnormal returns (Jensen’s alpha). 
 
                                                 
172 As seen in chapter 3, this is (for the time being) the most widely-tested and recognized 
model used to predict the risk premium in organized markets. It is able to explain 90% of 
past returns instead of the 70% of the SML-CAPM.  
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(4) Gross T.IRR = Risk adjusted Returns + IC + Abnormal Returns (σ) 
 
(5) Risk adjusted Returns = CAPM factors 
 
(6) σ = PEFF + BF  
 
IC: the internal costs have to be considered as a part of the threshold IRR. 
Part of them might have an alpha component (For instance: BIFs have lower 
fees than REFs or experienced GPs might achieve lower opportunity costs 
than other GPs). However, the ICs (even some part of it might generate 
abnormal returns) have to be considered as part of the threshold IRR.  
 
 
In addition: 
 
(7) Gross T.IRR = Net T.IRR + IC  
 
Where: 
 
Net T.IRR is the LPs’ expectations. 
  
 
LPs’ expectations are based on previous experience (past PEF performance) 
and on alternative investments to which they might have access in the 
organized markets. The net T.IRR can be understood as follows: 
 
(8) Net T.IRR = H.IRR  + λ  
 
Where: 
 
H.IRR = The opportunity cost that LPs incurred by not investing in organized 
markets. In other words, this is what they might have earned if they would not 
have invested in a PEF. 
 
λ = The additional return risk-adjusted (premium) for investing in a PEF 
  
 
Additionally, it is also possible to reformulate (4) as follows. 
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(9) Net T.IRR = Rf + βPEF (Rm) + βs2 SMB + βv2 HML + γ 
 
Where: 
 
The values of Rm, SMB, and HML are taken from organized markets since 
LPs look at organized markets when comparing with alternative investments. 
 
βPEF represents the PEF systematic risk, as measured by an LP. 
 
βs2 might differ from βs since LPs measure the size of the PEF in terms of 
capital committed. In contrast, GPs measure the size of the companies to be 
held by the expected portfolio which is a GP’s strategic decision. 
 
βv2 might differ from βv since LPs measure the PEF as a whole in terms of 
value risk. In contrast, GPs measure the value risk of the companies to be 
held by the expected portfolio which is a GP’s strategic decision. 
 
γ = The additional PEF risk drivers that an LP has to consider when investing 
in it.   
 
 
Note that, in (9), a new factor γ (different from the σ of (1)) has been 
considered. This is because an LP through the net T.IRR measures only risk 
factors (γ considers only risk drivers). Instead, σ accounts for internal PEF 
drivers which might consider drivers other than risk drivers.  
 
In the same way as in (1), βp should indicate the systematic risk of the 
portfolio that GPs expect to hold. In other words, βp is associated with the 
strategy that GPs intend to follow in terms of portfolio (industry sector, small 
deals, big deals, diversification vs. specialization, etc). Instead, βPEF should 
indicate the systematic risk of the PEF (relative to alternative investments 
outside the PEF) as perceived and measured by an LP.  The next sections 
will further develop the model but concentrate attention on the PEF factors 
(PEFF) presented in (3) and the conclusions seen in this section will be 
further analyzed. 
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8.4.2 The Speed Effect (SE) and the Opportunity Cost (OC) 
 
Section 7.2.2 of chapter 7 has shown that some PEFs calculate their ex-post 
IRR over capital drawdowns and some others over capital committed. In the 
first case, the opportunity cost should be seen as the difference between the 
H.IRR173 (between 6% and 8%) and the interest given by a liquid current 
bank account (less than the Euribor rate which is around 1.5%174). In the 
second case, the opportunity costs can be intuitively understood as the 
difference between the Net T.IRR (between 12% and 20%) and the H.IRR 
(between 6% and 8%). The difference between these two variables is what 
LPs do not earn (opportunity cost) while the capital committed is waiting to be 
invested in a potential deal.  
 
In the first case, the OC is between 4.5% and 6.5% with an average value of 
5.5%. In the second case, the OC is between 4% and 14% with an average 
value of 9%. For simplicity175, a unique value will be taken: the average OC 
of the two methodologies which is 7%.   Although, in the first case, the PEFs 
calculate the ex-post IRR based on capital draw-downs, it is logical to think 
that LPs’ expectations look at the whole PEF life since their cash was 
committed and not since the cash was called. 
 
                                                 
173 This is what LPs might earn outside the PEF in their alternative investment portfolios. 
174 Euribor estimation for the year 2011(1.5%  between September and November 2011) 
175 Each PEF according to its own methodologies and contracts will have to define its own 
opportunity cost. Through this work, the researcher is setting the basis through a 
generalization. 
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(10) OC = H.IRR – Euribor (First Case) 
 
(11) OC = Net T.IRR – H.IRR (Second Case) 
 
(12) T.OC = OC x [ E.SY / 2 ]  x  CC 
 
Where: 
 
OC = The opportunity cost as a percentage. 
 
E.SY = Expected speed in years (expected by GPs) to invest all the capital 
committed. 
 
T.OC = Total opportunity costs. 
 
CC = Capital committed. 
 
 
Equation (12) obtains the total opportunity cost incurred by the PEF and this 
depends on the investment speed (E.SY). This factor is divided by two 
because if GPs expect to invest all the CC in E.SY years (a linear investing 
process is assumed here), this would be like investing all at once in half that 
period. In addition, the following formula expresses the yearly opportunity 
cost (measured as a percentage of the whole PEF life).  
 
(13)  ൌ ୓େሺ୉Ǥୗଢ଼Ȁଶሻ୉Ǥ୐ଢ଼   
Where: 
 
YOC = Yearly Opportunity Cost 
 
E.LY = Expected PEF life in years 
 
 
Equation (13) indicates the yearly opportunity cost that can be used in a 
model directed at estimating the gross T.IRR. For instance:  
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Example: 
 
OC = 7%  
 
E.SY = 5 years (investment period) 
 
E.LY = 10 years 
 
Then: 
 
 ൌ ଻ΨሺହȀଶሻଵ଴  = 1.75% 
 
The yearly opportunity cost for this PEF will be 1.75% and this must be 
considered when assessing the gross T.IRR  
 
 
Therefore, returning to equation (3), the first PEF factor to be considered is 
the value of YOC (1.75% in the last example). 
(2) σ = PEFF + BF 
 
Where as a starting point: 
 
(14) PEFF = YOC + other PEFFs 
 
 
But what happens during the disinvestment process (last five years) in which 
capital returns to LPs? At this last stage, there should not be any opportunity 
cost since LPs can again reinvest their capital at the H.IRR (unless they wish 
to invest in a new fund and start a new cycle) which means a well-diversified 
portfolio.  
 
Conversely, during the last stage (as seen in section 7.3.3 of chapter 7 
regarding the conflict of interests between LPs and GPs), GPs might tend to 
delay the exit of the companies. This problem was confirmed by Lerner and 
Schoar who stated that:  
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“the liquidity level of private equity funds is a decision variable for fund 
managers. Fund managers deliberately make the fund illiquid to screen 
investors that are less likely to face a liquidity shock.” Lerner & Schoar 
(2004:3). 
 
In line with this last statement, this project found that GPs prefer to hold 
longer deals with a lower IRR than shorter deals with a higher IRR as a way 
to keep the capital “locked in” and increase the PEF life as well as their fees.  
However, it is obvious that the duration of the deal will not only depend on 
the strategy chosen by GPs and their conflict of interests with LPs, but also 
on the exit conditions of the market at the end of the PEF life.  
 
This conflict of interest factor cannot be quantified. However, this has more to 
do with the liquidity conditions (external variable) of the market than with 
these so-called opportunity costs (an internal variable which is a 
consequence of a GP’s strategic decision). Therefore, this factor should be 
included in the liquidity factor to be approached in the next section. 
 
8.4.3 Liquidity Risk 
 
Liquidity conditions are connected to a number of macro-economic variables 
seen in chapter 3. In addition, three kinds of liquidity risk were also identified 
in chapter 3 section 3.2.4.2:  
- Uncertainty over transaction costs;  
- Higher tolerance for liquidity risk;  
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- The level of leverage of the companies which might need to be re-
financed.  
This implies that PEFs might have lower returns (more bankruptcies) when 
aggregate market liquidity deteriorates. Therefore, a new factor should be 
included in the model: The illiquidity minus liquidity (IML)176 factor which 
corresponds to a long position in high-liquidity-beta public stocks and a short 
position in low-liquidity-beta stocks. 
(15) Gross T.IRR = Rf + βp (Rm - Rf) + βs SMB + βv HML βliq  PIML + IC 
 
Where: 
 
 βliq represents the unsystematic risk for the liquidity factor. 
 
PIML this factor is included in the factor ω presented in (1). It is the pure 
illiquidity minus liquidity premium (pure of opportunity costs) estimated for the 
private equity funds177 
 
In (15), the value βliq will depend on four main drivers:  
- The expected market liquidity conditions during the life of the PEF: 
The weaker the aggregate liquidity conditions, the higher the βliq. 
- The level of leverage of the companies to be held in the portfolio: The 
higher the leverage, the higher the βliq. This is because highly 
leveraged companies might find it difficult to re-finance their debts in 
                                                 
176 The liquidity-mimicking portfolio was obtained by Stambaugh and Pastor (2003) 
calculating the difference between the average return of the least liquid portfolios and the 
average return of the most liquid portfolios, therefore the term IML (Illiquid Minus Liquid). 
Franzoni et al. (2010), applying the same method for unquoted private equity funds, found 
an IML premium (PIML) of 4.5% and a βliq of 0.67. 
177 The value of this premium for PEFs was estimated by Franzoni et al. (2010) which is 
around 4.5%. However, this risk is mixed with opportunity costs found in this thesis.  
Therefore, in order to understand the true drivers of the PEF premium, it is necessary to 
subtract the opportunity costs from the total IML.  
312 
 
the event of financial crisis. In such cases, banking creditors might 
choose to send highly leveraged companies into bankruptcy. 
-  The company’s intrinsic conditions to find an exit: The greater 
difficulty in exiting (due to the lack of trade buyers in its market or to 
the impossibility of making an IPO), the higher the βliq. As stated in the 
previous section, GPs could also delay the exit and make the fund 
more illiquid thus increasing the IML factor. 
 
As stated in section 8.4, one of the targets of this analysis is to unbundle the 
liquidity factor. Consequently, the opportunity costs calculated in (13) will be 
separated from the liquidity premium. See the example below. 
Taking mean values of the findings exhibited in chapter 6:  
 
OC = 7%  
 
E.SY = 5 years 
 
E.LY = 10 years 
 
Then: 
 ൌ ଻ΨሺହȀଶሻଵ଴  = 1.75 % 
 
IML = 4.5% (this value was calculated by Franzoni et al. for PEFs’ deals 
between 1975 and 2006 using the same methodologies applied by 
Stambaugh and Pastor (2003) for quoted companies. 
 
(16) PIML = IML – YOC  
 
PIML = 4.5% - 1.75 % = 2.75% 
 
 
Considering these last values, the values of the three factors taken from 
Kenneth French’s website (see chapter 2), and the value for the liquidity 
factor taken from the estimations of Franzoni et al. (2010), it is possible to 
assess the first part of the model: 
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(17) CAPM factors = Rf + βp Rm  + βs SMB + βv HML βliq  PIML 
 
CAPM factors = 5% + 1.3 (4%) + 0,034 (3%) + 0.93 (5%) + 0.67 (2.75%) = 
17% 
 
Appendix 8.2 explains the source of the values chosen for the previous 
formula. 
 
Adding YOC = 1.75% 
 
(18) CAPM factors + YOC = Rf + βp Rm + βs SMB + βv HML βliq  PIML + YOC 
 
CAPM factors + YOC = 18.75% 
 
 
The value of 18.75% is only a general estimation for illustration178. However, 
as stated before in this section, each single PEF should assess its own value 
according to its portfolio, strategy and future expectations. Note that the size 
premium and the liquidity premium together account for 2% which is in line 
with the answers given by the interviewees (see chapter 5). In fact, this 
premium was between 1% and 3%. 
 
But the model developed in these first sections is incomplete since it refers 
only to the CAPM drivers. The only new contribution until now was the 
specification of the opportunity costs. Therefore, it is now necessary to 
address and reveal the drivers which might generate abnormal returns (σ) 
and where not included in the formula (1):  
 
(3) IC + σ where σ = PEFF + BF 
 
                                                 
178 This is a standard estimation for a big PEF that is able to have a well-diversified portfolio 
(many few deals) without specialization (a generalist PEF). 
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IC: In contrast with σ, as shown in figure 8.2, IC being the PEFs’ internal 
costs might be included in the gross threshold IRR. 
 
8.4.4 The Internal Costs (IC) 
 
The internal costs (IC) are mainly three: Fees, carried interests and the 
opportunity costs generated by the reserves: 
(19) IC = EF + ECI + OCR 
 
Where: 
 
EF = Expected Fees 
 
ECI = Expected Carried Interests 
 
OCR = Opportunity cost generated by the reserves. 
 
 
The expected fees (EF) have already been measured through a model 
introduced in chapter 6 appendix 8.1 (see chapter 6, section 6.2). In order to 
calculate the true cost generated by the fees, it is necessary to account for 
each of the formulae applied by the PEFs. The results for each method and 
each PEF of the sample have been shown in chapter 6 (appendix 8.1). 
Appendix 8.1 shows that the values of the EFs depend on the type of PEF:  
- For BIFs and PAFs, this is circa 1%;  
- For CAPs (generalist), it is circa 1%;  
- For CAPs (specialist), it is 0.7%;  
- For REFs, it is between 1.5% and 2%  
(for more details regarding these figures, refer to chapter 6).    
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The expected carried interest (ECI) can be calculated as follows: 
(20) ECI = [ CI x (Gross T.IRR ]  
 
Where: 
 
CI = normally 20% of the capital gain.  
 
Example: 
 
ECI (REF) = [ 20% x 20%] = 4 % 
 
ECI (BIF & PAFs) = [20% x 25%] = 5 % 
 
This difference is due to the fact that BIFs and PAFs have higher net T.IRRs 
than REFs 
 
 
Finally, the opportunity cost originated by the reserves (OCR) can be 
calculated as follows: 
(21) ORC = [ R x  (E.LY x 2 / 3) x OC ]  
 
Where: 
 
R = Reserves  
 
(E.LY x 2 / 3) = the first two thirds of the life of the PEF, when the reserves 
must be kept in case of emergencies. 
 
Example: 
 
R = 10% over capital committed 
 
OC = 7% 
 
E.LY = 10 
 
ORC = 10% x (10 x 2/3) x 7% = 0.5% 
 
 
Summarizing, a general estimation for the IC will be: 
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(19) IC = EF + ECI + OCR 
 
IC (REFs) = 1.75% + 4% + 0.5% = 6.25% 
 
IC (BIFs & PAFs) = 1% + 5% + 0.5% = 6.5% 
 
IC (CAPs) = 1% +0.5% = 1.5% 
 
 
These last values are in line with the answers of the interviewees who stated 
(in the case of BIFs, PAFs and REFs) that the difference between the net 
T.IRR and the gross T.IRR (that is, the internal costs) is between 5% and 
10% (see chapter 5). 
 
Nevertheless, as underlined in sections 8.4.2 and 8.4.3 of this chapter, it is 
very important to separate the risk drivers from the cost drivers179. In fact, the 
YOC assessed in section 8.4.2 belongs to the internal costs and not to the 
risk drivers. The distinction between risk drivers and cost drivers is one of the 
main contributions of this theory. Therefore, although GPs do not price this 
factor, this model will consider it as a part of the internal costs: 
 
(22) IC = EF + ECI + OCR + YOC 
 
IC (REFs) = 1.75% + 4% + 0.5% + 1.75 % = 8 %  
 
IC (BIFs & PAFs) = 1% + 5% + 0.5% +1.75% = 8.25% 
 
IC (CAPs) = 1% +0% + 0% = 1 % 
 
 
Until now, two general factors (or two parts of the cake of section 4.1) of the 
model were developed as an initial framework for the final model:  
                                                 
179 If drivers of different natures are not separated, it will not be possible to understand how 
the T.IRR is driven and how these influence GPs’ strategic decisions: For instance 
specialization vs. diversification, big deals vs. small deals, etc. 
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(1) Gross T.IRR = CAPM factors + IC 
 
CAPM factors = Rf + βp (Rm - Rf) + βs SMB + βv HML βliq  PIML Æ first part of 
(18) 
 
CAPM factors = 5% + 1.3 (4%) + 0.034 (3%) + 0.93 (5%) + 0.67 (2.75%) = 
17% 
 
(19) IC = EF + ECI + OCR + YOC 
 
IC (BIFs) = 1 % + 5% + 0.5% + 1.75 % = 8.25% 
 
Therefore: 
 
(20) Gross T.IRR (BIFs) = 17% + 8.25% = 25.25 %  
 
 
8.4.5 Performance Persistence Factor (PPF) 
 
As shown in section 7.2.3 of chapter 7, bigger and older PEFs tend to have 
higher net T.IRRs (higher LPs’ expectations). This implies that they have 
access to better deals. It is possible to express this specific driver with the 
following factor, the PPF: 
 
(23) PPF = μpp x PP 
 
Where: 
 
PPF = performance persistence factor  
 
μpp = performance persistence coefficient (whose values are between 0 and 
1) 
 
PP = performance persistence premium. In the sample of this thesis, the 
difference between big PEFs and small PEFs in terms of net T.IRR is 5%. 
 
Then: 
 
PPF = μpp x (5%). Æ for the smallest PEF μpp = 0 and PPF = 0. 
          Æ for the biggest PEF  μpp = 1 and PPF = 5% 
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Therefore, both the net T.IRR and the H.IRR will have the following drivers 
and formulae: 
(24) Net T.IRR = 4F-CAPM + PPF 
 
(25) H.IRR = S&P500 + PPF   or    H.IRR = SML CAPM + PPF 
 
Where: 
 
4F-CAPM = 4 factor model seen in the equation (17) 
 
S&P500 = the return of S&P 500. 
 
 
8.4.6 The Money-Chasing Deals Factor (MCDF) 
 
In section 7.2.1 of chapter 7, it was shown how small PEFs need to buy at 
very low EBITDA multiples (discounts set at 30% or 35% which, translated 
into a component of the IRR of about 3%). Conversely, big PEFs are able to 
pay more (30% more as an extreme value) than the market value (especially 
when competition is present). This affects the E.IRR which can vary from -3% 
to 3%. A low E.IRR can affect and decrease the acceptance level (the 
T.IRR).  
 
Consequently, the following formula illustrates this effect: 
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(26) MCDF = μmcd x MDC 
 
Where: 
 
MCDF = money-chasing deals factor  
 
μmcd = money-chasing deals coefficient 
 
MCD = money chasing deal premium. In the sample of this thesis, the 
difference between big PEFs and small PEFs in terms of E.IRR affecting the 
gross T.IRR is 6%. In other words, MCD can have values of -3% for big PEFs 
and + 3% for small PEFs. 
 
Then: 
 
MCDF = μmcd x (6%) 
 
The value of μmcd will be between -0.5 and +0.5 depending on the expected 
competition with other PEFs and on the number of available deals. The 
higher the competition, the lower the coefficient (nearer to -0.5). The higher 
the number of deals available, the higher the coefficient (nearer to 0.5). The 
smaller the PEF, the higher the coefficient (nearer to 0.5). 
 
 
8.4.7 Speed Factor (SF) 
 
Section 7.2.2 of chapter 7 showed the necessary balance between speed 
and the magnitude of the gross T.IRR (the opportunity cost standard value 
for a 5-year investment period is YOC = 1.75%). If the opportunity cost 
increases, the gross T.IRR must offset that situation. These forces can be 
measured as follows: 
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(27) EOC = μmcd2 x (YOC) 
 
Where: 
 
EOC = expected opportunity cost. 
 
μmcd2 = money-chasing deal second coefficient (whose values are between 0 
and 1). This coefficient affects both the speed and the opportunity costs. 
In the sample of PEFs, it has been shown that a standard value for the 
opportunity costs is 1.75%. It is therefore possible to assume that an extreme 
high value might be 3.5% and an extreme low value 0%. 
 
Therefore: 
 
EOC = μmcd2 x (3.5%) 
 
μmcd is negatively correlated to μmcd2 Æ if μmcd = - 0.5 (the lowest value) , then 
μmcd2 = 1 (the highest value). This is due to the fact that an unfavorable MCD 
situation (high competition and a few deals available) will imply both a low 
MCDF (PEFs have to pay higher values for their acquisitions) and a high 
EOC (opportunity costs will be high due to the lack of available deals). 
However, one of the differences between the MCDF and the EOC is the fact 
that the former can take negative values. The MCDF can be negative 
because PEFs could acquire companies at values lower than the market 
values. 
 
 
8.4.8 Type-of-Deal Factor (TDF) 
 
The type of deal mainly refers to the stage of development: start-up, 
turnaround, expansion, LBO, MBO, replacement, etc. In contrast, with the 
PEF factors seen in sections: 8.4.5, 8.4.6, 8.4.7, this factor is a risk driver. 
This factor can be assessed as follows: 
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(28) TDF = μtd x (TD) 
 
Where: 
 
TDF = type-of-deal factor. 
 
μtd = type-of-deal coefficient (whose values are between 0 and 1). 
 
TD = type-of-deal premium. According to the interviews held during the 
project, the riskier deals are the start-up deals in which the gross T.IRR is 
increased by circa 5%.  
 
From the sample assessed in this research project, it is possible to infer the 
following figures for the coefficient (μtd): 
 
Start-up deals = 1  
Turnaround deals = 0.6 -1 
Expansion deals = 0.3 – 0.5 
LBOs, MBOs and Replacement deals = 0 – 0.3 
 
 
8.4.9 Monitoring Intensity Factor (MIF) 
 
The effect of direct monitoring intensity seen in section 2.5 can be estimated 
by using the following formula: 
(29) MIF = μmi x (MI)  
 
Where: 
 
MIF = monitoring intensity factor 
 
μmi = monitoring intensity coefficient (whose values are between 0 and 1). 
 
MI = monitoring intensity premium. According to the interviews held during 
the project, this value can reach a value of 2%. 
 
Therefore: 
 
MIF = μmi x (2%) 
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8.4.10 The Business Plan and the Contract Covenants 
 
Section 7.4.2 of chapter 7 showed that the volatility of a business plan is also 
driven by many unsystematic risk factors that section 8.4.2 is trying to include 
in a consolidated model. Therefore, a simple model could be seen as follows: 
 
(30) Gross T.IRR = Systematic Risk + Unsystematic Risk + IC 
 
or 
 
(31) Gross T.IRR = SML-CAPM + IC + σ (E.IRR) 
 
Where: 
 
σ (E.IRR) = could be measured as the standard deviation of the E.IRR as an 
output of a Monte Carlo simulation. 
 
This standard deviation (the volatility of the E.IRR measured as a standard 
deviation of the expected business plan) might include the unsystematic risks 
of the investment: SMB factor, Liquidity factor, etc. 
 
 
What the contract covenants try to do is to mitigate the σ (E.IRR). The 
covenants might limit the volatility of some of the variables of the business 
plan (For instance: to assure the exit by forcing the entrepreneur to buy the 
shares back at an established minimum price). In this way, a new business 
plan with new variables will have as an output a new σ (E.IRR): 
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(32) Gross T.IRR = SML CAPM + IC + σc (E.IRR) 
 
Where: 
 
σc (E.IRR) = could be measured as the standard deviation of the E.IRR with 
covenants as an output of a Monte Carlo simulation. This standard deviations 
will be mitigated by the covenants whose target is to reduce the volatility of 
the variables. 
 
Therefore: 
 
(33) ∆Gross T.IRR = σ (E.IRR) - σc (E.IRR) 
 
Gross T.IRR with covenants = Gross T.IRR without covenants - ∆Gross 
T.IRR 
 
Where 
 
∆Gross T.IRR = risk variation (mitigation) due to the settlement of contract 
covenants 
 
However: 
 
(34) Gross T.IRR with covenants > Net T.IRR + IC  
 
 
8.4.11 Behavioral Factors (BF) 
 
Among all the behavioral drivers revealed during this research project 
(chapter 5 & 6), the only one that might be quantitatively included in the 
model is the so-called buffer. In fact, section 7.3.4 of chapter 7 has explained 
GPs’ behavior when setting a buffer and has suggested that this kind of 
pattern has a connection with the concept of over-confidence developed by 
behavioral finance. GPs tend to be over-optimistic when assessing the 
business plans and the E.IRR, and, therefore, they increase the gross T.IRR 
to be protected from too high expectations. They intuitively increase the 
gross T.IRR (5% was the maximum increase found – see chapter 5), 
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depending on their uncertainty perception (it might be an attempt to price 
some unknown risk drivers). This factor can be measured as follows: 
(35) UBF = μub x (UB) 
 
Where: 
 
UBF = uncertainty buffer factor  
 
μub = uncertainty buffer coefficient (whose values are between 0 and 1). 
 
UB = uncertainty buffer premium. According to the interviews held during the 
project, this value can reach a value of 5%. 
 
Therefore: 
UBF = μub x (5%) 
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8.5 The Final Model (Summary) 
 
Now it is time to consolidate all the factors in order to obtain the final model. 
(36) Gross T.IRR =  SRF + URF + IC180 
(37) σ = PEFF + BF 
 
Where: 
 
SRF + URF = CAPM factors 
 
SRF = systematic risk factors = Rf + βp (Rm)  
 
URF = unsystematic risk factors = βs SMB + βv HML βliq  PIML + [ σ 
(E.IRR) - σc (E.IRR)] 
 
IC = EF + ECI + OCR  
 
PEFF = PPF + MCDF + EOC + TDF + MIF  
 
PEFF = μpp x (5%) + μmcd x (6%) + μmcd2 x (3.5%) + μtd x (5%) + μmi x (2%)  
 
BF = UBF 
 
BF= μub x (5%) 
  
In addition: 
 
(32) Gross T.IRR = SML CAPM + IC + σc (E.IRR) 
 
(34) Gross T.IRR with covenants > Net T.IRR + IC 
 
(24) Net T.IRR = 4F CAPM + PPF 
 
(25) H.IRR = S&P500 + PPF   or    H.IRR = SML CAPM + PPF 
 
The researcher using the knowledge and the understanding acquired during 
this research project proposed a qualitative model (shown in chapter 7 and in 
the first part of chapter 8) and a quantitative model summarized in the last 
blue chart. The goal of the researcher was to simplify and explain the 
complexity and confusion of the PEFs’ behavior when assessing their 
                                                 
180 In the cake of section 8.2, the factor IC is included as a PEF factor  
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threshold IRR.  
 
In general, the greater the number of simplifying assumptions made about 
the essential structure of the real world, the simpler the model. The aim of 
this researcher was to create a simple model that has a great deal of 
explanatory power. Such models are called parsimonious models. The 
researcher in this case had to face a trade-off between the power of the 
model and the number of simplifying assumptions made about the world. A 
decision has to be made: At what point the gain in the explanatory power of 
the model no longer warrants the additional complexity of the model 
(Stockburger, 2001).  
 
8.6 PEF Portfolio and GPs’ Strategic Decisions 
 
Section 7.3 of chapter 7 has proposed some tools and models to improve 
GPs’ decisions regarding portfolio management. This section will offer 
quantitative models to assess GPs’ decisions.  
 
8.6.1 Specialization vs. Diversification 
 
According to section 7.3.1 of chapter 7, it is possible to estimate which 
strategy might be most suitable. This section will propose a formula that 
might be useful to assess which strategy is more rewarding. These formulae 
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will not be included in the final model since the model already assesses the 
T.IRR according to the portfolio strategy chosen.  
1 – Assessment of a general / diversified Portfolio (Generalist GPs) 
Risk Nature T.IRR (general portfolio) = 4 CAPM Factors (A)  
Non-Risk Nature T.IRR (general portfolio) = IC + EOC + PEFF +BF (B) 
  
2 – Assessment of a specialized Portfolio (Specialists GPs) 
Risk Nature T.IRR (specialist portfolio) = 4 CAPM Factors (C)  
Non-Risk Nature T.IRR (specialist portfolio) = IC + EOC + PEFF +BF (D) 
 
3 - Strategic Decision 
If C – A > B – D Æ a generalist strategy is advised. 
If C – A < B – D Æ a specialist strategy is advised. 
 
 
8.6.2 Big Deals vs. Small Deals 
 
Here again, (as in the case of specialization vs. diversification), and 
according to the conclusions addressed in section 7.3.2 of chapter 7, it is 
necessary to compare both strategies in terms of risks and costs. 
1 – Assessment of a “Few Big Deals Portfolio” (FBD) 
Risk Nature T.IRR (FBD portfolio) = 4 CAPM Factors (A)  
Non-Risk Nature T.IRR (FBD portfolio) = IC + EOC + PEFF +BF (B) 
  
2 – Assessment of a “Many Small Deals Portfolio” (MSD) 
Risk Nature T.IRR (MSD portfolio) = 4 CAPM Factors (C)  
Non-Risk Nature T.IRR (MSD) = IC + EOC + PEFF +BF (D) 
 
3 - Strategic Decision 
If C – A > B – D Æ A FBD strategy is advised. 
If C – A < B – D Æ A MSD strategy is advised. 
 
 
8.7 Expected Portfolio Premium vs. Expected deal Premium 
 
The model introduced in this chapter can be used for two purposes: 
- First, it serves to assess the risk premium of the expected portfolio. 
Depending on the type and size of the PEF as well as on the GP’s 
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strategy. GP’s strategy will consider: Type of deals; number and size 
of the deals; diversified or specialized portfolio; expected fees; 
expected investment speed. Therefore, this model can help to 
estimate a general ex-ante T.IRR for the expected portfolio as a basis 
for assessing single deals. 
- Second, it serves to assess the risk premium of the single deal, in 
which case, the betas of the CAPM factors should refer to the sector, 
size and particular features of the deal under analysis.   
 
The model is potentially operational for both scopes but with some 
precautions to consider: 
- The data of the CAPM factors is found in the Kenneth French Website 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/) according to 
the profile of the company or portfolio of companies to be considered. 
- For the IC factors, this thesis has presented some examples according 
to different type of PEFs (see section 8.8 of this chapter). However, for 
any specific case, and PEF profile in terms of contracts (fees, 
reserves, expected speed, carried interests, etc), the formulae applied 
in this chapter can be used to assess any other specific situation. 
- The PEFP premiums and coefficients are summarized in the appendix 
8.3. 
- The BFP premium as well as its coefficients are summarized in 
appendix 8.3. 
- The liquidity Premium (PIML) is 2.75% 
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- In the case of the liquidity coefficient βliq, the value of 0.67 can be 
applied as a general value for a portfolio of companies and as a point 
of reference. Unfortunately, Franzoni et al. (2010) did not provide a 
dataset with different values for the βliq   according to the type of PEF, 
size of PEF, type of deals, etc. In addition, there are no coefficients to 
assess the βliq   for a single deal. Therefore, the researcher  advises 
the use of intuition and experience as follows: 
o Since the value of 0.67 is a general value coming from all types 
of PEFs, it is a useful value as a standard point of reference. 
o If GPs consider that the expected liquidity risk181 will be higher 
than the average values (for a single deal or for the expected 
portfolio), then they can intuitively increase the value of 0.67. In 
contrast, if they expect low levels of liquidity risk, then they can 
intuitively decrease the value of 0.67. 
The model is far from perfect and presents some problems that can be 
improved with future research. The most important aspects that need to be 
improved are the following: 
- Create a database to assess the factors HML and SMB per single 
deal. In this way, it would be possible to find better comparators for 
future PEFs deals. Instead, this model is taking these factors from the 
French website database whose values reflect quoted US companies. 
                                                 
181 Illiquidity risk, in this case, refers to two kinds of risk: First, the risk inherent in the 
business operations. Highly leveraged companies, such as LBOs, could run out of cash 
during a financial crisis. Second, it might be difficult to sell a highly leveraged company 
during a financial crisis. 
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-  The same concept should be applied to the liquidity factor.  It is 
necessary to have a database showing the βliq for each single deal in 
order to avoid the over-use of intuition. 
- In addition, the liquidity premium calculated by Stambaugh and Pastor 
(2003) (the IML) refers to organized markets. It is necessary to do the 
same work for PEFs’ deals. 
- Finally, there is another issue in the HML factor (book-value to market-
value) to consider: how can one assess the market value for the case 
of privately-held companies? This is another reason why, 
interpretations and assumptions made by Franzoni et al. (2010) 
regarding their four-factor model might be biased. Therefore, at first 
sight, it might be worth considering (for future research) the model of 
Chen and Zhang (2010) (seen in chapter 2) who look only at book 
values. The problem with this model is the fact that, being too young, 
there are no data regarding its factors.  
 
The following section will assess some examples of the expected portfolios of 
some of the PEFs of this research sample182. 
 
8.8 Applying the Model - Examples 
 
Using the model proposed in section 8.4, this section shows the results for 
the gross T.IRR of four different examples: 
                                                 
182 Only a few general examples were considered (for general expected portfolios) in order to 
show the functionality of the model and because of the problem of space. 
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1) A big generalist PEF with a high number of deals (BIFs’ general values), 
2) A small generalist PEF (general values of the REFs), 
3) A big specialist fund in the food industry, 
4) A big specialist captive fund in the food industry (CAP2 of the sample) 
The following table and figure shows the results (calculations details are 
shown in appendix 8.4) for each kind of PEF split down by type of driver183:  
         
Table 8.1 Examples Using the Model       
 
Source: Author’s own work 
                                                 
183 These calculations were made based on the standard values calculated in the 
previous sections for the different types of PEFs: IC (REFs) = 8%;  IC (BIFs & 
PAFs) = 8.25% ; IC (CAPs) = 1% 
PEF 1 PEF 2 PEF 3 PEF 4
CAPM factors 15,00% 17,50% 11,50% 11,50%
IC 8,25% 8,00% 5,00% 1,00%
TOTAL Gross T.IRR 23,25% 25,50% 16,50% 12,50%
PEFF 7,00% 4,00% 7,00% 7,00%
E.IRR without BFF with alpha 30,25% 29,50% 23,50% 19,50%
BFF 0,50% 4,00% 1,00% 1,00%
TOTAL E.IRR with alpha 30,75% 33,50% 24,50% 20,50%
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The following observations can be made: 
- Only the CAPM factors and the IC factors (the blue part and the red 
part of the blocks), as explained in figure 8.2 and in the equations (4), 
(4), and (6), conform to risk factors and internal costs thus assessing 
the gross T.IRR. On the contrary, the violet and green blocks do not 
include risk factors and assess the expected abnormal returns 
(Jensen’s alpha).  
- PEF2 has the highest T.IRR, mainly due to the risk of its portfolio (the 
size of the companies) reflected in the CAPM factors. Behavioral 
drivers are also high in this PEF due to the lack of experience of the 
GPs. However, these factors are partially offset by the low value of the 
PEF factors whose main driver is the low LPs’ expectations in terms of 
net T.IRR (Performance Persistence factor).  
- PEF1 has the second highest T.IRR mainly due to the higher LPs’ 
expectations (performance persistence factor) which also implies a 
higher cost of the carried interest (remember that carried interest is 
proportional to the magnitude of the expected gross T.IRR). This last 
factor is offset by the lower level of the expected fees (EFs) present in 
big PEFs. The portfolio of this PEF also reflects a lower portfolio risk 
(CAPM factors) and this is due to the fact that Big PEFs have access 
to better deals (bigger in size and with lower risk).  
 
It is very interesting to compare these two last results. Although the gross 
T.IRR for PEF1 is slightly lower, the components are very different and 
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these differences are what make possible the understanding of the 
drivers’ behavior. 
 
- PEF3 has even a lower gross T.IRR due to the low risk of a food 
industry portfolio (the food industry has lower betas). PEF factors are 
also low (only PPF is high). The speed here might be high due to the 
lack of competition and therefore opportunity costs are low.  
- PEF4 has the lowest gross T.IRR due to its captive nature which 
means the lowest ICs (no OCs and no OCRs) 
 
In (3), it was stated that the internal costs have to be considered as a part of 
threshold IRR. However, part of them might have an alpha component (For 
instance: BIFs have lower fees than REFs or experienced GPs might achieve 
lower opportunity costs than other GPs). In table 8.1 there are values which 
go from 8% to 1% meaning that PEF4 expect to earn abnormal returns (due 
to internal costs efficiency) of circa 7% (compared with PEF2). 
 
Now, it is possible to compare some of these results with the T.IRR used by 
the PEFs of the sample:  
 
For instance:  
1. PEF1 could refer to BIF1, BIF2, BIF3, PAF1, PAF2, and PEF3. These 
are big PEFs with LBOs and expansion deals with the characteristics 
of PEF1. In addition, these PEFs apply a general T.IRR for the whole 
portfolio. The T.IRR for PEF1 calculated with the model is 23.25% 
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(using Italian bond yields at 3% instead of 5%). In addition, the BIFs 
and PAFs present gross T.IRRs between 20% and 30% (with an 
average of 25%).  
2. PEF2 could refer to the REFs of the sample whose gross T.IRRs are 
between 17% to 25% with an average of 21%. According to the model, 
the PEF2 has a T.IRR of 25.75% (considering Italian bonds at 3% 
instead of 5%). 
3. PEF4 could refer to CAP2 of the sample whose gross T.IRR is 15%. 
According to the model, the PEF4 has a T.IRR of 16.5% (considering 
Italian bond yields at 3% instead of 5%). 
 
The discrepancies with the values given by the model are: 
- for the BIFs and PAFs: 1.75%.  
- for the REFs: 4.75% 
- for the specialist CAP2: 1.5% 
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Such differences can be explained as follows: 
- GPs assess the T.IRR using only intuition and experience. 
- GPs are based on LPs’ expectations which might be underestimated 
since they have no knowledge about the risk and drivers involved in 
PEFs investments. LPs do not assess risk and, therefore, the net 
T.IRR (LPs’ expectations) is not calculated as a risk-adjusted return. 
- GPs do not price liquidity risk, opportunity costs and PEF factors when 
assessing the T.IRR but they price buffers (especially the REFs), and 
other drivers like performance persistence which are not considered 
here as a part of the T.IRR (T.IRR in this model considers only risk 
factors and costs factors) 
- Small regional PEFs, whose figures show the biggest gaps with the 
ones calculated by the model, have regional LPs with more behavioral 
drivers (this was explained in chapter 7)  
 
These results confirm once more the performance persistence effect: “large 
funds significantly out-perform small funds” (Kaplan and Schoar, 2005). 
Furthermore, in these examples, the high gap present in small PEFs between 
the T.IRR of the REFs and the T.IRR of the model makes the risk-return 
relationship more dramatic. 
 
Now it is also possible consider the whole expected IRR including Jensen’s 
alpha: 
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Table 8.2 Expected E.IRR considering Alpha  
Type of PEF Gross T.IRR E.IRR (*) Expected Alpha  
REFs 23.25 30.25 3.5 
BIF & PAFs 25.75 29.5 7.25 
BIF (specialist) 17.50 23.5 7 
CAP2 (specialist) 12.50 19.5 7 
 
Source: Author’s own work 
 
(*) It does not include behavioural drivers like the buffer. The buffer is not an 
expectation but an increase in the T.IRR. This is a way to protect the PEF 
from unexpected issues. The results confirm that REFs have lower potential 
to gain abnormal returns.  
 
8.9 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has proposed a new model which quantifies most of the factors 
(outside traditional finance) that drive the risk premium in the private equity 
funds. Recent papers have proposed models accounting only for risk and 
CAPM factors without being able to explain the presence of other important 
drivers confirmed by past literature (chapter 3) as well as their nature. 
Conversely, this work has been able to propose a new theory including 
drivers outside the CAPM, thus complementing those previous models. 
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However, it is now important to ask if this thesis, through this model, has 
accomplished its targets. Consequently, the next chapter will discuss the 
most important contributions, the implications for practice and academia, as 
well as the limitations of the model and the whole work.  In any case, it is 
important to recognize that this thesis is only a “brick in the wall” and, 
therefore, the researcher will give some suggestions for future research. 
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9 CONCLUSIONS 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis has finally come to the task of asking whether the objectives 
proposed in chapter 1 have been accomplished. Consequently, this chapter 
will highlight the most important contributions, the implications for practice 
and academia, as well as the limitations of the model proposed in chapters 7 
and 8.  It is also important to recognize that this thesis is only a brick in the 
wall and therefore the researcher will give some suggestions for future 
research. 
 
As outlined in the beginning of Chapter 1, the research presented in this 
thesis had the following aims: 
x To understand the nature of the risk-return drivers present in 
private equity funds by looking at GPs’ risk perceptions and 
return expectations when assessing the value of deals. 
x To propose an explanatory model by revealing all the 
determinants of the risk premium (having in mind the 
phenomena found in the last couple of decades of research)  
x To propose a model184 by quantifying some of those drivers 
thus being able to estimate the required return on a PEF 
portfolio and on the cost of a single deal by using a modified 
                                                 
184 The aim was to propose a model that sets the bases to assess PEFs’ portfolios and deals 
through a different criteria based on a more complete scenario of determinants.   
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and extended version of the Fama & French (1993) three-factor 
CAPM.  
 
Has this project accomplished these aims? This concluding chapter of the 
thesis will start by providing a summary of the most important contributions 
and accomplishments. On the basis of the findings and the model proposed 
in chapter 7, it discusses implications for practice (for PEFs) and academia 
(for finance theory). Finally, the chapter discusses the limitations of the 
research and offers suggestions for future research. 
 
9.2 Contributions 
 
This research, within its limitations, has been able to achieve its main aims. 
Most of the academic papers between 1997 and 2011 had only grasped the 
existence of newly-revealed phenomena to academia outside the traditional 
finance arena. This project, from a completely different approach, has 
deepened the knowledge of those phenomena, found some new ones, and 
proposed an explanatory and quantitative model which, for the first time,185 
includes those phenomena to assess the premium. 
 
What this new theory shows can be summarized with the following four 
elements: 
1. The cause-effect relationship among all factors driving the premium 
through a driver-flow chart. It describes how the premium is driven. 
                                                 
185 At least to the knowledge of this researcher. 
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2. The drivers classification by nature: CAPM factors, Risk Factors 
Outside CAPM, PEF Factors, Behavioural Factors, Non-Risk Factors, 
Cost Factors, etc. 
3. The factors classification by Jensen’s alpha concept: risk-adjusted 
premium and abnormal returns. 
4. It has proposed a new model incorporating the drivers of the previous 
point. 
 
Related to these main accomplished targets, the next sub-sections will 
enumerate further contributions and implications of this project. 
 
9.2.1 Contribution to Practitioners (GPs and LPs) 
 
Overall, the model presented in chapters 7 and 8 is an innovative way to 
assess the risk premium of the PEF portfolios and deals: 
- First: It includes drivers outside traditional finance. 
- Second: It separates drivers of different nature (such as: costs, RBT, 
PEFF, BF, etc). 
- Third: It will allow GPs not only to assess risk but also to take 
decisions regarding their investment strategy. In concrete, the model 
is capable of assessing the attractiveness of alternative portfolios: 
Specialization vs. Diversification; Big Deals vs. Small deals; High 
investment speed vs. Low investment Speed; etc. 
- Fourth: It will also allow LPs to better assess the required return or net 
T.IRR. 
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- Fifth: As a result, the project has been able to offer practical advice to 
GPs.  
 
In addition, this type of study is unique for Italy where there are no previous 
research experiences in this field. In fact, being younger and less developed 
than in other EU countries like the UK or France, the Italian private equity 
sector still tends to be very reluctant to reveal information and research is 
very limited.  
 
9.2.2 Contribution to Academia 
 
This research project has also been able to reveal many new concepts not 
previously found in the academic literature:  
- First: The meaning of the T.IRR (net and gross) and the H.IRR: 
Previous papers have studied the ex-post IRR but overlooking the ex-
ante variables. This research project provides in-depth analysis about 
these ex-ante variables as well as GPs’ risk perceptions and return 
expectations. 
- Second: The opportunity cost in relationship with the speed effect: 
This is the first work186 to assess the opportunity cost as a dependent 
variable of the speed effect. Furthermore, it has been measured as the 
difference between the net T.IRR and the H.IRR.  
- Third: The drivers-flow: Since 1997 (starting with Lerner & Gompers 
1997), researchers have suggested (by observing ex-post statistical 
                                                 
186 To the knowledge of the researcher. 
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data) the existence of certain phenomena not included in the concepts 
of traditional finance. Through a completely different approach, this 
research project has been able to confirm the existence of such 
phenomena (and also observed new phenomena) and, for the first 
time187, propose a drivers-flow explaining the causes of the 
phenomena as well as the relationship among variables. 
- Fourth: The model itself is the first attempt188 in the PEFs’ sector to 
measure the risk premium not hitherto found in finance theory. 
 
9.2.3 Contribution to Corporate Finance and Valuation 
 
This research project makes a contribution to valuation, in particular to 
privately-held companies’ valuation. In fact, it sheds light on the 
understanding of those markets outside the organized markets which do not 
correspond to the EMH, and where bounded rationality, lack of information 
and therefore, behavioral drivers are more important. It complements 
valuation theory by proposing a new model based on the CAPM as well as 
on newly-revealed theories in order to explain those phenomena that the 
CAPM alone is not able to enlighten. This model also contributes to 
behavioral finance and its attempts to develop a behavioral CAPM (see 
chapter 2).  
 
 
 
                                                 
187 To the knowledge of the researcher. 
188 To the knowledge of the researcher. 
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9.2.4 Contribution to strategic finance and risk management 
 
This thesis has shown how PEFs and GPs do not behave as private 
investors who only care about buying and selling shares. On the contrary, 
PEFs are like holding companies and GPs are managers involved in the 
company strategy (insiders). GPs must work in the definition of two types of 
strategy:  
1 – The portfolio strategy: it refers to the choosing of the portfolio (the 
expected portfolio) in terms of industry sector, specialization, firm size, 
diversification, type of deal (LBO, expansion, turnaround, etc), etc. 
This strategy is also related to risk management.   
2 – Company strategy: it refers to the GPs’ involvement in the strategy 
of each single deal. 
This thesis is making a contribution to the first type of strategy: In fact, by 
revealing the risk premium drivers, this thesis is shedding light as to how GPs 
should choose and manage their portfolios. It might be a tool to support GPs 
in the choosing a value-oriented strategy in terms of investment decisions, 
portfolio management and risk mitigation.  
 
9.2.5 Contribution in terms of approach and research method 
 
This thesis has also made some contributions in terms of epistemological 
approach, research method and perspective: 
 
1 – The model developed in this thesis is based on a positivistic approach in 
terms of an ontological stance but from an epistemological perspective, it is 
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based on critical realism (the Burrell and Morgan spectrum, Burrell & 
Morgan, 1979). Epistemological approach: As stated in chapter 4, 
observations of statistical effects alone are not enough to find causations and 
hence, to develop a model. According to Stanley L. Jaki (1978:145): “many 
researchers are still influenced by the conviction that science is a mere 
empiricist of sensations.” In terms of research method, this work has followed 
the opposite direction: Instead of making assumptions (only by observing 
statistical effects) of the possible causes driving the premium, this project has 
revealed, by first studying  26 cases in-depth189, the drivers-flow chain and, 
only after this, has it proposed a model.  
 
2 – New Perspective: This is the first attempt190 to develop a model aimed at 
assessing the PEFs’ risk premium based from an ex-ante perspective. As 
seen in chapter 3, there are few research papers which try to analyze PEFs’ 
performance from an ex-ante perspective. However, they are not able to 
build a drivers-flow (they only assume causation) and, therefore, they are not 
able to propose models based on GPs’ risk perceptions and return 
expectations in the way that this thesis does. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
189 Spending time in each PEF, interviewing GPs, and leveraging from” why” and “how” 
questions. The close relationship to PEFs is one of the most important differentiations and 
contribution of this research project 
190 To the knowledge of the researcher. 
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9.3 Limitations and Gaps 
 
Like all research studies, This thesis presents some limitations that have to 
be recognized and be considered in future research. The limitations are 
generally a consequence of the researcher’s choice regarding the 
methodology: data collection methods and analysis. The most important 
limitations can be listed as follows: 
 
9.3.1 The size of the sample 
 
The size of the sample might be considered as a limitation. In fact, in Italy, in 
2010, there were circa 272 active PEFs with a total amount invested of € 
21.5 billion in 1,160 companies (AIFI yearbook 2011) and this sample is 
including only 13 PEFs and 26 deals, managing € 4.1 billion (from which 
circa € 2191 million is invested). This is due to the fact that a qualitative in-
depth case study like this requires a huge amount of time and most PEFs are 
not accessible for such a work. As a result, a bigger sample is very difficult to 
obtain.  
 
In contrast, if the depth of the interviews, the time spent in each PEF, and the 
nature of the data collected is considered, 13 PEFs and 26 deals could be 
seen as a significant number. In fact, the section 4.3.5.3 of chapter 4 explains 
how, according to Yin (2003), this sample in terms of size might possess 
sufficient external validity. 
 
                                                 
191 Meaning  less than 10% of the total. 
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Moreover, the researcher believed it to be more valuable to extend and 
complement past research in terms of approach (even forsaking the size of 
the sample) rather than having a bigger sample with the same approach. 
 
9.3.2 Homogeneity of the Sample PEFs 
 
Due to the difficulty of finding PEFs disposed to disclose information, the 
sample is not as homogeneous as the researcher would have desired. For 
instance, there is only one specialist fund (one of the captive funds) and 
therefore, the conclusions regarding the nature and effects of specialization, 
diversification and captivity need further research and analysis. This work 
has given an initial input and proposal for those drivers which need to be 
deepened in future research. 
 
Therefore, it might be important to emphasize the issue of access to PEFs in 
Italy: First, they are not disposed to disclose information; Second: They are 
not willing to invest 3 or 4 hours in such a project. That is the reason why the 
choosing of the sample does not depend on the researcher’s desires but on 
the PEFs which are eager to participate.  
 
9.3.3 Generalizations are difficult 
 
This thesis has proposed a model to assess a risk premium for each PEF 
according to its portfolio and its strategy. However, each single deal is a 
whole universe in itself in terms of drivers and this makes a generalization 
through a unique model very difficult.  
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Furthermore, one of the most important hurdles of the study is ensuring not 
only that the factors accurately represent reality, but also that all important 
factors were included in the model.  In fact, the PEFs’ world is constantly 
evolving and future contracts between LPs and GPs might differ from the 
past ones.  This implies that new drivers might appear and old drivers like the 
speed-effect and the opportunity costs might change. Therefore, the model 
proposed in this thesis will also have to evolve and adapt to changes. 
 
In addition, chapter 8 section 8.7 showed that, although the model is 
operational, it presents some problems (see the list in chapter 8) that can be 
improved with future research. Therefore, the model proposed in this thesis, 
although far from perfect, sets the basis for a new type of approach and this 
achieves the initial aim proposed in Chapter 1. 
 
Such issues mean that the model might not explain each single situation 
leaving a part of the risk assessment to the subjective judgment of GPs. For 
instance, as seen in chapters 7 and 8, each deal might involve its own 
covenants (covenants directed at mitigating the risks) and although the 
model proposed in this thesis might help GPs to assess risk mitigation, it 
does not provide an exact value.  
 
As a further example, the assessment of a new management presents similar 
problems. The final figure should be decided by GPs not only using the 
model but also by trusting past experience.  
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According to the researcher’s opinion, no model can completely replace GPs’ 
experience and there will always be a part of the expected risk premium left 
to their experience and know-how. 
 
In addition, being this a DBA thesis, it might be relevant to report that the 
model was presented to some of the GPs who participated to this project 
and, in general, they were very impressed about the potential of the model 
(the results of these feedbacks to the GPs are shown in appendix 9.1).  
 
9.3.4 Possible bias  
 
There might have been bias in the questionnaires addressed to PEFs.  In 
fact, since the researcher was much closer to the pilot case than to the other 
12, and thus is an outsider in most of the analysis assessed in chapter 6, one 
could argue that the interpretation of the answers given by the 12 PEFs had 
some influence from previous research and the outsider might be nearer to 
true conclusions. However, as explained in chapter 6, this was due to the fact 
of a true particular case with particular drivers (covenants in this case) and 
this situation can be found in section 8.3.3. In addition, and according to the 
researcher, it is quite improbable to have repeated the same error (bias) with 
24 different cases. 
 
9.3.5 Regionalism of the Sample 
 
The findings of this research are limited to the Italian experience (the study 
consists only of Italian PEFs and Italian deals, even if the sample includes 
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pan-European PEFs) even though most of the conclusions might be applied 
to the PEFs in general. In order to make the model stronger in terms of 
generalization, it might be advisable to extend the sample to other countries 
and cultures. 
 
9.3.6 Lack of Testing 
 
There is of course a further task that needs to be undertaken: Test the model 
using a bigger sample (both qualitative and quantitative). As stated in chapter 
4, this project has the target of proposing a new model for future testing. At 
the end of chapter 8, there were some applications and illustrations. They 
were just examples for general cases. These examples were aimed at 
assessing the coherence of the quantitative model with the qualitative one. In 
other words, their scope was only to check if the quantitative model 
corresponded to the drivers-flow proposed in the qualitative model. However, 
both the qualitative and quantitative model need to be tested on a bigger 
sample. 
 
9.4 Recommendations for Future Research 
 
There are four main recommendations for future research. In the first place, it 
is recommended that future researchers continue to use this type of 
approach (less positivistic and closer to the source of information) but making 
the effort of using larger samples. This research has shown the need for a 
different approach to reveal and understand all the factors driving the 
premium, and in that direction; it has put an initial brick in the wall. However, 
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this process must continue to analyze larger samples in order to give a more 
representative view of the population. 
 
Second, and related to the first recommendation, future studies could be set 
in a multi-country context to determine if they are any inherent differences in 
the determinants of the premium from different countries. Third, the 
researcher should try to have a more homogenous sample: generalist PEFs, 
specialist PEFs, captive PEFs, non-captive PEFs, etc. 
 
Fourth, it is necessary to create a database to assess the factors HML and 
SMB for privately-held markets. In this way, it would be possible to find better 
comparators for future PEFs deals (the values taken from the French website 
reflect quoted companies). It also necessary to have a database showing the 
βliq for each single deal. Finally, the liquidity premium calculated by 
Stambaugh and Pastor (2003) (the IML) refers to organized markets. It is 
necessary to do the same work for PEFs’ deals. 
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APPENDIX 4.1: Summary of the Steps and Tasks 
 
 
Step Task Destination Description Interaction Timing
1 Introduction To all PEFs • PaperÆ project synthesis
• General questions
• Detail of the necessary documentation
Via email In advance
second 
week of 
February
2 First Direct Contact Pilot PEF • First Interview ÆGeneral questions
• Choosing of the deals
• Look at the documentation, files, 
procedures, etc
Personal Visit End of 
February
3 Deals Information Pilot PEF Reception of the information regarding 
the specific deals chosen
Via email First week 
of March
4 DealAnalysis ------------------- Analysis of the information sent by the
pilot PEF regarding the specific deals:
Valuations, procedures, excel files, etc
-------------------- Second 
week of 
March
5 Second Direct Visit Pilot PEF Second InterviewÆ Specific questions 
level 1 & level 2. Questions about the 
specific deals under analysis
Personal Visit Third Week 
of Mach
6 Case Report Pilot PEF Brief feedback to pilot PEF and 
confirmation of the information revealed 
during the interviews.
Via email and Visit First Week
of April
7 Repetition The rest of the 
PEFs
Repetition of the steps 2 to 6 for the rest of 
the PEFs
---------------------- Between 
April and 
September
8 CrossAnalysis All PEFs Cross analysis considering the information
from all PEFs and all deals
----------------------- October
9 Third Visit All PEFs Third Interview Æ Level 3 question or 
cross questions
Personal Visit Between 
October & 
December
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APPENDIX 5.1: Figures of the Target Company 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Profit & Loss statement 2007 % 2008 % 2009 %
Net Sales 2.160.455      97,96% 2.700.569 98,12% 3.543.354 84,89%
Other incomes 21.133            0,96% 26.195 0,95% 49.000 1,17%
Inventories 23.876            1,08% 25.621 0,93% 581.570 13,93%
Total Income 2.205.464 100,00% 2.752.385 100,00% 4.173.924 100,00%
Cost of Goods 1.054.354      47,81% 1.317.942 47,88% 1.872.000 44,85%
Gross Margin 1.151.111 52,19% 1.434.443 52,12% 2.301.924 55,15%
Services / Energy 277.654          12,59% 309.637 11,25% 333.600 7,99%
Assets Rented -                   0,00% 0 0,00% 80.000 1,92%
Salaries 391.191          17,74% 408.570 14,84% 500.000 11,98%
Other operating costs 30.099            1,36% 32.683 1,19% 50.000 1,20%
Cost of the Operations 698.944 31,69% 750.890 27,28% 963.600 23,09%
Administrative Costs 71.999            3,26% 77.943 2,83% 100.000 2,40%
EBITDA 380.168 17,24% 605.610 22,00% 1.238.324 29,67%
Depreciations 235.260          10,67% 235.260 8,55% 235.260 5,64%
EBIT 144.908 6,57% 370.350 13,46% 1.003.064 24,03%
Interests 25.111            1,14% 31.241 1,14% 60.000 1,44%
Extraordinary Items -                   0,00% 0 0,00% 0 0,00%
EBT 119.797 5,43% 339.109 12,32% 943.064 22,59%
Taxes 39.533 33,00% 111.906 33,00% 471.532 50,00%
EAT 80.264 3,64% 227.203 8,25% 471.532 11,30%
Company Growth 25% 52%
Balance Sheet 2007 % 2008 % 2009 %
Cash on hands 0 0 0
Inventories 1.243.092 37% 1.458.969 42% 1.609.177 43%
Receivables 467.150 14% 602.451 17% 901.888 24%
Other credits 165.834 5% 182.166 5% 264.302 7%
Current Assets 1.876.076 56% 2.243.586 64% 2.775.367 74%
Fixed Assets 1.481.375 44% 1.241.988 36% 954.888 26%
Total Assets 3.357.451 100% 3.485.574 100% 3.730.255 100%
0% 0% 0%
Payables with supliers 551.993 16% 654.099 19% 658.652 18%
Other Payables 224.607 7% 227.708 7% 334.878 9%
Short Term Debts with banks 782.417 23% 926.535 27% 969.171 26%
Current Liabilities 1.559.017 46% 1.808.342 52% 1.962.700 53%
0% 0% 0
Long Term Debts with banks 1.276.327 38% 976.327 28% 668.468 18%
Total Liabilities 2.835.344 84% 2.784.669 80% 2.631.168 71%
Equity 522.107 16% 700.905 20% 1.099.087 29%
Some Rates 2007 2008 2009
Days Inventories 206 193 141
Days Receivables 77 80 79
Days Payables 151                 147                     107                     
Days net working capital 132 127 113
Net Working Capital 1.158.249 1.407.321 1.852.413
Debt / Equity 3,94 2,71 1,49
Debt / Turnover 0,93 0,69 0,39
Debt / fixed Assets 1,39 1,53 1,72
Debt / net working capital 1,78 1,35 0,88
Total Financial Debt 2.058.744 1.902.862 1.637.639
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Valuation tables used by the PEF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Scenario 1 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Profit & Lost Statement valu 2007 % 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 2011 % CAGR 2011-2007
Net Sales 2.436.845 100,00% 2.997.094 100,00% 4.429.192 100,00% 6.126.620 100% 6.739.282 100% 29,0%
Cost of Goods (1.505.795) (61,79%) (2.132.880) (71,16%) (2.927.998) (66,11%) (3.476.368) (57%) (3.833.005) (57%)
Gross Margin 931.050 38,21% 864.214 28,84% 1.501.194 33,89% 2.650.251 43% 2.906.277 43% 32,9%
Cost of Services / Energy (169.644) (6,96%) (151.900) (5,07%) (311.000) (7,02%) (369.000) (6%) (377.070) (6%)
Rented assets (80.000) (3,28%) (80.000) (2,67%) (80.000) (1,81%) (80.000) (1%) (82.400) (1%)
Salaries (205.600) (8,44%) (210.000) (7,01%) (234.000) (5,28%) (244.000) (4%) (251.320) (4%)
Other operating costs (25.407) (1,04%) (10.000) (0,33%) (11.000) (0,25%) (12.000) (0%) (12.360) (0%)
Operating Costs (480.651) (19,72%) (451.900) (15,08%) (636.000) (14,36%) (705.000) (12%) (723.150) (11%)
EBITDA 450.399 18,48% 412.314 13,76% 865.194 19,53% 1.945.251 32% 2.183.127 32% 48,4%
Intangible assets Depreciations 0 0,00% (16.800) (0,56%) (33.600) (0,76%) (33.600) (1%) (33.600) (0%)
Tangible assets Depreciations (235.000) (9,64%) (237.143) (7,91%) (263.571) (5,95%) (289.286) (5%) (292.143) (4%)
EBIT 215.399 8,84% 158.371 5,28% 568.023 12,82% 1.622.366 26% 1.857.384 28% 71,4%
Interests (164.425) (6,75%) (68.819) (2,30%) (89.506) (2,02%) (105.004) (2%) (49.493) (1%)
Extra-ordinary Items 0 0,00% 0 0,00% 0 0,00% 0% 0%
EBT 50.974 2,09% 89.552 2,99% 478.517 10,80% 1.517.362 25% 1.807.891 27%
Taxes (34.987) (68,64%) (28.250) (31,55%) (159.380) (33,31%) (485.968) (32%) (577.479) (32%)
EAT 15.987 0,66% 61.302 2,05% 319.137 7,21% 1.031.394 17% 1.230.412 18% 196,2%
Scenario 1
Balance Sheet valu 2007 % 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 2011 %
Inventories 1.243.092 49% 1.158.689 42% 1.609.177 48% 2.206.241 57% 2.426.865 63%
Receivables 467.150 18% 852.539 31% 1.210.415 36% 1.572.031 41% 1.729.234 45%
Other Credits 165.834 7% 182.166 7% 264.302 8% 362.368 9% 398.605 10%
Current Assets 1.876.076 74% 2.193.395 80% 3.083.894 92% 4.140.640 108% 4.554.704 119%
Payables (551.973) (22%) (450.696) (17%) (638.926) (19%) (758.538) (20%) (830.481) (22%)
Other Liabilites (224.607) (9%) (227.708) (8%) (334.878) (10%) (456.815) (12%) (501.427) (13%)
Current Liabilities (776.580) (30%) (678.404) (25%) (973.803) (29%) (1.215.354) (32%) (1.331.908) (35%)
Net working capital 1.099.496 43% 1.514.990 56% 2.110.091 63% 2.925.286 76% 3.222.796 84%
Intangible Assets 168.000 7% 151.200 6% 117.600 4% 84.000 2% 50.400 1%
Tangible Assets 1.313.375 52% 1.106.232 41% 1.182.661 35% 913.375 24% 641.232 17%
Total Fixed Assets 1.481.375 58% 1.257.432 46% 1.300.261 39% 997.375 26% 691.632 18%
Capital Invested 2.580.871 101% 2.772.422 102% 3.410.352 102% 3.922.661 102% 3.914.428 102%
Net Capital Invested 2.548.892 100% 2.727.843 100% 3.351.733 100% 3.849.402 100% 3.826.090 100%      FONTI
Short term debts 782.417 31% 902.831 33% 850.000 25% 750.000 19% 750.000 20%
Long term debts 1.276.327 50% 976.327 36% 668.468 20% 423.007 11% 345.274 9%
Financial Debt 2.058.744 81% 1.879.158 69% 1.518.468 45% 1.173.007 30% 1.095.274 29%
Further need of financing 0 0% 297.236 11% 962.679 29% 774.416 20% (401.576) (10%)
Net financial Position 2.058.744 81% 2.176.394 80% 2.481.147 74% 1.947.422 51% 693.698 18%
Shareholders 474.161 19% 474.161 17% 474.161 14% 474.161 12% 474.161 12%
Reserves 0 0% 15.987 1% 77.288 2% 396.425 10% 1.427.819 37%
EAT 15.987 1% 61.302 2% 319.137 10% 1.031.394 27% 1.230.412 32%
Total Equity 490.148 19% 551.449 20% 870.586 26% 1.901.980 49% 3.132.392 82%
Total Sources 2.548.892 100% 2.727.843 100% 3.351.733 100% 3.849.402 100% 3.826.090 100%
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APPENDIX 5.2: Questions and Issues to be Discussed – Guiding Points 
for the Interview. 
 
1. Identification of those responsible for the determination of the IRR. 
 
2. Introductory description of the valuation process and the calculation of 
the IRR in detail. 
 
3. Analysis of the rational equation commonly used for calculating the 
IRR (rational drivers): Adjustments: size, lack of marketability, stage of 
development and other rational drivers. 
 
4. Methodology used and drivers considers to calculate the threshold 
IRR192 (that is the minimum IRR necessary to accept a deal). 
 
5. Observation of the influences of the required return from LPs (net) to 
define the IRR for the target companies (gross). How the expected 
agreed return for the LP investors’ influences the IRR? Does bigger 
and more prestigious PEFs require higher returns from their target 
companies? (performance persistence effect or a potential behavioral 
driver like representativeness). 
 
6. Examination of the influences from the cash flow fluctuations (LPs 
inflows) in the IRR during the lifetime of the PEF. Analyze the number 
of deals available (investment alternatives) versus available cash and 
IRR during the lifetime of the PEF. (money chasing deal 
phenomenon). 
 
7. Exploration of the influence from competitors (other PEFs) when 
defining the IRR (PEF segmentation phenomenon and money chasing 
deal phenomenon) 
 
8. Portfolio strategy: Investigation of the strategy when searching for new 
target companies (diversification vs. specialization). What is the 
impact in the IRR when huge synergies with the portfolio are found? 
(specialization effect) 
 
9. Description of the monitoring intensity strategy in the target companies  
(low, medium, high). What’s the number of managers and members of 
the board in the target company? What’s the time employed? How 
does this affect the final IRR. (Fees effect – monitoring intensity effect) 
 
                                                 
192 In italian: “IRR di soglia” 
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10. Description of the alternative policies for other financial tools like 
carried interest which could be hiding required return (fees effect). 
 
11. Analysis of the investment speed and its influence in the IRR. Holding 
period during the cash inflows and the investment  in the target 
companies (investment fees effect). 
 
12. Describe the evolution (if any) in the calculation of the  IRR during the 
years of existence of the PEF (learning cost effect) 
 
13. Analyze the number of investment deals versus IRR (economies of 
scale and scope) 
 
14. Analyze the expected past IRR versus realized return (over-
confidence) 
 
Two Specific Cases – Deal Analysis:  
 
1. Analyze the drivers of a particular deal, How was the RR calculated. 
Analyze the proportions of each driver in detail? 
 
2. Analyze how specific factors (target company entrepreneur behaviors) 
like dependence, financial distress, affiliation feeling, and holding time 
period might affect the deal and its final IRR.  
 
Complementary and Convenient Documentation: 
 
- IRR calculations general procedures. 
- Strategy and scope procedures. 
- Performance reports 
- Excel files – Specific deals valuation & IRR calculation 
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APPENDIX 5.3: One Example (Answers sent by e-mail) 
 
 
1. Observation of the influences of the required return from LPs (net) to 
define the IRR for the target companies (gross). How the expected 
agreed return for the LP investors’ influences the IRR? Does bigger 
and more prestigious PEFs require higher returns from their target 
companies? (performance persistence effect or a potential behavioral 
driver like representativeness). 
In presenting a new deal to our LPs the expected return should at 
least match the target return of the whole fund. This means that  if a 
PEF offered a 20% target return to his LPs, cannot present deals with 
lower return. If the fund is performing below target, the target IRR for 
new investment will higher in order to compensate for bad deals 
2. Examination of the influences from the cash flow fluctuations (LPs 
inflows) in the IRR during the lifetime of the PEF. Analyze the number 
of deals available (investment alternatives) versus available cash and 
IRR during the lifetime of the PEF. (money chasing deal 
phenomenon). 
Pressure to invest is for sure influencing the way a fund put its money 
at work. My understating though, is that this pressure acts more in the 
way people (under)evaluate intangible risk (i.e. determine expected 
cash flow from a deal) better that be part of an explicit reduction of the 
target IRR. It’s therefore key that a fund manager be conscious of this 
risk and make his best to challenge his judgment in order to limit the 
extent of these psychological factors. Furthermore, pressure to invest 
make acceptable IRR levels closer to the threshold IRR, while 
tendency is to be more selective when the amount of money to invest 
is smaller  
3. Exploration of the influence from competitors (other PEFs) when 
defining the IRR (PEF segmentation phenomenon and money chasing 
deal phenomenon) 
a. If a fund is performing below the average of comparable funds 
of the same vintage (i.e. its direct competitors), new deals will 
tend to be made with a higher expected return , in order for the 
fund to improve its competitive positioning  and therefore gain 
better chances to get new money at the next fundraising. 
b. Direct competitive pressure also obviously pushes fund 
managers to close deals to IRR levels closer to the minimum 
threshold. 
4. Portfolio strategy: Investigation of the strategy when searching for new 
target companies (diversification vs. specialization). What is the 
impact in the IRR when huge synergies with the portfolio are found? 
(specialization effect) 
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In our opinion, advantages from diversification prevails over 
specialization. Except for add-on deals, usually smaller in size, 
synergies between portfolio companies are limited,  while there is a 
serious risk from having portfolio investments concentrated in one 
sector. 
5. Description of the monitoring intensity strategy in the target companies  
(low, medium, high). What’s the number of managers and members of 
the board in the target company? What’s the time employed? How 
does this affect the final IRR. (Fees effect – monitoring intensity effect) 
I would say that we put a medium to high intensity in monitoring 
portfolio companies, depending on the specific need and investment 
strategy. Time employed also varies depending on the phase of the 
investment cycle: in this period, with small remaining available funds 
and problems in portfolio performance, we dedicate strong effort in 
monitoring. 
Time employed in “active” monitoring does affect final IRR. 
6. Description of the alternative policies for other financial tools like 
carried interest which could be hiding required return (fees effect). 
Fees may condition exit strategies better than acquisitions. If carried 
interest in frozen, waiting  for a minimum IRR to be achieved, it’s 
possible that an exit may be accelerated at a value that could not 
reflect full potential 
7. Analysis of the investment speed and its influence in the IRR. Holding 
period during the cash inflows and the investment  in the target 
companies (investment fees effect). 
IRR is often calculated since the drawdown date and not since the 
commitment date, therefore there is no pressure to invest quickly to 
get a higher IRR. Of course high turnover of portfolio companies 
means bigger return for the fund 
8. Describe the evolution (if any) in the calculation of the  IRR during the 
years of existence of the PEF (learning cost effect) 
No substantial changes 
9. Analyze the number of investment deals versus IRR (economies of 
scale and scope) 
Studies shows that there is no correlation between fund size and fund 
performance. Since bigger funds also means more investments (even 
if larger funds tend to do bigger investments) we can say that there is 
no or weak correlation between number of deals and IRR 
10. Analyze the expected past IRR versus realized return (over-
confidence) 
Over confidence related to past IRR may lead to a less rational and 
more instinctive approach to deal making and can therefore be a 
source of bad deals  
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APPENDIX 5.4: Summary of the Second Round 
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PHENOMENA STUDIED CAP2 BIF3 REF4 PAF3
Money chasing deal Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed
when competitors are specialization decreases the seek for deals with no they seek deals with no pan European PEFs
present, the E.IRR can be competition competition because the pay competition have access to bigger
reduced as long as the very low ebitda multiples markets to choose for 
T.IRR is lower. better deals
Internal Fees / LPs preasure /Speed Effect Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed
Return Targets with LPs might specialization increases speed Low speed implies high high speed could also force the cost of opportunity
influence the T.IRR and the because of the network opportunity costs (OC) the PEF to make bad deals is bigger for those LPs
choosing of the deals They don't have opportunity OC = net T.IRR - H.IRR LPs press GPs to invest all cap who invest a lot in PEFs
The longer the time to invest all costs for the cap not invested H.IRR is what LPs are able to In other words, it depends
the capital collected by the LPs due to the fact that the cap obtain outside the PEF on the portfolio of each
the more important the need of is kept by the bank. Bigger PEFs can ask for a lower % LP and the way they offset
deals with higher IRR. of Fees risk
Performance Persistence Confirmed confirmed confirmed Confirmed
Big PEFs get better deals Specialized PEFs add value they don't know how they don't know how the sector of PEFs might
and are able to ask for to the entrepreneur to quantify it to quantify it tend to concentrate in
lower IRRs in bigger PEFs with the
Smaller PEFs need higher best GPs
IRRs to offset the risk
of smaller portfolios
Behavioural Factors confirmed Confirmed Confirmed Confirmed
overconfidence they don't know how they don't know how they don't know how market is changing and
hearding behaviour They don't have a rational They don't have a rational They don't have a rational this changes the T.IRR
The way PEFs assess T.IRR model to calculate T.IRR model to calculate T.IRR model to calculate T.IRR and the expectations:
They confirme the use T.IRR might change during time this PEF has a written target less deals, less leverage
of intuition, experience, & T.IRR depends on the liquidity for the net T.IRR more competition, 
qualitative drivers left to be invested T.IRR also depends on abort gearing through China
They confirme the use costs longer term deals.
of intuition, experience, & They confirme the use They confirme that T.IRR
qualitative drivers of intuition, experience, & depends on intuition,
qualitative drivers experience, & qualitative
drivers
Strategy: Specialization vs. Diversification specialization prevails over both strategies are both strategies are specialization prevails over
one previous study inferred that PEFs diversification. This fund is used and none of them used and none of them diversification. They seek
prefers specialization and synergies specialized in food industry prevails over the other prevails over the other synergies if possible
rather than diversification as traditional sinergies add value This factor does not affect This factor does not affect They prefer few deals but
finance teach us. high information and know how the IRR the IRR bigger to get economies
reduces risk of scale but they agree 
they can have lower T.IRR they lose diversification
and this implies more risk
Monitoring intensity low level Medium to low level Medium to low level Low level
the high presence of fund professionals they prefer few deals but
in the target companies might increase big in order to have small
the IRR teams of professionals
create economies of 
scale and be more
competitive. However 
the T.IRR might not be 
affected (only what GPs
earn)
PRIVATE EQUITY FUNDS INTERVIEWED (3)
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APPENDIX 5.5: Second Questionnaire 
 
Information on private equity fund (PEF). 
1) What percentage of the total capital raised by the PEF is collected at the 
beginning (estimate). 
2) How many years did it take (or do we need) to invest all the capital at the 
beginning (estimate). 
3) What would be the target of eventual return (an estimate in%) for 
investors at the end of the life of PEF and when all the capital will be 
distributed to LPs? Here are two completely different things: 
a) Net IRR Target: the target pursued by the PEFs or expectations from 
LPs 
b) Arrangements for carried interest: Distribution of capital gains in case 
of exceeding a certain threshold (which would be the threshold and 
what percentage of the capital gain is distributed to GPs) 
4) Percentage of capital held by the commitment (Fees) for internal costs of 
the PEF. How long the procedure would be the life of the PEF? Is 
increasingly seen as a percentage of total commitment and this varies 
depending on the stage is located in the bottom? 
5) How are funded abortions Costs 
6) Percentage of commitment that is left in reserve (not invested in deals) for 
contingencies and other purposes (such as managed). 
7) percentage (expected to write off the beginning of the life of the PEF). 
8) In your opinion, the LPs suffer an opportunity cost during the period in 
which the capital commitment has not yet invested? It 'obvious that they 
cannot do long-term investment and should hold relatively liquid capital to 
invest in deals that may occur suddenly. What do you think? It is 
estimated that the opportunity cost of LPs? 
 
Information relating to the expectations of two analyzed by PEF Deals 
9) These questions relate to two deals to choose from. Some of the 
questions have a quantitative output, and you can fill in the tables below. 
The qualitative part and additional comments can be answered below the 
questions themselves. 
10) What is the IRR (expected IRR) during the initial evaluation of the two 
deals? 
11) During the evaluation have hypothesized / simulated different IRR (worst 
case, best case, etc? Could give the value chosen for the two deals? 
12) Consider a threshold IRR? That is, a minimum IRR for the acceptance of 
a deal? As it calculated? Why not 30% and 25% or 35%?. This IRR 
threshold depends on each deal (it should be so because in every deal 
involves different risk and therefore a different threshold IRR)? 
13) What was the IRR threshold for the two deals shown for this query? 
14) How was it structured the deal: Estimation of the ratio D / E (debt / equity) 
of the deal (the level of leverage at the beginning (estimate). 
15) Percentage of discount applied to the multiple of EBITDA during the 
valuation effect of the size and Lack of marketability (estimate). 
16) In the two deals chosen, there have been some cases where you have 
been forced to increase the value of the multiple planned initially for the 
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presence of competition or for reasons of negotiations? If this were the 
case, as (approximately) was increased and why? 
17) What was the ROE (return on equity of the company) prior to the PEF 
(estimate)? 
18) Year in which the deal was made. 
19) The value of the deal (total investment made: Leverage Equity +). 
20) Type of operation: Expansion, MBO, LBO? 
21) Percentage of shares acquired? 
22) Sector in which the company acquired: Food, Energy, Pharma, etc.? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
380 
 
APPENDIX 5.6: Summary of the Quantitative Data 
 
 
 
                   
 
 
 
 
Type of PEF CC (capital committed) N of companies N of executives Fund raised Year PEF ex-life (L) Speed - Years (1) Carried Interest Reserves % over
in millions H.IRR capital committed
BIF2 500 8 7 2003 10 5 8% 20%
BIF1 1180 13 12 1993 10 4 8% 15%
CAP1 352 23 4 2002 10 4 5% 15%
PAF1 450 18 13 2004 10 5,5 7% 20%
REF1 20 1 2 2007 15 6 8% 0%
REF3 30 7 7 2006 10 2,5 6% 15%
BIF4 310 6 6 2004 10 3 7% 7,5%
REF2 35 6 6 2009 10 2,5 6% 10%
PAF2 675 12 6 2006 10 4 8% 15%
BIF3 300 10 8 2007 10 3,5 8% 20%
REF4 35 2 3 2010 10 4 8% 20%
PAF3 200 3 5 1991 10 4 8% 10%
CAP2 100 2 3 2009 15 3 0% 0%
no carried interest (#)
Type of PEF Abort costs per year Write Off Net Consolidated IRR  (LPs expectations & GPs target
outside Fees IRR Multiple
BIF2 -                                       5% 22,5%
BIF1 -                                       11% 15,0%
CAP1 -                                       0% 20,0%
PAF1 -                                       10% 16,0%
REF1 -                                       8% 10,0%
REF3 -                                       15% 20,0%
BIF4 -                                       0% 2,00
REF2 250.000                              0% 10,0%
PAF2 -                                       10% 25,0%
BIF3 -                                       10% 15,0%
REF4 -                                       10% 15,0%
PAF3 -                                       10% 15,0%
CAP2 financed by bank and 0% 6%
entrepreneur
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Definitions: 
CC (capital commitment):  Amount of capital under commitment. 
Number of Companies:  Number of companies managed at the time of the interview 
Number of executives: Number of executives (directors, seniors and juniors) working for the 
PEFs. 
PEF ex-life: Expected life for the PEF since the foundation of the PEF to the end of it.. 
Speed Years: Expected number of years required to invest all the capital in deals. 
Carried Interest: The value of the H.IRR 
 Net Consolidated IRR: LPs expectations and GPs target net of internal costs 
Size + Dlom: The percentage discounted due to size and liquidity risk. It directly affects the 
E.IRR. 
T.IRR type: Indicates if the T.IRR is used by the PEF as a general value applied to all deal 
equally (general) or as a single value depending on each deal. 
Competition Effect: Percentage discounted due to the presence of other PEFs competing for 
the deal. It directly affects the E.IRR  
D/E: The Debt / Equity ratio planned for the deal. 
The % of Reserves and write-offs are calculated over the capital under commitment. 
 
Type of PEF Deal Shares acquired Size + Dlom Gross single deal IRR  (GPs target) Threshold T.IRR type D/E (4) E.IRR  or Multiple Competition Effect (10)
IRR Multiple IRR Multiple
BIF2 Deal 1 33,0% 2,7% 30,0% general 0,7 29,3% 0%
Deal 2 33,0% 2,7% 30,0% general 0,7 22,9% 0%
BIF1 Deal 1 68,0% 0,0% 20,0% general 1,5 55,0% 1,5%
Deal 2 58,0% 0,0% 20,0% general 4,3 31,0% 1,5%
CAP1 Deal 1 49,7% 1,7% 25,0% general 2,2 42,0% 0%
Deal 2 43,8% 1,7% 25,0% general 1,9 42,0% 0%
PAF1 Deal 1 85,0% 3,5% 2,00 general 4 17,8% 0%
Deal 2 80,0% 3,5% 2,00 general 0,4 35,0% 1%
REF1 Deal 1 41,7% 3,0% 40,0% depends on deal (min 25%) 1,5 45,0% 0%
Deal 2 57,0% 2,5% 25,0% depends on deal (min 25%) 1,5 32,0% 0%
REF3 Deal 1 60,0% 4,0% 15,0% depends on deal 0,7 25,0% 0%
Deal 2 60,0% 4,0% 15,0% depends on deal 0,7 25,0% 0%
BIF4 Deal 1 85,0% 4,0% 3,00 depends on deal 0,5 25,0% 3,50                       0%
Deal 2 80,0% 4,0% 2,50 depends on deal 0 22,0% 3,00                       0%
REF2 Deal 1 56,0% 3,0% 17,5% general 2,3 30,0% 0%
Deal 2 11,0% 3,0% 17,5% general 0 30,0% 0%
PAF2 Deal 1 95,0% 3,0% 30,0% general 1,5 30,0% 0%
Deal 2 90,0% 2,0% 30,0% general 1 45,0% 0%
BIF3 Deal 1 95,0% 1,5% 20,0% general 2 24,0% 1%
Deal 2 60,0% 1,5% 20,0% general 0,5 22,0% 0%
REF4 Deal 1 40,0% 3,0% 18,0% general 1,5 20,0% 0%
Deal 2 70,0% 3,0% 18,0% general 1 18,0% 0%
PAF3 Deal 1 36,0% 2,0% 25,0% depends on deal 1,4 35% 2%
Deal 2 44,0% 2,0% 23,0% depends on deal 0,5 23% 1,1%
CAP2 Deal 1 25,0% 2,0% 10,0% depends on deal 0,0 20,0% 0%
Deal 2 30,0% 2,0% 15,0% depends on deal 0,0 15,0% 0%
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APPENDIX 5.7: Internal Fees with its Methodologies 
 
 
 
Definitions 
PEF internal fees: The percentage apply for the internal fees. This percentage is not always 
applied over the capital under commitment. Each PEF has its own methodology and this is 
explained in the column called Fees Method. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Type of PEF PEF internal Fees Fees methodology
BIF2 2,00% 2% over capital committed (CC) first 5 years
0,00% No fees in the last 5 years. They live out of a new fund
BIF1 2,00% 2% over capital committed (CC) first 3 years
1,75% 1,75% over capital invested (CAPI) last 7 years
CAP1 2,50% 2,5% over capital committed (CC) first 4 years
2,50% 2,5% over capital invested (CAPI) last 6 years
PAF1 2,00% 2% over capital committed (CC) first 5 years
1,75% 1,75% over capital invested (CAPI) last 5 years
REF1 1,75% 1,75% over capital invested (CAPI)
1,75%
REF3 2,50% 2,5% over capital committed (CC) first year
2,50% 2,5% over capital invested (CAPI) last 9 years
BIF4 2,00% 2% over the capital committed(CC) first 5 years
2,00% 2 % over capital invested (CAPI) last 5 years
REF2 2,10% 2,1% over capital commited (CC) first 5 years
2,10% 2,1% over capital investd (CAPI) last 5 years
PAF2 2,00% 2% over capital subscribed (CS) which is sent by the mother PEF in tranches
BIF3 2,00% 2% over (CC not invested + CAPI) for each year
2,00%
REF4 1,00% 1% over capital committed (CC) first 1 years
2,50% 2,5% over capital committed (CC) in the last 9 years
PAF3 2% 2% over capital subscribed (CS) which is sent by the mother PEF in tranches
CAP2 1,00% 1% over capital committed (CC) first 3 years
1,50% 1,5% over capital invested  (CAPI) in the last 7 years
384 
 
APPENDIX 6.1: Calculation of the Expected Fees (EF) 
 
Calculation of the Expected Fees (EF) According to Each System 
 
1 – First Years over Capital Committed (CC) & last Years Over Capital 
Invested (CAPI) 
 
		 ൌ 			Ǥ  ሺͳሻ 
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EF = EF first years + EF last years (3) 
 
Where: 
NFY = Number of year in which the Fees are applied to the capital committed 
(CC) 
FFY = % of Fees applied in the first period (over capital commited) 
E.LY = Expected Life of the PEF in years 
CC = Capital Committed 
CC x R = Amount of reserves 
(CC – CC x R) = Capital Committed without considering the Reserves 
CAPI = Capital Invested 
CAPI = (CC – CC x R) x (1 + Net T.IRR) = Capital committed (without 
reserves) increased by the value created in the target investments (increased 
by the net T.IRR) 
FLY = Number of years in which the Fees are applied to the capital invested 
E.SY= expected years to invest  = speed years 
NFY = Number of Years in which the fees where applied the CC (first period). 
 
The first formula (1) is very intuitive and easy to understand. 
The second formula (2) is a little more complicated and might need some 
explanation: The years in which the capital is invested is equal to (E.LY – 
E.SY). to this figure however the first part of the period in which the fees 
where applied to the CC must also be subtracted (E.LY – E.SY – NFY). 
Therefore for that period the fees (FLY) must be applied to the capital 
invested which is equal to the capital committed (minus reserves) increased 
by the value created. Thereafter, to arrive to the annual percentage, the 
whole formula must be divided for CC and E.LY. 
At the end the total annual percentage (EF) will be the sum of both periods 
(formula (1) + formula (2) ) 
 
 
2 –  Fees applied to the Capital Committed only in the first period and no fees 
for the second period 
 
		 ൌ 			Ǥ  ሺͳሻ 
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EF Last Years = 0 
 
3 –  Fees applied to the Capital Subscribed (CS) Sent by the Mother PEF in 
Tranches 
 
	 ൌ Ǥ 	ʹǤ  ൌ 
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In this case, the capital committed is received in tranches during the life of 
the PEF. It is assumed that in half of the life of the PEF (E.LY / 2) the whole 
amount of CC has been received by the PEF and the Fees are applied to the 
capital subscribe (CS) or capital received which will be equal to (CC x E.LY) 
/2  
 
4 –  Fees Applied to the CC not Invested plus the Capital Invested for each 
Year  
 
An example as how to calculate this system is shown in the following table: 
 
 
  
 
 
The table shows a system by which the fees percentage is applied to the 
sum of capital committed and capital invested. In the example of the table the 
initial capital committed is always 100 but the capital invested changes 
according to value created. 
 
The following table shows the results for the EF in each case applying the 
previous formulas:  
  Commitment Invested value Total Fee (2%) 
Year 1 100 0 100 2 
Year 2 80 25 105 2,1 
Year 3 50 70 120 2,4 
Year N     
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Type CC PEF Speed Reserves Abort costs PEF int Net Consolidated IRR Total EF per Fees methodology
of PEF Ex.Life Years (1) x year Fees net T.IRR Multiple EF year
BIF2 500 10 4 20% -              2,00% 22,5% 50    1,00% 2% over capital committed (CC) first 5 years
0,00% No fees in the last 5 years. They live out of a new fund
BIF1 1180 10 5 15% -              2,00% 15,0% 111 0,94% 2% over capital committed (CC) first 3 years
1,75% 1,75% over capital invested (CAPI) last 7 years
CAP1 352 10 5 15% -              2,50% 20,0% 44    1,26% 2,5% over capital committed (CC) first 4 years
2,50% 2,5% over capital invested (CAPI) last 6 years
PAF1 450 10 4 20% -              2,00% 16,0% 52    1,16% 2% over capital committed (CC) first 5 years
1,75% 1,75% over capital invested (CAPI) last 5 years
REF1 20 15 4 0% -              1,75% 10,0% 4      1,41% 1,75% over capital invested (CAPI)
1,75%
REF3 30 10 4 15% -              2,50% 20,0% 5      1,53% 2,5% over capital committed (CC) first year
2,50% 2,5% over capital invested (CAPI) last 9 years
BIF4 310 10 4 7,5% -              2,00% 25,0% 2,00 38    1,23% 2% over the capital committed(CC) first 5 years
2,00% 2 % over capital invested (CAPI) last 5 years
REF2 35 10 4 10% 250              2,10% 10,0% 4      1,97% 2,1% over capital commited (CC) first 5 years
2,10% 2,1% over capital investd (CAPI) last 5 years
PAF2 675 10 3 15% -              2,00% 25,0% 68    1,00% 2% over capital subscribed (CS) which
 is sent by the mother PEF in tranches
BIF3 300 10 3 20% -              2,00% 15,0% 57    1,91% 2% over (CC not invested + CAPI) for each year
2,00%
REF4 35 10 3 20% -              1,00% 15,0% 5      1,48% 1% over capital committed (CC) first 1 years
2,50% 2,5% over capital committed (CC) in the last 9 years
PAF3 200 10 4 10% -              2% 15,0% 20    1,00% 2% over capital subscribed (CS) which
 is sent by the mother PEF in tranches
CAP2 100 15 6 0% financed 1,00% 6% 11    0,71% 1% over capital committed (CC) first 3 years
by bank 1,50% 1,5% over capital invested  (CAPI) in the last 7 years
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APPENDIX 8.1: Considerations about the HML Factors 
 
This work (see chapters 5, 6, and 7) found that expansion deals are riskier than LBO 
deals. But according to Fama and French (1993), quoted high growth potential 
companies have lower risk. Why this contradiction?  Before answering this last 
question, one must bear in mind the following:  
- LBOs deals are cash cows with a low level of leverage before the PEF 
entrance. Such LBOs have the potential to repaid most of the debt in the 
short-term (3 or 4 years). 
- Expansion deals instead, are more difficult since in 4 – 6 years the company 
needs to create value with new products, new technology, more market 
share, etc. These drivers might present more uncertainty and higher risk 
than short-term LBOs.  
Then why Franzoni et al. (2010) found that PEFs have high betas for the HML 
factor? They assumed that the reason for this is the fact that PEFs companies have 
high leverage because they hold more LBOs than expansion deals. In other words, 
they are assuming that LBOs have higher risk than expansion deals. This statement 
might be truth (PEFs might hold more LBOs than expansion deals (at least in the 
past but probably not in the future). However, according to this researcher, the 
answer to this matter is the following:  
- LBOs might have higher illiquidity risk than expansion deals but not higher 
risk as a whole. 
- LBOs have higher illiquidity risk193 due to the debt itself which in case of 
crisis (this is what is happening nowadays), banks might not be willing to 
refinance leveraged companies (due to the lack of liquidity in the system) 
sending them to bankruptcy.. Instead, in expansion deals this might not 
happen since they do not need a great deal of leverage. 
 
Therefore, the HML factor has to do with liquidity risk. It is therefore coherent to use 
this factor exactly as used by Fama and French but with another interpretation: The 
HML in the case of PEFs reflects liquidity risk and not value risk.  
                                                 
193 Illiquidity risk, in this case, refers to two kinds of risk: First, the risk inherent in the 
business operations. High leveraged companies such as the LBOs could run out of cash 
during a financial crisis. Second, it might be difficult to sell a high leveraged company 
during a financial crisis. 
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APPENDIX 8.2: The Four-Factor Model CAPM – Some Considerations 
 
(13) CAPM factors = Rf + βp Rm + βs SMB + βv HML βliq  PIML 
CAPM factors = 5% + 1.3 (4%) + 0,034 (3%) + 0.93 (5%) + 0.67 (2.75%) = 
17% 
 
The value of Rf: is an estimation of the Italian 10 year bonds for the next 10 
years (circa 7%) which is uncommonly high due to the financial crisis. 
Historic value has been about 3%. This situation is influencing the final 
values for the gross T.IRR obtained by this model. In order to compare these 
premiums with the T.IRR used by the PEFs of the sample, it is necessary to 
consider a rate of 3% since the ex-ante perspective of the PEFs included in 
the sample of this work, have started their lives before the crisis with an ex-
ante perspective where Italian bonds had values inferior to 3%. However, the 
example shown in the formula (13)  have considered a rate of 5% (which is 
something in between).   
 
The value of Rm: There are some important considerations in relation what 
the market premium values discussed and reviewed in chapter 2: 
The value of Welch (2000) is 5.5%. This is the only methodology that uses an 
ex-ante perspective based on a survey directed to professionals and 
academics and therefore, in terms of methodology, this study is coherent this 
thesis. However, the study is too old and is limited to the US markets. 
The value of Dimson et al. (2008) is 3.9%. This is the only global study and 
intends to have an ex-ante perspective although its methodology differs from 
the one used by this thesis. These authors look at past data and try to 
eliminate survivorship bias or the effect of past events that should not happen 
in the future. 
Italian Premium is 6.5% (Dimson et al. (2008). This value has two problems: 
First, it is too high because the Italian bond rates were too low (low 
performance). Second, it is based on past data and the no survivorship bias 
(as in the case of the global study) has been taken out.  
 
Therefore, it seems that the best value is the global value of Dimson et al 
(2008) which is 3.9% (the model will take the rounded 4%). In addition, 
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markets are becoming increasingly globalized and market premiums will 
certainly follow that trend as well. For the future, we must think globally and 
not locally. 
 
The values SMB, and HML: are taken from the Kenneth French website for 
that same period although these do relate to quoted US firms. 
 
The values of the betas: are the mean regressions estimated by Franzoni et 
al., (2010) for the private equity funds in general. 
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APPENDIX 8.3: Data to be used in the Model 
 
1 – PEF Factors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 – PEF coefficients 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 – BF factor & Coefficient 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Factor Premium 
PP 5% 
MCD 6% 
YOC 3.5% 
TD 5% 
MI 
 
2% 
Coefficient Values 
μpp  0 -1 
μmcd (-0.5) – (+0.5) 
μmcd2 0 -1 
μtd 0 -1 
μmi 0 -1 
Coefficient Values 
μub 0 -1 
Factor Premium 
UB 5% 
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APPENDIX 8.4: Testing the Model 
 
1 - E.IRR with alpha for a Big generalist PEF with a high number of deals. 
1 – CAPM factors and IC factors: 
SRF + URF = CAPM factors = 15% 
The last formula, considers a standard value for a big generalist PEF with 
high number of deals which is the same example given in section 8.4.3 & 
8.4.4. In this case there are no major changes with the standard. The only 
differences are:  
- A lower value of βv  (0.63 instead of 0.93) due to the fact that the value of 
0.93 is based in pasta data were more LBO deals were present.  
- A lower value of  βliq  (0.5 instead of 0.67) due to the fact that this is a PEF 
with high number of deals and the liquidity risk is well diversified. 
However each case will have its own values according to the expected 
portfolio. 
 
IC (BIF) = 8,25%  
 
2 – PEF Factors and Behavioral Factors 
 
PEFF = μpp x (5%) + μmcd x (6%) + μmcd2 x (3.5%) + μtd x (5%) + μmi x (2%) + [ 
σ (E.IRR) - σc (E.IRR)] 
According to the reasoning explained in this chapter for each factor, the 
values to be considered in this example might be: 
μpp = 0.7 : being a big PEF (older and with past success) LPs will require 
higher net T.IRR 
μmcd =  + 0.2: It might be logical to thing that being a successful experienced 
PEF, it might have easier access to deals but very high competition. 
μmcd2 = 0.3: Low opportunity costs due to high speed. Remember that this 
factor is negatively correlated to the previous one but cannot take negative 
values. 
μtd = 0.2: a mix of expansion and MBO deals 
μmi = 0. l: low monitoring intensity and no expected additional costs. 
BF= μub + (5%) 
μub = 0.1 : this are experienced GPs with realistic business plan.  
Then: 
PEFF = 0.7 x (5%) + 0.2 x (6%) + 0.3 x (3.5%) + 0.2 x (5%) + 0.1 x (2%) = 7 
% 
BF = 0.1 x 5% = 0.5% 
E.IRR with alpha = 15% + 8.25 % + 7 % + 0.5% = 30.75% 
Thereafter, it will depend on the covenants to reduce this figure (mitigate the 
risks). 
For this example the gross and the net T.IRR will be 
Gross T.IRR = 15% + 8.25% = 23.25% 
Net T.IRR = Gross T.IRR – IC = 15% 
Since LPs might consider performance persistence (past experience), their 
expected net IRR can be (including alphas) calculated as follows: 
 
Net T.IRR = CAPM factors + PPF = 15 % + 0.7 x (5%) = 18.5% 
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2 – E.IRR with alpha for a small generalist PEF. 
 
1 – CAPM factors and IC factors: 
CAPM factors = 5% + 1.3 (4%) + 0.8 (3%) + 0.63 (5%) + 0.67 (2.75%) = 17,5 
% 
In the last formula, the risk is higher than the first example due to a higher 
size risk (smaller deals)  
 
IC (REF) = 8 %  
In this case the ECI is lower than the first example because of net T.IRR in a 
small PEF is lower. 
 
2 – PEF Factors and Behavioral Factors 
 
PEFF = μpp x (5%) + μmcd x (6%) + μmcd2 x (3.5%) + μtd x (5%) + μmi x (2%) + [ 
σ (E.IRR) - σc (E.IRR)] 
Where: 
μpp = 0.1 : being a small PEF,  LPs will require a lower net T.IRR 
μmcd =  - 0.1: Being a new PEF with no experience, it might have more difficult 
access to deals. In contrast they have low competition (they have to pay 
less). 
μmcd2 = 0.6: higher OC than the previous example.  
μtd = 0.3: a mix of expansion and MBO deals 
μmi = 0.3: higher monitoring intensity and more expected additional costs in 
comparison with the first example (less economies of scale). 
BF= μub + (5%) 
μub = 0.8: higher level of uncertainty.   
Then: 
PEFF = 0.1 x (5%) - 0.1 x (6%) + 0.6 x (3.5%) + 0.3 x (5%) + 0.3 x (2%) = 4% 
BF = 0.8  x 5% = 4% 
 
E.IRR with alpha = 17.5% + 8% + 4% + 4% = 33.5% 
 
Thereafter, it will depend on the covenants.  
For this example the gross and the net T.IRR will be: 
Gross T.IRR = 17.5% + 8% = 25.5% 
Net T.IRR = 17.5% 
Net E.IRR with alpha = 17.5% + 0.1 x (5%) = 18% 
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3 – E.IRR with alpha for big specialist fund in the food industry. 
 
1 – CAPM factors and IC factors: 
CAPM factors = 5% + 0.8 (4%) + 0.2 (3%) + 0.4 (5%) + 0.5 (2.75%) = 11.5% 
This PEF has more expansion deals and therefore βv  is even lower (0.4 
instead of 0.93) 
 
IC = EF + ECI + OCR 
IC = 1% + 3.5% + 0.5%   = 5 %  
In this case the ECI is lower than the previous two cases because of gross 
T.IRR for specialist funds is lower. 
 
2 – PEF Factors and Behavioral Factors 
 
PEFF = μpp x (5%) + μmcd x (6%) + μmcd2 x (3.5%) + μtd x (5%) + μmi x (2%) + [ 
σ (E.IRR) - σc (E.IRR)] 
Where:  
μpp = 0.7 : big specialized PEF 
μmcd =  + 0.2: experienced PEF with contacts and working in a niche with low 
competition. 
μmcd2 =  0.3: low opportunity cost.  
μtd = 0.3: a mix of expansion and MBO deals 
μmi = 0.1: low monitoring intensity and no expected additional costs. 
BF= μub + (5%) 
μub = 0.2: low level of uncertainty.   
Then: 
PEFF = 0.7 x (5%) + 0.2 x (6%) + 0.1 x (3.5%) + 0.3 x (5%) + 0.1 x (2%) = 
7% 
BF = 0.2 x 5% = 1 % 
E.IRR with alpha = 11.5 % + 5% + 7% + 1 % = 24.5% 
 
Thereafter, it will depend on the covenants.  
For this example the gross and the net T.IRR will be: 
Gross T.IRR = 11.5% + 5% = 16.5% 
Net T.IRR = 11.5%  
Net E.IRR with alpha = CAPM factors + PPF = 11.5% + 0.7 x (5%) = 15% 
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4 – E.IRR with alpha for big specialist captive fund in the food industry. 
 
The only difference with the case 3 is: 
IC = 1% + 0% + 0%   = 1 % 
E.IRR with alpha = 11.5% + 1% + 7% + 1 % = 20.5% 
Gross T.IRR = 11.5% +1% = 12.5% 
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APPENDIX 9.1: Some Comments given by the GPs and Postscript 
A drafted version of the Model was first presented at DBA seminar held at the 
University of St. Andrews in May 2010. In that occasion, the researcher 
represented the University of Bradford as a DBA student. The researcher 
received the first important feedback from the finance professors participating 
at that event. 
 
Between September and October 2011, the final model was presented to 
some of the executives who participated in the project. One GP of BIF2 
stated: “I think this could be a very good tool to assess our T.IRR in the 
future. It will be useful to define a point of reference but it will not replace our 
judgment based on experience. ” Another GP of CAP2 stated: “This is a very 
interesting procedure to assess the T.IRR and we would like to have a 
presentation of the whole model for our GPs and senior analyst” 
 
In addition, the model was presented to one of the top 3 academics and 
practitioners in Italy. He194 was very impressed and stated: “this is a very 
important contribution for the PEFs and you have to publish it”. Therefore, the 
researcher asked him to publish the model together and he accepted. The 
model will be published between May and July in the most important 
magazine in Italy in the topic of private equity funds. 
 
                                                 
194 Professor at the University of Castellanza and Director of the most important PEF in Italy. 
